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PREFACE 
For the past decade and more, the United Statesp through its 
military departments, other agencies of government, and private 
organizations, has placed a considerable investment in national and 
international standardization. A significant portion of this effort has 
gone into national standardization, but, with the increasing recognition 
of the principle of mutual defense and economic interdependence, an 
ever-increasing portion of the effort has been expended to achieve 
international standardization. However, in spite of good intentions 
and the application of considerable resources to achieve standardiza-
tion, the results have been limited and the program, itself , has been 
marked with frustration, conflict, uncertainty, ignorance, open dis -
agreement, and confusion. This is not directly a criticism of the 
personnel, agencies, and organizations participating in the program- -
it is more a reflection of the conditions and circumstances encountered 
in society and in the processes of standardization. 
For four years (1954 - 1958) the author of this thesis was in 
charge of the United States Air Force international standardization 
effort. During that period, he became uniquely concerned with many 
aspects of the United States national and international standardization 
programs. In consideration of this experience, while the author 
attended the Air War College of the United States Air Force (1958 - 1959) 
ii 
• : ; ·,,j', l /} 
' t; .. " 
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he was given authority to conduct an extensive research of the problem 
of standardization. Based on this research and his personal experiences, 
the author then prepared for the United States government a lengthy 
history of the problem of standardization in the United States together 
with a discussion of the current national and international policy, organi -
zational, and other problems. Due to the sources of much of the infor-
mati on used by the author in this governmental report and the nature of 
some of the conclusions, the document cannot be made public. However , 
since there is an almost complete lack of writings in the United States 
on this most vital national and international subject, the author con-
sidered it worthwhile to devote this thesis to discus sing those general 
portions of the probl em that were not of a sensitive nature. 
In the bibliography appended to this thesis, the author has in-
dicated the full range of the more important documents and information 
sources to which he has had access. It is not thereby implied that all 
the cited sources have been used directly in this thesis, but the listing 
will serve to give the reader a feel fo r the base upon which the author 
has built this thesis. 
John Otto Dax Moench 
June 1 , 1 9 5 9. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 




THE NATURE OF STANDARDIZATION . . . . 
HISTORY OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES PRE- WORLD WAR II • • • • • 
HISTORY OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES WORLD WAR II • • • • • • • 
A. The General Situation. • 
• 
• 





World War II • • • • • • • 66 
C. Screw Thread Standardization- -World War II. 77 
D. Aeronautical Standardization--World War II • 82 
E. Summary of Effects of Standardization--World 
War II. • • • • • • • • • • 93 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II CIVIL AND 
MILITARY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 95 
A. The Primary Situation, 1945 - 1946 • • 95 
B. The International Civil Aviation Organization . 97 
C. The International Organization for Standard-
ization. . . . 
D. Overall Post-War Security • 
E. Western Hemisphere Security. . . . . 
F. The United States, The United Kingdom , and 








G. The International Situation Worsens • • 110 
H. The North Atlantic Treaty And Subsequent 
Developments • • • • • • • • 113 
Vo UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARD-
IZATION • • • . . • • . . . . • . • 117 
A. The Overall View . . . . . . • . • 117 
B. The Air Coordinating Committee and Inter = 
national Standardization. • . . • . • 121 
c. The Forces of Decentralization, Profit, and 
Practicality. . . • • • . . . . . • 123 
D. The Trend Toward Centralization. . • . . 125 
E. Effect of the Sherman Act and the F ederal Trade 
Commission. • • • • • • • • • • • 125 
F. The United States Government in Conflict • 131 
G. The American Standards Association and the 
United States Government in Conflict • • 134 
H. United States Representation to the Interna -
tional Organization for Standardization • • 140 
I. A Summary of the United States Organizational 
Position Regarding Standardization • • • • 145 
VI. UNIFICATION OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES • • • • • • • • 147 
A. The General Problem of Unification. 147 
B. The American Standards Association Attempt to 
Form a National Standards Body • • • • • 153 
VII. THE INFLUENC E OF INDUSTRY ON INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION • • • • • • • 169 
A. The Nature of Industry Influence on Interna-
tional Standardization in the United States • • 169 
vi 
Chapter P age 
B. The Attitude of United States Industry Toward 
Standardization Organization . . . . . 170 
c. The Problem of Industry and Government Coord-
ination in the United States • • • . . . . 173 
D. Governmental Protection of United States 
Industry • • • • . . . . • . 179 
E. Industry/Government Suspicions . . • • 182 
F. The United States Industry View • • . • 0 184 
G. In Summary . . . • . . • . • . . 185 
VIIL DETERRENTS TO STANDARDIZATION • . • • • 187 
A. Deterrents in General • . • • . • • • 187 
B. The Political Deterrent • . • • • • . . 188 
c. The Economic D eterrent. • . . • . 189 
D. The Deterrent of a Negative Concept. . . . 191 
E. The Deterrent of Decentralized Action • . . 196 
F. The Deterrent of Voluntary Action . • • . 199 
G. The Deterrent of Individualism and Nationalism 205 
H. The Deterrent of Time • . • . . 207 
I. The Deterrent of Cost • . . . • • • • 209 
J. The Technological Deterrent . . . . • 211 
K. The Technical Deterrent. . • • . . 212 
L. Deterrents in Summary • . . . . . . . 213 
IX. COURSES OF ACTION . . . • . . . . . . 214 
A. General . . . . • . • . . . 214 
Chapter 
B. With Reference to Organization on the 
States Level . • • • • • • • 
C. With Reference to Organization on the 
World Level. • • • • • • • • 
D. With Reference to Organization on the 












E. With Reference to Voluntary Standardization • 235 
F. With Reference to General Deterrents to Stand ... 
ardization . . . . . . . . . . . . 
G. In Summary • . . . . . . . . • • • 
235 
236 
APPENDIX A. STANDARDIZATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 238 
APPENDIX B. STANDARDIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION • 249 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • 255 
CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF STANDARDIZATION 
11 Now throughout the empire carriages all have wheels with the 
same tread, all writing is with the same characters, and for conduct 
1 
there are the same rules. 11 
What is standardization? Countless people have asked this ques-
tion and as many replies have been provided. 2 
Contrary to popular reaction, standardization, far from a 
narrow and specialized technical undertaking, is a vast and complex 
discipline. As a result it has become the subject of considerable 
interpretation and misinterpretation. 
Standardization is, as Willis S. MacLeod stated in 194 7, 11a 
much- maligned and badly used word- j_;,,nd/ perhaps should be taken out 
of our vocabulary ••• for the simple reason that it has to be interpreted 
1 
Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, "Doctrine of the Mean, 11 
C. XXVIII, Vol. 3, William Edward Soothill, The Analects of Confucius 
(Yokohama: Fukuin Printing Co., Ltd, 1910), p. 316. 
2see as an example Benjamin M e lnitsky, Profiting From Indus-
trial Standardization (New York: Conover-Mast Publications, Inc., 
1953), p. 1; Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Some 
Aspects of Standardization in the U. S. A. and in Europe (Paris: Organ~ 
ization f~r European E£,_ono;;.i-Z-Co-:oper;,,tio~ 195 3), p. l O; John 
Gaillard, Industrial Standardization, Its Principles and Application 
{New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1934), p. 33; and P. K. McElroy, 




very specifically on every case in point. 113 Conventionally, MacLeod 
is correct. Standardization may mean one thing to the political scien-
tist and a totally different thing to the biologist, the chemist, the 
politician, or the law enforcement officer. More than that, standardi-
zation may embody totally different meanings for two people of the 
same profession or occupation. As a result most professional stand-
ardizers believe that a large part, perhaps the greatest part, of stand-
ardization is essentially agreement on definition. But it must be pointed 
out that these professional standardizers treat the problem of standard-
ization in only a limited sense or for a specific and specialized purpose. 
As an example, the military standardization officers generally break 
their problem down into materiel and non-materiel areas and apply 
different definitions and rules to each. 4 In some instances these 
specialists further divide the materiel standardization into sub-areas 
such as: compl ete standardization, component standardization, func-
tional standardization, functional interchangeability, operational inter-
changeability, and adaptability. In turn, they divide the non-materiel 
standardization into sub - areas such as: operations, administration, 
3willis S . MacLeod, An address before the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces, December 17, 1947 (in the files of the Air 
University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). 
4u. S. Army, Army Regulation 1-70, "Standardization Among 
Armies of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada, 11 June 25, 1957, 
and U . S. Air Forc e, Air Force Regulation 81-6, "Specifications 
and Standards--Interna tional Standardization Programs, " October 18, 
1955. 
3 
logistics, doctrine, organization, and training. 5 Each of these sub-
areas, of course, involves varying definitions and rules. Along the 
same line, Benjamin Melnitsky pointed out that industrial standardiza-
tion roughly involves specification standards, nomenclature standards, 
dimensional standards, testing standards, rating standards, standard 
practices, simplification standards, 6 and safety standards. 7 In govern-
ment, the Federal Supply Service, the successor to the Bureau of 
Federal Supply, emphasizes commodity standards and acceptabl e 
product lists, 8 while the National Bureau of Standards emphasizes 
standards of measurement, quality, and service. 9 John Gaillard 
makes a great point about performance standards and standards of 
measurement as well as the division between basic and other standards. lO 
No doubt the listing of standardization var i ances could be car-
ried on almost indefinitely for standardization runs the gauntlet of pro-
fessions, trades, a dvocations, occupations, and interests. In a very 
6 often referred to as "rationalization" standards in foreign 
countries . 
7 
Melnitsky, op. cit., p. 14. 
8Ibid. , p. 206, and U. S . General Services Administration, 
United St~ Government Organization Manual 1955-56 (Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 407. 
9 u. S. Gener.al S ervices Administration, United States Govern-
ment Organization Manual 1955 - 56 (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1955), p. 280. 
10
Gaillard, op. cit. , Chaps. I and II. 
-
4 
real sense all forces of civilization--institutions, customs, laws, 
literature, art, science, education- - involve standardization. This 
extremely broad application of standardization is clearly stated in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica where it is observed that: 
Manmade standardization is not confined to language nor to 
weights, measures, money, energy, power, nor to the other 
material commodities or services subject to purchase. One 
finds standards in folklore, mythology, legend, taboos, in social 
customs, ceremonies, codes, practices, procedures, specifi-
cations and time. Standardiza tion is important to geography, 
photography, chemistry, pharmacy, safety, insurance, education, 
games, sports, music, eligibility to the professions, ethics and 
religions. There are standards for soils, fertilizers, seeds, 
fruits, vegetables, grains, meat, poultry, dairy products, natural 
and synthetic fibres, and clothing. Standards are available for all 
kinds of aircraft, airposts, highways, bridges, building construc-
tion, air conditioning, heating, insulation, plumbing, refrigeration, 
and roofing. There are even standards for living and standards for 
success. From prenatal care through burial preparation and rites 
man has set up standards and incorporated them into law. l l 
But standardization even goes beyond the realm of human control. In 
fact, human accomplishment in this discipline is insignificant in rela-
tion to the accomplishments of nature. In nature one can observe such 
tremendous feats of standardization as the constellations, the orbits 
of the planets, the changeless normal properties of conductivity, ducti-
bility, elasticity, hardness, permeability, refractivity, strength or 
viscosity of materials, the orbits of electrons within the atom, and the 
structure of cells. 
What then is standardization? The answer 1s everything; yet 
nothing. It is everything in that it applies to every element of our world : 
1111Standardization," Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. XXI, 19th 
ed. 
5 
material, psychological, and spiritual. But, of itself, it is nothing 
more than an idea, a concept, or, as some have termed it, a state of 
mind. Standardization has no mass nor dimension and it imparts no 
rays, sounds, nor odors. Nevertheless, it has shaped our entire 
society by its presence and by its absence. It is the element that 
makes possible a social structure and controls its growth and its de ~ 
cay. Socially, it forms the basis of language, the catalyst of our so -
ciety. Beyond that, agriculture, industry, science, religion, politics, 
ideology, technology--everything embodies it. Researching this dis-
cipline, Franklin E. Powell observed that: 
On historical reflection, standardization is readily discernible 
as a prevalent and socially sanctioned manifestation of human 
activity stemming from the earliest periods of social order, as 
in religious ceremony, protocol, etiquette, construction and fur-
nishing of habitation, and general behavior pattern. 12 
A student of the discipline of standardization soon realizes that 
the processes of creation, learning, and growth all depend on standard-
ization. As a discipline and as a concept it is the most dynamic and 
progressive approach to social, industrial, political, economic, and 
other problems that has been laid at the foot of man. With it he holds 
the world and the universe in his grasp. Without it he could hardly 
qualify as a vegetable. 
12Franklin E. Powell, "Some Aspects of Standardization and 
Economic Theory" (unpublished Master's thesis, School of Social 
Science, Catholic University, May, 194 7), p. 5. 
If the reader is now reacting advers e ly to the shadow of the 
proposition that is being unfolded, his reaction is normal. Standardi -
6 
zation in the extreme is alleged to be the deprivation of human freedom. 
Now it is true that standardization in any degree limits freedom 
of action or the right to be different. Anyone who doubts this should 
try to be a Communist in the United States; to drive on the left hand 
side of the road in Canada; to build a factory in a residential zone in 
Hollywood; to run a gasoline engine on water; or to connect a 110 volt 
appliance to a 220 volt power source. But if standardization did not 
exist anarchy would prevail, and where it does not exist anarchy does 
prevail. 
It is admitted that any limitation of human behavior is a restric -
tion of human freedom. But it is also recognized that unlimited human 
freedom and social order are incompatible. It is not intended that this 
thesis should become a dissertation on the political theories of human 
behavior and rights; however, it must be pointed out that the concept 
of human rights is nothing more or less than the limitation of freedom 
through social standardization or social contract. Nevertheless, it is 
recognized that most acts of standardization meet resista:oce both as 
individual acts and on the basis of principle. Along this line John Perry 
reported that in the era when standardization was being actively i.ntro -
duced by Herbert Hoover: 
Some thoughtful men foresaw a threat to human individuality. Indi -
vidual examples of standardization might seem trivial : slicing all 
bread to the same thickness and limiting the numbe r of c an size s. 
that: 
7 
But when thousands of such limitations were added together, where 
would it end: If five hundred varieties could be reduced to twenty-
five, why not to one? Were we on the verge of building a machine -
like society in which everyone dressed alike, ate alike, and--
ultimatel y--thought alike? 13 
Commenting on this trend, Albert W. Whitney observed in 1924 
It is not uncommon nowadays to see articles and editorials and 
l etters in the public press deploring the state of uniform medioc-
rity that standardization will produce if allowed to have its way; 
this may even be considered a standard objection to standardiza-
tion; in fact, with fine irony, a syndicated editorial on the evils 
of standardization has recently appeared in papers throughout the 
country. 14 
Unfortunately, the concept of standardization has succeeded in 
creating an unusual paradox by simultaneously stirring and reinforcing 
the two great but opposing social fears of change and of uniformity or 
conformity. On the one hand, standardization is viewed and resisted 
as a "change " to existing practices. On the other hand, standardization 
is viewed and resisted as the force of "uniformity or conformity" and 
thus the element that will prevent social change. Complicating this is 
the sordid fact that society is generally unwilling to view standardiza-
tion in anything but all b l ack or all white--all bad or all good. Comment-
ing on this point , Melnitsky noted that " the layman and those in industry 
13 John Perry, The Story :?i_ Standards (New York: Funk and Wag -
nalls Co., 1955) , p. 133. 
14Albert W. Whitney, The Place of Standardization in Modern 
Life, A paper prepared for the First Pan-American Standardization Con-
ference, Lima, Peru, 1924, originally published by the C e ntral Exec u -
tive Council of the Inter American High Commission, reprinted in 
Industrial Standardization, January, 1943, pp. 21-25. 
8 
who have not been fully or properly initiated into the subject often 
demonstrate the rather unfortunate tendency of confusing standardiza -
. . h 15 . 
tion wit sameness. 1 1 In much the same sense, an anti-standardization 
reaction in the_ United States can be expected whenever standardization is 
emphasized by the Soviet Union. To the reactionary, when the Soviet 
Union decrees that enterpri zes will not ttturn out goods without properly 
labeling or marking them tt and provides that they ttmust be produced under 
0 t 0 11 d t h . 1 d " . d d" "f" · ttl 6 h c n r e ec n1ca con 1tions an accor 1ng to spec1 1cat1on, t e prac-
tice of labeling and standardization automatically becomes an undemo-
cratic process. 
There is no doubt that standardization's far too common conno -
tations are ttmonotonous uniformity, 11 1· 1·regimentation, 11 ttdictatorship , 11 
ttindustrial goose stepping, tt tt thought control, 11 ttdull mediocrity, t1 
ti stagnation, t1 and ttliving in the same houses, eating the same meals, 
reading the same papers, wearing the same clothes, and even looking 
alike. 11 These conceptions, Melnitsky concluded, have: 
••• been fostered by many glaring examples of the misuses of 
standardizati on. The peas-in- the - pod houses which blight 
American suburb ia, t1 standardtt engineering methods which 
stifle inventiveness, b u i l ding codes which enable archaic con-
struction methods--literally thousands of the other horrible 
examples offered by those in the anti - standardization camp 
come to mind. Yet, the standards tool should not be judged 
by its perverted uses any more than the motor car should be 
condemned for the frightening tol l of human life lost in 
15Melnitsky, op. cit. , p. 1. 
16 The New York Times, May 27, 1945 , p . 12. 
automobil e accidents or the monkey wrenches damned for having 
been slipped between moving gears . 17 
9 
These negative reactions to standardization which, incidentally, 
are widely held raise two important questions~ first, standardization is 
either a real danger to human existence; or, second, a popular mis-
cone eption exists. 
Is standardization a desirable and necessary process; if so, 
what is its exact place in the world; and second, how is it susceptible 
of abuse and how can such abuse be avoided? This was a question 
analyzed in detail :by Albert W. Whitney in 1924, and his analysis is 
still considered 11 one of the most basic documents on the philosophy of 
standardization. 1118 
Some mention of standardization in nature already has been 
made. ·whitney too used standardization in nature as a basis for his 
argument, for he believed that 11 the processes of nature and of men are, 
after all, very much alike. 1119 The primary difference, he felt, lay in 
man's ability to experiment rather than to depend on mutation and trial 
in life itself to produce a standard. 
In his view of the world of nature, Whitney saw a discrete and 
actually enumerabl e but ordered assemblage of types, each of which had 
a considerabl e degree of stability and among which certain type-conserving 
17 1 · k · 1· 2 Me nits y, op. cit. , PP• - • 
18rndustrial Standardization, January, 1943, p. 20. 
19whitney, op. cit., p. 21. 
forces operated, such as those that inhibit miscegenation. This 
e stablishment of a system of discrete and enumerable types in nature 
Whitney saw as the exact analogue of standardization as a purposeful 
h uman activity, and he felt the two were subject to the same laws and 
20 
to the same abuses. 
Not only has nature developed types which can be enumerated 
and classified, but she has standardized for each a multitude of 
organs and functions. Individuals of the same species resemble 
each other in the minutest details of structure and function. If 
this were not so, organized life w ould be practically impossible. 
Everything would be an individual problem with no possibility of 
generalization. Institutions and customs would be impossible, 
for institutions and customs and laws depend upon an underlying 
sameness of reaction •••• An underlying sameness is the basis 
for every civilization. 
I do not overlook the fact that with this sameness goes along 
a strong flavor or variety and individuality. No two faces are 
exactly alike and no two temperaments and personalities are 
exactly alike, but this difference, which undoubtedly gives not 
only much of the charm to life but which is as well the cutting 
edge of progress, can flourish only on a deep-lying basis of uni-
formity. It is the differences that persist, some of them racial 
but many of them cutting across racial lines, that account for the 
actual diversity of civilizations and institutions . Thanks for the 
diversity, but still more deeply, thanks for the sameness that 
makes the diversity possible and effective I 
10 
There are, then, in nature these two fundamental different ten-
dencies: First, a force that is continually operating to produce 
greater variety and, second, a force that is continually operating 
to e liminate unsuccessful variations and to concentrate upon rela-
tively few types which in their main features are reproduced faith-
fully from generation to generation. 
Now, both of these processes are absolutely necessary in a 
world of progress and each depends intimately on the other •• 
When we come to the directed, purposeful evolution of human 
society the main lines are the same ; -;;_s in nature/ •••• 
20Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
Standardization is here ••• the selective and conservational 
force, the selection being made consciously, howeve r, instead of 
through trial and error, although even in human standardization 
actual experiment has a large part to play. 
11 
When the type has been ;;elected by standardization/, economic 
laws fortify the selection by directing the forces of mass produc -
tion upon it and it assumes a place much analogous to that of a 
species in the worl d of nature. So, just as in nature, standardiza -
tion operates to capitalize the advance by making it an actually pre -
vailing type. 
It is this effect that is commonly in mind when the attempt is 
made to evaluate the place of standardizati on in civilization. It is 
measured in terms of its effect upon mass production, it is evalu -
ated as an instrument for making the advantages of life more abun-
dantly available; and the critics of standardization also attack it at 
exactly this point, claiming that its effect is coarsening since its 
resul ts are to be measured in terms of quantity rather than quality. 
They conceive of standardization as producing a world of universal, 
dull mediocrity in place of a world of color and scintillating lights 
and shadows and heights and depths that we have under the p l ay of 
individual initiative. 21 
Many of the misconceptions surrounding standardization can be 
corrected simply by contemplating the rational rather than the irrational 
or diseased elements of the discipline. Some trends in this direction 
already seem to be taking place. The National Aircraft Standards Com-
mittee, as an exampl e, in 1943 observed that: 11 It is evident that the 
principles and practice of standardization is in the ascendency, that men 
of higher qualifications are volunteering, and are being assigned to the 
work by industry •• •• 1122 Similarly, Powell contended in 194 7 that 
the word 11 standard ' 1 was actually acquiring a pleasant connotation much 
2 lrbid., pp. 22-23. 
22rndustrial Standardization, May, 1943, p. 154. 
12 
like the word " engineer" and was being used loosely as an indication of 
desirability. This, he thought, was "evidently due to the reputation 
standards lhad/ acquired in promoting industrial efficiency. 1123 
Rationally, the discipline of standardization embodies nothing 
more than the concept that identical or compatible solutions should be 
employed for recurring problems. In this context one can see that 
standards may be both rigid, as in the case of mathematics, or loose, 
as generally in the case of social mores; they may offer a range of 
rigid solutions , as in the case of measurements, or a range of loose 
solutions, as in the case of language; they may be a combination of all 
of these, as in the case of building codes. Rationally, standardization 
also embraces the principle that things standardized are not perma-
nently fixed. Rather, the concept involves nothing more than a tempo-
24 rary leveling in a series of progressive steps forward. Anyone 
familiar with the processes of standardization realizes that few stand-
ards tend to have everlasting properties. Accordingly, some stand-
ardization bodies require a complete review of a ll existing standards 
23p 11 . . .. owe , op. cit. , p . 111. 
24some standards may be formally recognized as temporary, 
but there may be a desire, regardless of developments, to retain the 
temporary standard over a relatively long period of time to permit 
widespread us e and coordination. An ear ly case in point was the rec-
ommendation made by Technical Committee No. 3 , on Fits, of the Inter-
national Federation of National Standardizing Associations, to the effect 
that the values on the manufacturing limits and the permissible wear of 
limit gages laid down in a system of fits between cylindrical parts de-
veloped by the committee should not be changed during the next ten years. 
(International Federation of National Standardizing Associations, Tech-
nical Committee No. 3, Resolution No. 7, adopted at Stockholm, 1930.) 
on a definite time schedule. Revision of standards to reflect new re-
quirements, technology, conditions, and knowledge is an accepted 
e l ement of the standardization process. However, it is recognized 
that a high frequency of revision of standards is essentially incom-




is the theory that quality should be held within certain constants during 
a time p er iod which is compatible with progress and organization. 
Since requirements, technology, conditions, and knowledge are con-
stantly changing, standards will tend t o lag these elements. But within 
the realm of good judgment and without d estroying the basic discipline, 
every attempt is made to maintain the standards on a level with these 
elements. In the words of Robert A. Martino: "Standardization is the 
modern way of making permanent each advance that we make in our 
. ·1· . 26 c1v1 1zat1on. " The motto of the American Standards Association 
reflects a similar thought: "Standardization is dynamic, not static. It 
27 
means not to stand still, but to move forward together." Standardi-
zation viewed thusly is the basis of advance. As Whitney observed: 
Variation is creative, it pioneers the advance; standardization 
is conservational, it seizes the advance and establishes it as an 
actual concrete fact. • • • If the world were broken up into an 
2 5 As an example, see Gaillard, op. cit. , p. 71. 
26Robert A. Martino, Standardization Activities of National 
Technical and Trade Associations {Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1941), p. 1. 
27Quoted in a ll issues of Industrial Standardization, Standardiza-
tion, and The Magazine of Standards. 
innumerable number of forms, with no rallying point at which 
nature had carried on mass production, there would be no way 
of expressing the fact that the successful type had been dis-
covered. In order to make progress not only must there be a 
better type, but it must be made the prevailing type. 2 8 
14 
This being true, Whitney contended that the discipline of stand-
ardization must be recognized as underlying our entire social structure. 
Without the force of this discipline, he believed that there could only be 
chaos and anarchy. 
Suppose the world of living nature really had the properties of 
a continuum; it would be a world of complete individualism; there 
would be no foci about which to group mass action, about which to 
gather the integrating and ameliorating forces of affection and 
loyalty. It would be a mad, restless, wearying world of infinite 
but meaningless variety and detail , obeying no laws except the laws 
of probability, to which even the molecules in their aimless wander-
ing give allegiance. 
Creative work in such a world as this would be an impossibility. 
Nothing would stay put; there would be nothing to stand on to make 
a fresh advance. All one's energies would be used up in meeting 
the idiosyncrasies of the immediate moment. In the field of indus-
try each piece of machinery would be an individual problem, even 
each screw, each bolt, and each nut. What time would be left over 
amid such maddening detail for fresh advance? 29 
But, if without standardization there would be only chaos and 
anarchy, does the absence of the latter indicate the adequacy of the 
former? This, unfortunately, is the common allegation of the anti-
standardization group: the statement that the absence of conditions of 
chaos and anarchy indicate a sufficiency of standardization. 
28wh· 22 1tney, op. cit., p. • 
29Ibid. , p. 23. 
It is true that we are not now in a state of chaos or anarchy, 
but does our present status attest that our standardization processes 
and standards are adequate? How far are we removed fra:n the state 
of chaos and anarchy? And how far are we from the social order we 
advocate? Few indeed are those who are satisfied with the nation or 
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the world as they find it today. But few are those who recognize that 
the state of the nation and of the world in the past, present, and futur e 
is and will be the direct product of the standardization process and the 
standards achieved. On this point Herbert Hoover commented that: 
The public assumes that ••• progress has come from scientific 
discovery of natural laws, new materials, inventions, and increas-
ing skills. But ••• the increase in our living standards and com-
fort has received an enormous contribution from / the/ related ideas 
of standards, of simplifications and specifications. 3U 
Man, it must be recalled, grew up in a vast system of compart-
mentalization which was reinforced by fear of that outside his own group. 
Nationalism, caste, creed, class, segregation, isolation, sovereignty, 
and the ghetto are all symbols of this compartmentalization. A nd within 
this system of human compartmentalization it was all too obvious that 
man would conceive a multitude of solutions for his problems and that 
these many solutions would become fixed within each given compart-
ment of that society. That most of thes e solutions were arbitrary is 
unimportant. What is important is that the social circumstances of 
30Herbert Hoover , "The Crusade for Standards," Dickson R eck 
{ed.), National Standards in a Modern Society {New York:· Harper and 
Brothers, Publishers, 1956)~ pp. 3-4. 
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man's growth prevented single solutions and this served to perpetuate 
and strengthen the compartmentalization that caused the uncoordinated 
solution in the first instance. As mentioned earlier, non-standardiza -
tion can be and usually is a highly destroying influence in the social 
order. 
Now in this age man is seeking more and more to remove the 
walls with which he has surrounded himself. 
31 
Today he is forced to 
think in terms of national, regional, and world unity, solidarity, coop -
eration, and friendship. Today he wishes to live in a peaceful commu-
nity of nations--among friendly allies. Today he knows that no man, 
no nation, can guarantee his own survival. But these concepts are as 
empty words unless the walls with which man has surrounded himself 
are destroyed. And these walls can be destroyed only through stand-
ardization. Fortunately, the force of standardization has a cumulative 
constructive value in much the same sense the non- standardization 
serves to reinforce itself. But standardization must be initiated by 
man's will; it will not materialize of itself. 
It is unfortunate that, contrary to popular belief, relatively few 
natural laws underlie the standards of society. True, the law of survival 
31 In this regard it is now felt that effective standardization de-
pends at least on national application. This was brought out by the 
American Standards Association in a pamphlet addressed to Latin 
America, E l ementos de Normalizac~on Industrial (New York: American 
Standards Association-:-1943) , p. 14: "La experiencia de los pa."ises de 
gran desarrollo industrial demuestra que la normalizaci~n no alcanza a 
su mayor de eficacia hasta tanto que se enfoca como problema nacional. " 
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may be looked upon as a universal motivation for standardization, but 
it is hardly directly applicable to the solution of a standardization prob -
l em. Only in the case of the exact sciences are natural l aws found t hat 
dictate some of the standards of society. In all other things standards 
are the individual or collective product of such things as rationalization, 
profit, cost, mutual advantage, comparative quality, practice, tradition, 
custom, pride, simple dictate, random selection, or arbitrary choice. 
Given a problem in which natural laws did not apply it was inevitable that 
man, in his socially disorganized environment, would produce a multi -
tude of solutions for every problem. But a society cannot exist that em -
ploys a multitude of solutions for each of its problems. Society to exist 
must not conflict with itself but must mesh and flow in a given direction. 
Literally, social traffic must be regulated. This can be done consciously 
by formal standardization or surreptitiously by centralized direction. 
The ease of the latter is obvious, and it is thus a maxim that standardi-
zation generally tends to be weakest in a democracy and strongest in a 
dictatorship. This is not to denounce d emocracy; it is to emphasize that, 
to the extent centralized authority is weakened, to that extent standardi-
zation must be approached deliberately and consciously. 
There is little question that standardization has always been a 
social problem, but there have be en changes in scope. In ancient times 
standardization involved the individual, the family, and the tribe. Now 
it has moved in scope up through the national to the international levels. 
Today it is a problem of a lmost infinite extension and infinite facts. 
Yet, it is a problem that is studied only superficially. This is not to 
say that it is ignored. On the contrary, today thousands of national 
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and international bodies have standardization as their primary or second-
ary objective. These efforts, however, are more the result of the law 
of necessity than the application of a discipline. Any group of individ-
uals that band together, whether at the local , national, or international 
level, soon find that their greatest obstacle to understanding and prog-
ress is the lack of standards. Of necessity these groups then endeavor 
to create standards to govern their conduct. Generally, however , these 
groups fail to understand the broad concept of standardization--the fact 
that standards to be effective cannot be developed in isolation or in 
c omp artments. 
The idea of inclusive standardization, the idea that standardiza-
tion to be effective must be all-encompassing, is recognized by some 
groups such as the International Organization for Standardization, the 
Universal Postal Union, the International Electrotechnical Commission, 
the International Telecommunication Union, and others. But one finds 
that, even with the large number of inclusive standardization bodies, 
standardization at that level is still a fertile fie l d with new agencies be -
ing formed on a regular basis. 
At present the United States is engaged in widespread inter-
national political, economic, and military activities and appears des-
tined to remain so engaged. This has cau sed and is causing an ever 
greater emphasis of the discipline of standardization. However, this 
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emphasis is not uniform and varies frorn the lowest level of lip -
service to the serious level found in the military s :ructure. All other 
elements of the nation it s eems may circumnavigate a lack of stand-
ardization with reasonable facility. But rnilitary fo rces are unable to 
do this. Successful military opera tions, national or international, are 
entirely dependent on a large number of standards and are enhanced by 
a host of others. Military, and p articularly wartime military, require-
ments have thus tended to lead the way in national and international 
standardization. History shows that standardization always has been 
an important factor in warfare as well as in the preparation for warfare. 
One writer goes so far as to c r edit military £ore.es for initiating both 
standardization and interchangeability: 
The pressure of military demand not mere ly hastened factory 
organization at the beginning; it has remained persistent through-
out its entire development. A s warfare incr e ased in scope and 
larger armies were brought i nto the fie l d, their equipment became 
a much heavier task. And as their tactics became mechanized, the 
instruments needed to make their movernents precise and well-
timed were necessarily reduc ed to uniformity also. Hence along 
with factory organization there came standardization on a larger 
scale than was to b e found in any other cleparLment of business, of 
industry, except perhaps in printing . 32 
The fact that the military l ead in standardization means that it 
is not supported in this endeavor w i th equal vigor by the other elements 
of the government or of the nation. In other word s, the nation does not 
32 Brig. Gen. John K . Christmas, Joint Army-Navy Standardiza-
tion, An address before the Indus trial College oI :he Armed Forces, 
February 26, 1948 (in the files 0£ the Air Univers ity Library, Maxwell 
Air Force Base, A l abama) . 
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respond to standardization as an entity. It may be, in fact, that while 
the military earnestly need and support standardization other elements 
in the nation oppose it even though, in the final analysis, the future of 
the nation may be decided by military strength or weakness having its 
foundation in standardization. 
It is physically impossible for a nation honestly to proceed in 
two opposing directions at once. Yet this condition often is found in 
international standardization. National divergence of purpose is evi-
denced in more fields than standardization; however, the inherent nature 
of the discipline of standardization- - its consideration of the fundamentals 
of social strength and its elaborate and time,- consuming processes--
demand something more than a conflicting national purpose if real prog-
ress is to be made. 
The road to nationa l standardization is not easy to follow, but the 
road to international standardization is, by far, more complicated. If 
standards could be established on the basis of natural laws or even logic, 
standardization would be simple. But the creation of standards involves 
a host of other considerations, and if it is to be effectively pursued it 
must be supported by clear-cut, long term objectives, authoritatively 
supported. International standardization involves programs extending 
over two, five, ten, fifty, and even a hundred years or more. Unity 
I 
and continuity of purpose thus become a prime necessity. That these 
conditions have not always prevailed may be all too obvious to the reader. 
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Nations are reluctant to speak in such l ong terms. Yet an internationa l 
program cannot be successful without them. Even a national program 
cannot be successful without them. 
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that standardization 
usually is not a natural process. The normal collision of ideas, customs , 
practices, procedures, and processes, when it does occur, tends to pro -
duce some standardization by the thesis-antithesis-synthesis process. 
But this is the exception rather than the rul e. Most standardization of 
the current era has come about as a result of the violent collision of 
forces. Wars, economic competition, and power politics symbolize 
these collisions and a synthesis seldom emerges from them. Instead 
one of the original standards usually emerges in its pure form. 
Opposing the normal collision and the violent collision concepts 
1s the discipline of standardization wherein the end is sought con-
sciously and with the least pain and disruption. This discipline recog-
nizes the intrinsic value of standardization per ~ even though most of 
its disciples repeat with monotonous regularity that standardization is 
not an end in its e lf. Advancing from this point, the disciples attempt 
to create an atmosphere of organization , policy, understanding, and, 1n 
some cases , coercion whereby the desire d ends can be achieved. 
As a studied discipline, standardization is both new and of a 
growing and changing nature; therefore, it can be understood b est and, 
perhaps, only in terms of historical development. On this assumption 
we w ill turn to an exploration. of some of that history. 
CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES PRE-WORLD WAR II 
"The Congress shall have Power To ••• fix the Standard of 
Weights and Measures 11 1 . . . . 
The weights and measures in common use in the American 
colonies at the time of the American Revolution generally were of 
English origin and tended to be named the same as those in use 1n 
Great Britain. But they were far from being established on a scientific 
basis and a considerable lack of uniformity existed both within the 
colonies and as between the colonies and Great Britain. This was 
recognized by the framers of the Articles of Confederation and of the 
Constitution and provisions for a solution of the dilemma of non- standard 
weights and measures was written into both documents. 2 
When George Washington took the office of President of the 
United States he urged the new Congr ess to use its Constitutional power 
1 U. S. , Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8 . 
2 For the very early history of standardization in the United States, 
the author leaned heavily on John Perry, The Story of Standards (New York: 
Funk and Wagnalls, 1955), John Gaillard,IndustrialStandardization, Its 
Principles and Application (New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1934) and 
briefs of the American Standards Association as contained in the magazines: 
Standardization, The Magazine of Standards, and Industrial Standardization. 
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to give the new nation a national, unified system of weights and 
measures. Acting on this request, the congress set up a special 
committee to consider the matter and, in due course, this committee 
asked the first United States Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, 
for his recommendations. 
3 
However, this request came at a most 
unfortunate time for Jefferson and for the nation since it coincided 
with the French Revolution. 
In France, Prince Tallyrand was acting with new authority and, 
like many national l eaders of the past, he saw that unity of weights and 
measures was a key to national unity. Accordingly, he directed the 
Royal Academy of Sciences to construct a new system of weights and 
measures based on the decimalized system advocated by the Scottish 
instrument maker and engineer, James Watt. News of this action soon 
reached J efferson and, while it laid before him the opportunity to give 
the United States a logical system of weights and measures, he responded 
4 with an indecisive report to Congress. 
Congress did not act on Jefferson's report and after a while 
Washington renewed his plea for Congressional action. But by then 
more news had arrived from France and Great Britain and there was 
3 By this action the Congress apparently showed a recognition 
that, while it had Constitutional powers to fix the standards of weights 
and measures, that action had far reaching international implications. 
In any event, the general division of responsibility for standardization 
as between the legislative and the executive r e mains debatable to this 
date. 
4 This event is discussed at l ength in John Perry, op. cit. 
reason to await further developments and decisions in those two 
countries regarding the adoption of the new French system. 
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The next year a third message from Washington prompted the 
Senate to appoint a special committee to l ook into the subject of 
weights and measures. Five months later this committee brought 
back a recommendation to adopt Jefferson's most radical plan. 
Startled, the Senate did nothing. 
Three more years passed without Congressional action. By 
then the new French system, then termed the Metric System, had been 
formalized. In France, the Committee of P ub lic Safety now invited all 
other countries to j oin with that nation in making the system world-
wide, and Citizen Dombey was appointed as special ambassador to 
bring the French invitation to the United States. En route Dombey died 
and his papers were lost. Then some months later they were recovered 
and sent to the French Ambassador at Washington who presented them 
to the President who, in t u rn, sent them to Congress. For weeks there -
after the Congress took no action on this invitation. Then suddenly it 
burst into action voting down every system of weights and measures in 
sight: committee proposal s, Jefferson's proposals, and the Metric 
System. United States measures, dec l ared a House resolution, should 
b e those now in use--whatever that meant. 
Unfortunately, the Congressional approach to the problem of 
weights and measures was far from satisfactory and pressur e b egan to 
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mount for more definite action. 5 A significant portion of this pressure 
came from the individual states which were discovering that without 
standard weights and measures interstate commerce was exceedingly 
difficult. Internationally, the problem was as bad. Complaints from 
foreign sources pointed out that international trade with the United 
States was difficult because collectors of customs had very personal 
ideas as to the weight of a pound or the size of a bushel. As an exampl e, 
due solely to differences in the definition of common weights and 
5 
The extent of the problem was tremendous. In the early United 
States one could find such weights and measures as the palm, link, 
hand , nail, span, cubit, pottl e, loom, way, last , firkin, kildren, strike, 
hogshead, tierce, pipe, butt, puncheon, wine gallon, beer gallon, ale 
gallon, and, of course, the undefined barrel. In Connecticut a bushel 
of wheat was 56 pounds while in surrounding states it was 60. Con-
necticut's bushel of oats weighed 28 pounds, but New Jersey's was 32, 
Kentucky's was 33 1/2, Missouri's became 35, and the Washington 
Territory's be came 36. Meanwhile the bushel employed by the town of 
Alexandria, Virginia, dated back to a bushel that was popular in Eng-
land in 1266 and which was define d in this manner: An English penny, 
called a sterling, round and without clipping, shall weigh thirty-two 
wheat corns, from the midst of the ear, and twenty pence shall make an 
ounce, and twelve ounces one pound, and eight pounds do make a gallon 
of wine, and eight gallons of wine do make a London bushel, which is the 
eighth part of a quarter. Even as late as 1902, Brooklyn had as lega l 
the United States foot, the Williamsburg foot1 and the foot of the 26th 
Ward. Since all were legal , confusion reached the point that some 
property could not b e taxed because surveys could show that it didn't 
exist. But this was not a problem local to the United States. As an 
example, in the state of Baden, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
112 different yards \\ere in use. Nevertheless, it is shocking to learn that 
at the b eginning of World War II the United States was still confronted 
with many major differences in weights and measures. An exampl e of the 
extent of difference is ap tly demonstrated in the weights accorded a bushel 
of pears. In 1942 these differences were listed as ranging from 58 pounds 
per bushel in five states, to 56 in two, 55 in one, 52 in one, 50 in four, 
48 in four, 45 in seventeen, and a low of 36 in one . 
measure s , if a shipper landed his cargo in New York he might pay 
ten percent more import tax than if he docked in Philadelphia. 
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Acting on this pressure Congress passed a bill directing that 
sets of standards be furnished to the collectors of customs. This was 
an excellent idea except that the Congress failed to provide a set of 
standard weights and measures for the United States. Further, Con-
gre ss now failed to appropriate any money to carry out the bill so the 
executive branch of the government was unable to implement the plan. 
Thus, in spite of Congressional action, customs collectors and others 
continued to use their own judgment as to the weight of a pound, the 
size of a bushel, and the length of a foot. 
And so it went. State legislatures sent memorial after memorial 
to Congress pleading that something be done for interstate commerce as 
well as for foreign trade. President James Madison urged action. Com -
mittees were appointed and discharged. Bills were introduced into Con-
gress and then allowed to die unreported. 
Without doubt the situation was serious, but facing the alterna-
tive seemed to require an answer to the question of what Great Britain 
was going to do about the Metric System. The merit of the Metric 
System was secondary. If Great Britain decided to join France and the 
other nations in adopting the Metric System, the United States would have 
no choice other than to follow. But if the rest of the world did not unite, 
Great Britain retaining its standards and France the Metric System , the 
United States would have to face the difficult task of choosing betwee n 
the two. Ties with both Great Britain and France were strong and 
the United States was not yet an ind us tr ial influence of its own. 
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While the matter of the Metric System was being weighed, Con-
gress, in 1801, was subjected to a revolutionary idea by the inventor 
6 
of the cotton gin, Eli Whitney. Whitney had obtained a small govern-
mental contract to produce rifles for the new nation and in carrying out 
this contract he departed from the old production system of customized 
manufacture. Standardizing production operations, narrowing tal er-
ances, and building reasonably accurate tools and jigs, Whitney was 
able to produce parts that were interchangeable between all rifles . 
This achievement amazed the Congress , but they failed somehow to 
comprehend the implication in the area of standard weights and measures. 
Whitney and his associates accomplished what they did in spite of the lack 
of standard weights and measures. 
As time passed the problem of the Metric System became more 
complicated and it was soon denounced for its origins in the French 
Revolution. Religious feeling eve n aros e against it for the Committee 
on Public Safety had included a calendar as a part of its reform. 7 
6contrary to popular opinion, a contemporary of Whitney's, a 
Frenchman named LaBlanc, had made guns of interchangeable parts at 
an earlier date than did Whitney. Further, Whitney's demonstration in 
1801 was limited to the interchange of parts of locks only. Not until 
1824 were a quantity of Hall rifles stripped and remounted in a full 
demonstration of standard parts. 
7 In this new cal endar, the Sabbath was abolished, the week had 
ten days, the month had three weeks, and the twelve months were given 
revolutionary names. One day during the year and five days at the 
year's end were dedicated to the L ord. 
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Religious bodies striking out at this calendar also struck out at every-
thing else included in the reform. Added to this, the scientists who 
had designed the Metric System wer e no longer available to explain it 
for they had fared badly during the Terror. What was even more dis -
astrous for the Sys tern was that it was losing favor in France itself. 
Efforts to enforce it failed. By the time Napoleon I became Emperor 
in 1804, confusion was widespread with both old and new units in use 
and the names of each at times applied to the other. Then Napoleon 
contrived to make matters worse by sanctioning the measures usuelles. 
This was the general state of the metric reform when John 
Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, was asked to prepare a new re -
port on weights and measures. To say the least, Adams was hesitant 
to add to the metric problems of the day. Further, congress had just 
standardized the nation's currency with considerabl e unhappy results , 
and it was felt that an attempt to standardize weights and measures 
would be even more unpopular. 
Proceeding cautiously, Adams enlisted the aid of a man who was 
later to have a profound effect on the United States standards for weights 
and measures. This man, a Swiss immigrant named Ferdinand Hassler, 
helped Adams direct the first comprehensive survey of weights and 
measures in the United States --a survey that continues to affect United 
States policy to this date. 
After studying the history of weights and measures in the United 
States and abroad, Adams wrote that reforms had but one object: 
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When weights and measures present themselves to the contem-
plation of the legislature, and call for the interposition of law, the 
first and most prominent idea which occurs to him is that of uni -
formity; his first object is to embody them into a system, and 
his first wish to reduce them to one universal system. His pur-
poses are uniformity, permanency, universality: one standard to 
be the same for all persons and all purposes, and to continue the 
same forever. 8 
Then answering the obvious question of why these reforms had failed 
in the past, Adams stated that: 
These purposes, however, require powers which no legislature 
has hitherto been found to possess. The power of the legislature is 
limited by the extent of his territories and the numbers of his people. 
Bis principle of universality, therefore, cannot be made, by the 
mere agency of his power, to extend beyond the inhabitants of his 
possessions. The power of the legislator is limited over time. He 
is liable to change his own purposes. He is not infallible: he is 
liable to mistake the means of effecting his own objects. He is not 
immortal: his successor accedes to his power, with different views, 
different opinions, and perhaps different principles. The legislator 
has no power over the properties of matter. He cannot give a new 
constitution to nature. He cannot repeal her law of universal muta-
bility. He cannot square the circle. He cannot divide or multiply 
parts of the surface, the cube, or the sphere, by the uniform and 
exclusive number of ten. 
The power of the legislature is limited over the will and actions 
of his subjects. His conflict with them is desperate, when he 
counteracts their settled habits, their established usages, their 
domestic and individual economy, their ignorance, their prejudices, 
and their wants: all which is unavoidable in the attempt to chancre' 
or to originate, a totally new system of weights and measures. 
Adams' case was most penetrating. The power of the legislature 
seerned not enough to achieve standardization. His own mortality and the 
t:r . 
aits of the people were obstacles to its realization. Even more serious was 
his untenable political position once he acted to approve standardization. 
8 
John Quincy Adams, quoted in Perry, op. cit., p. 65. 
9Ibid. 
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Adams offered the C ongress two choices i.f it were to carry out 
its Constitutional r e sponsibility to fix the s tanda rd of weights and 
measures: tie the United States t o th e Bri tish or the metric system. 
But Congress, fearful of Adams 1 predic tions, chose instead to adopt 
once more the course of c autio u s deliberation. Again memorials were 
made while resolutions bloome d and fade d . F ou .r years later Adams 
became the sixth President of the Un i ted S tal s, but he had nothing to 
say on the subject of standardization . T hu s the United States moved to 
the end of its first half- c entury w i thout t h e p l ec,s for standardization 
answered- -without the authority g i ven t o C ongres s by the Constitution 
exercised. In the meantime H ass l er , t he man w io had helped Adams 
prepare his report on weights a nd me a sur e s , wa s destined to succeed 
where Congress had failed. 
In 1807 Congress dire c t ed t ha t a s u rvey 1 e made of the United 
States coast. Hassler, who had p lanne d the £i rs L scientific survey of 
Switzerland, submitted a proposal to the S e · r e t a ry of the Treasury. In 
due course this proposal was accepte d and Hass le r was brought to Wash .. 
ington as the first superintendent of t he C oas t Su rvey. When finally pro-
vided money by Congress, H a s sler emba r ked £or Europe to buy surveying 
instruments, an item not a v a ilabl e in t he Un it cl States. But due to the 
political difficulties with Great B ri tain h e was unable to return to the 
United States until 1812 . Whe n he d i d r eturn he ,vas caught in the wake 
of a vacillating Congress tha t alterna t e l y trans.fe l'red the survey function 
to the Navy Departme nt and b ack to t he T rei.lsury and then back to the 
~,..,.:::c,.. - ' 
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Navy and back to the Treasury again. While this was going on, Hassler 
acted to adopt a standard of measure for the United States without 
reference to Congress. 
On his trip to Europe, Hassler had acquired the best available 
copies of the Troy pound and the kilogram. In 1830, while the survey 
function was temporarily in the hands of the Navy, Congress asked the 
Secretary of the Treasury to investigate the old problem of weights and 
measures in the customs houses. Since Hassler was temporarily fr ee , 
he was given the job. 
Two years earlier the Congress had legalized a pound weight for 
use by the Mint, but, except for this use, it had no legal status. Hassler 
now determined that this pound approximated the Troy pound and he 
accepted it as standard and went ahead with his investigations. Beyond 
that h 1 . e a so broadened his survey, without authority, to include the 
Weights and measures of all governmental departments and states as 
Well a th s ose of the customs houses. His findings could have been fore-
cast--scarcely two weights and measures used in the United States were 
alike. But Congress received Hassler' s report in its usual manner --
With caution and deliberation. 
In the meantime Hassler acted on his own. Deciding for himself 
what th t · b h h e na 1onal weights and measures should e, e set up s op in a 
nearby 1 · f h . d d f arsena and began manufacturing copies o 1s stan ar s o 
w · 
eight and measure for distribution to the state governments. In time 
Congr d. ess 1scovered what Hassler was up to and, interestingly enough, 
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the House adopted a resolution supporting his action. Then in 1836 
Congress passed a resolution directing the Secretary of the Treasury 
to do what Hassler had been doing: to supply the states with sets of 
standards. This function was to be retained by the Treasury Depart-
ment until the National Bureau of Standards was created by Congress 
in 1901. 
Three years after Congress took its first cautious step in the 
standardization of weights and measures, in 1839, 40 men- - civil 
e ngineers from 11 of the then 27 states--met in New York to exchange 
ideas and information. From this initial meeting there evolved the 
American Society of Civil Engineers in November, 1852. IO 
This meeting of American civil engineers marked the serious 
introduction of engineering and technology in the United States. In 1830, 
the first l ocomotive had been placed in service in the United States. Pro-
duction of locomotives started in the same year. New techniques were 
required to b u ild roads and bridges strong enough to support the heavy 
rail loads. The growth of industries and deve l opment of better trans-
portation facilities he l ped build up the cities with a corresponding in-
crease in the demand for waterworks, pumping engines, systems of 
drainage, and gas works. This great expansion of engineering and 
technologi cal activity was reflected in the need for orderly coordination 
l0Initially the American Society of Civil Engineers was called 
the American Society of C ivil Engineers and Architects; however, in 
1868, a fragmentation of engineering specialities began to take place 
and the word " architects " was dropped from the name of the society. 
and dissemination of engineering information and, subsequently, 
s tandards. 
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Marking this technological advance, in 1824 the Rensselear 
Polytechnic Institute had been founded. In 1846 and 1847, this was 
followed by the establishment of engineering schools at Yale and 
Harvard. In 1846 the Smithsonian Institution was chartered. By 1848 
locomotives had reached the speed of a mile per minute. In 1851 Morse 
telegraph was introduced for the control of trains. 
Now, whil e the United States plunged through the ensuing fabulous 
fifties significant standardization steps were to be taken, mostly by 
individual s and companies with Congress acquiescing. Foremost, per-
haps, was that taken by Brown and Sharpe who introduc ed a system of 
wire gage based on a rational~ geometric progression. Little noticed 
at the time, this system was to remain a basic United States standard 
in years to come. Unfortunately, however, a similar system was to 
be established in Great Britain and, although using the same designation 
numbe r s, was to involve different dimensions. 
Following almost immediate ly on the heels of Brown and Sharpe 
came a citizen to exert a lasting, profound influence on American stand-
ardization. This man, William Sellers, was an engineer, Philadelphia 
manufacturer, and president of the Franklin Ins~itute. At the monthly 
meeting of the Institute, Sellers, on April 21, 1864 , introduced his now 
famous paper on a "System of Screw Threads and Nuts. 11 He stated 
t hat: 
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In this country no organized attempt has as yet been made to estab-
lish any system /-;f screw threads/, each manufacturer having 
adopted whateve;-his judgement 1_:;;-ay have dictated as the best, or 
as most convenient for himself; but • • • the extent to which manu-
facturing has attained , admonishes us that so radical a defect 
should be a llowed to exist no longer. 11 
Sellers, like Hassler, acted where Congress should have acted. 
There is little doubt that Sellers' solution removed a major obstacle to 
United States industrial expansion, but it also laid the basis for a prob-
l e m that was to exist for and, perhaps, beyond the next century. For 
one thing, efforts were a l ready underway to internationalize the metric 
thread systems that had been used in European Continental countries 
since 1848; for another, Joseph Whitworth had in 1841 put forth a different 
thread design that was to become the basis of the United Kingdom system. 
Again the United States and the United Kingdom were to diverge on a basic 
standard. 
Following the Civil War, the continued advance in engineering 
and technology resulted in the formation in 1871 of the American Institute 
of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers. Then i n 1874 and 1880 there 
w e re organized the American Institute of Electrical Engineers and the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers. 
Internationally, with the coming of electricity and the te l egraph , 
communications leaped across national borders, but it was soon found 
that varying national practices and equipment were destroying the 
usability of this invention. Thus in 1865 the re was organized the 
11 William Sellers, quoted in Journal 5!£ the Franklin Institute, 
M a y, 1864, p. 344. 
International Telegraphic Union. 12 Postal communications were 
presenting similar problems and in 1863, the year Congress set the 
Union Pacific Railroad gauge at four feet, eight and one-half inches, 
representatives of fifteen countries met to consider international 
postal problems, but the Universal Postal Union
13 
did not come into 
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being until 1878. Twelve years after the international postal me eting, 
in 1875, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures was 
organized with United States representation. These three international 
standardization organizations provided the world with its first ex-
periences in standardization at the international level. And all of 
these organizations were subscribed to by the United States but some-
how the United States did not thereby embrace the idea of standardization. 
Now related to the pressing demands for standardization in the 
field of communications was the need for standardization in the new 
field of electricity. This brought several congresses together during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century w:ith the Chicago Electrical 
Congress of 1 893 actually reaching the point of defining the words "ohm, 11 
"volt," and "ampere. 11 And upon the termination of the Chicago Electrical 
Congress, the United States Congress, after over a century of reluctance 
to act in the field of standardization, took the unprecedented step of 
legalizing these definitions. Unfortunately, it was soon discovered that 
l 2The International Telegraphic Union became the International 
Telecommunication Union in 19 32 as a result of a merger into one con -
ve ntion of radio, telegraph, and telephone. 
13Initially termed the General Postal Union. 
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the definitions provided by the Chicago Electrical Congress were not 
e ntirely accurate, and so the United States Congress had Adams' 
e arlier warning regarding the limits of the legislature in the field of 
standardization vividly emphasized. 
While all these international standardization actions were taking 
place another United States citizen acted to fill the tremendous stand-
ardization void left by Congress. This man was Charles Ferdinand 
Dowd an ordinary citizen who, in 1860, was principal of the Temple 
Grove Ladies Seminary at Saratoga Springs, New York. At that period 
in history, time was still a local choice. This would not have been too 
serious except that the introduction of rapid transport, the railroad, 
made the coordination of wide areas of activity on a time basis a neces-
sity. However, since no action had been taken to provide the nation 
with a uniform time system, the cities and the railroads e l ected to 
e stablish their own. The dilemma thus caused cannot be overstated. 
Dowd rebelled against this arrangement and devoted twenty years of 
his life fighting it. Finally, with the help of an exasperated public, he 
succeeded in winning over the American Railway Association which 
adopted the idea of standard time belts for its members on November 18, 
1883. 
14 
In the interim, the standardization of time had been fought 
vehemently on political, constitutional, and religious groun,ds--a 
14A traveller from Maine arriving in Buffalo might find his 
watch reading 12:15, the Buffalo city clock reading 11 :40, the New York 
C e ntral assuring him it was 12 noon, and the L ake Shore Railroad assert-
ing it was 11 :25. 
pattern that was to be repeated in the United States many times in 
the years to come. 
In industry, in the meantime, a revolution was underway. 
About 1885 Carl Edvard Johansson in Sweden; and Brown and Sharpe, 
a
nd 
Pratt and Whitney in the United States; and others developed a 
broad t . 
sys em of gaging equipment. Following on the heels of this 
came th 
e modern miracles of mass production and the assembly line. 
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The effects of rapid transportation, rapid communications, and 
techn 1 · 0 ogical advancement were now beginning to be felt throughout the 
United States. It was this and the force of industry and education that 
finall 
Y moved Congress to act with greater logic and on March 3, 1901, 
it e stablished the National Bureau of Standards. 15 But this action still 
followed b 
Y over a decade the establishment of Germany's Imperial 
Phy · 
· sical Technical Institute. 
Hassler' s standards were still in use, but the old Office of 
Weight 
s and Measure in the Treasury Department was not equal to the 
task of the day for need now exceeded by far the simple requirement for 
the cu t d 
s O Y of a few physical weights and measures. The United States 
now d 
nee ed precise standards in many fields. England, France, Ger -
many 
' and Russia already were far ahead in the physical sciences and 
each had in being a substantial national physical laboratory. No equiva-
lent fa ·1· 
Cl ity existed in the United States and, because of this and the 
D 15 U. S. Congress, Act of March 3, 1901-; 31 Stat. 1449; 15 
• s. c. 271. 
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lack of standards, United States science, education, and industry 
were lagging. 
While the Congress apparently did not realize i t, the United 
States and the worl d i n 1900 wa s on the thr e shold of t he age of stand-
a rdization. Ind u s t r y, education, a nd trad e s tandards were be c oming 
t he s ubjec t o f t he day a nd w e r e rapidly f o rming the b a sis of e xplosive 
expansi Bi.t at th tu:r the ntu y wh n - d~ v c o p:tn t , g 
• ~cl qu ity ont el w • . 
thi . 
A a d e my o f Sc i e n ce s, a t its annual mee ting in 190 0, p oint e d out that : 
The facilities at the disposal of the Government and of the scientific 
men of the country for the standardization of apparatus used in 
scientific research and in the arts are now either absent or entirely 
inadequate, so that it becomes necessary in most instances to send 
such apparatus abroad for comparison. 16 
Unfortunately, at the beginning of the twentieth century the 
accuracy of most scientific and industrial gear could not be determined 
1n the United States and unles s it bore a European seal it was considered 
of unknown reliability. Even the Navy Department had to send its navi-
gation instruments to Germany for calibration. Old and new industry 
a nd old and new science were being torn asunder by the l ack of standards. 
Typical of the day were the problems being encountered by the new 
e l ec trical industry. While in 189 3 certain key definitions had been 
16Perry, op. cit., p. 128. 
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provided this industry, it still lacked such fundamental standards as 
brightness tests and suffered severe disintegration from the some 200 
varieties of lamp sockets and 10,000 varieties of lamps in being. 
In 1900 the United States and the world were at the stage where 
e ither standardization became a basis for progress or social disorder 
took over. Fortunately standardization won out, but it was not a lways 
the result of logical thinking or by a significant margin. 
From 1900 on there was a marked growth in the number and 
size of national standards associations and societies. Foremost of 
these was the American Society for Testing Materials which was 
formed in 1902. In that same year the National Association of Auto = 
mobil e Manufacturers es tablished its first three standards. 17 
Internationally, the e l ectrical congresses that had been meeting 
during the last of the preceding century now conceived the idea of a 
permanent organization capable of carrying out international electro -
technical standardization in a methodical and continuous manner. Acting 
on this conclus ion the St. Louis Congress of 1904 entrusted Col. R. E. 
Crompton of the United Kingdom with the organization of such a body 
and in 1906 it was established as the International Electrotechnical 
Commission. Four years l ater, in 1910 , the first, but unsuccessful, 
attempt to reach international agreement on civil aviation was made by 
nineteen European nations. 
17 rn 1917 the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
became the Society of Automotive Engineers . 
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In the United States the year 1910 saw standardization raised 
a gain to Congressional level. Congressional complaints that procure -
m e nt was inefficient and should be standardized led to the ere ation by 
the Executive of a General Supply Committee. A year later, this 
c ommittee was to be p laced under the wing of the Treasury Department 
by Congress. 
But 1910 should be remembered in standardization circles more 
for the fact that that year Henry Hess, a member of the Standards 
Committee of the Society of Automotive Engineers, visited Europe and 
came back to the United States impressed with the need for centralized 
national standardization and some form of international standardization. 
It was this single visit that was to result, in 1918, in the formation of 
the American Engineering Standards Committee, the forerunner of the 
American Standards Association. In this instance, as so often had been 
the case in the past and was to be the case in the future, the United 
States was to take the lead from the United Kingdom and such persons 
as Col . Crompton, L. S. Roberton, and Charles l e Maistre, the 
organizers of the British Standards Co.mmittee, later the British 
Standards Institute. 
During the next year, 1911, at the urging of Hess, a United 
States committee on Joint Engineering Standards met several times to 
study his recommendations for organized standardization. Advancing 
from these discussions, in 1912, Hess was planning "that every en-
g ineeri·ng society or technical body having interest in standards work 
of any kind would form a special Joint Engineering Standards Com-
mittee. 1118 With little doubt, the urging of Hess was finding support 
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for in May of that year the Council of the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers voted: 
••• that the Society officially invite the sister engineering 
societies of the world to appoint committees similar to our own 
Committee on Standards and, upon the receipt of a sufficient 
number of acceptances in the judgment of our Committee on 
Standards, that a conference be held of these, or delegates 
from these committees and societies, for the formulation of a 
clearing house to assist in the formulation of standards for the 
engineering profession. 19 
But the mood of most such organizations was to form first a national 
coordinating body before proceeding to the international problem. 
While the national and international organizational problems 
were being argued, primarily along engineering lines, another stand-
ardization concept was being introduced. This was managerial stand-
ardization. In 1912 this concept of standardization, notably as advocated 
by such disciples as F. W. Taylor, w a s discussed before a Special 
Committee of the House of Representatives. Now it was recognized 
that the performance of an organization as a whole depended on the 
integration of numerous daily tasks carried out by individuals and that 
standardization was an absolute necessity to the success of the whole. 
18Henry Hess, Letter for F. L. Hutchinson, Secretary, 
American Institute of Electrical Enginee rs, May 23, 1912, quoted in 
Industrial Standardization, December, 1943 , p. 318. 
l 9Industrial Standardization, Decembe r, 1943, p . 319. 
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Standards for measuring work performance and other standard 
managerial tools came into their own. 
In that same year, 1912, Carl Edvard Johansson started mak-
ing gage blocks for the American market. 20 But, somehow, Johansson 
had to overcome the old inch/ metric controversy to produce Johansson 
blocks to meet American needs. This he accomplished by adopting 
an inch- milimeter conversion ratio of 25. 4. The difference between 
his ratio and the then United States legal ratio, which was about 
25. 400051, he used as the plus tol erance on his most accurate blocks. 
This action taken by a Swedish citizen was to have as lasting an effect 
on the United States system of measurement as Sellers' action had on 
the United States system of screw threads. 
The year 1913 saw a joint meeting of electrical and mechanical 
engineers, the American Institute of Electrical Engineers and the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, but further joint action 
temporarily was held up by the urgencies of World War I. Yet, in 1916 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers agreed to approach the 
American Institute of E l ectrical Engineers, the American Society of 
Civil Engineers, and the American Institute of Mining Engineers for the 
purpose of achieving cooperation in standardization and to avoid duplica-
tion and working at cross purposes. This idea was accepted and on 
December 29, 19 16, the first meeting of the Joint Conference on American 
20carl Edvard Johansson, in 1846, designed the method of gaging 
which bears his name. Since then his system has be c ome world-wide . 
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E . 
ngineering Standards was held. This Committee recommended the 
formation of an American Engineering Standards Committee in which 
u· 
nited States governmental representation was advised. But action on 
this 
recommendation was not to take place for two years. 
Unwittingly, the standardization that was achieved in the first 
sixteen years of the twentieth century made World War I technically 
a
nd 
logistically possible. Yet, the standardization achievements that 
accumulated in that period were as minutiae in comparison to the 
possibilities. It is now seen that standardization rather than money, 
rnen, materials, or the consent of the Congress frequently was the 
ingredient that prevented the optimum build up of United States military 
forces. 21 
Perhaps nothing had as great an impact on United States stand-
ardization as did World War I. The War Industries Board, appointed by 
President Woodrow Wilson to manage war production, seized upon 
standa d. · · · 1 d d r 1zation as a basic strategy to conserve mater1a s an pro uction 
capacity. Within a relatively short period of time drastic reductions 
Were effected. Approximately 5, 500 styles of rubber footwear were 
eli:minatedi 446 models of washing machines were reduced to 18; 550 
tyPes of harrows were reduced to 38. Similar standardization orders 
Went 22 
out to almost three hundred industry groups. But the only real 
21 
The New York Times, June 18, 1917, p. 8: "There is no lack 
of rnateria~--=--: All that is lacking is the consent of Congress. 11 
22 
Perry, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 
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st
andards agency in the United States rn 1917 remained the National 
Bureau of Standards. 
The work of the National Bureau of Standards in World War I 
is little known. However, it must be recalled that the Bureau, in 
addition to its standardization capability and prowess, in 1917, was 
one of the better scientific and research and development agencies in 
44 
th
e United States. This additional capability was developed as a 
necessary adjunct to its standardization responsibilities. The research, 
development, testing, and standardization work of the Bureau during 
World War I was enlarged to the point where most war materials at 
some stage passed through its hands. Aeronautical research, the 
synch · 
ronized cannon, engines, fuels, hydrogen-helium problems, 
signalling devices, instruments, and thousands of other wartime items 
came W:ithin the jurisdiction of the Bureau. With little question, the 
United States moved into World War I essentially a militarily back ... 
wa rd nation, and it was largel y through the standardization and related 
efforts of the Bureau that the United States was partially able to catch 
up. 23 
Pure military standardization in World War I had its problems. 
In the field of aeronautics, which was reasonably typical of the overall 
. 
23
This is not to discredit the contributions of the National Ad-
visory Committee for Aeronautics, the Council of National Defense, or 
O~her organizations. It is, however, to emphasize the direct and in-
direct benefits of standardization which, at that date, were epitomized 
by the National Bureau of Standards . 
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wartime standardization program , a Joint Board on Aeronautical 
Cognizance was organized by the Army and the Navy in January , 1917, 
to stimulate air cooperation. But this Board was more interested in 
jurisdictional agreements than in operational and procurement ecxnomy, 
a nd standardization did not appear on its agenda. About the same time 
a nother joint Army- Navy board recommended that airplane types 
a dopted by the Army and Navy be "as nearly alike 11 as consistent with 
their particular missions ; that "aircraft motors, machinery, radio sets, 
bombs, and other accessories" should be standardized "to the greatest 
e xtent compatible" with such missions ; and that "there should b e had 
the mutual interchange of ideas and joint cooperation that now obtain 
24 
1n the design and construction of the first Zeppelin. However, stand -
a rdization as a function was not as signed anywhere in the Air Servic e , 
a nd it was not until after World War I that the Aeronautical Board
25 
w as expanded to cover standards for parts and materials, and an 
Army- Navy Specifications Unit was set up as part of the Engineering 
Division at McCook Field, Dayton, Ohio. 
While some good steps and some poor steps w e r e taken in the 
fi e ld of national standardization, the international pictur e hardly lent 
24u. s. Army, Memorandum for the S e cretary of War by Board 
of A rmy and Navy officers relative to the d e velopm e nt of an a e ronautical 
s e rvice, March 12, 1917 (in the files of the D epartment of Army, fil e : 
AAG 334. 7). 
25 The Board of Aeronautic al Cognizanc e was r e nam e d the A e ro -
n a utical Board on December 29, 1919. M a ny writers , howe v e r, place the 
origin of the Aeronautical Board as 1916. (S ee a s an e xample Col. D. G . 
Lingle and Capt. G. A . S e itz, "Ar my .. Nav y Ae ronautical Sta nda rdization, 11 
S A E Journal, Novemb e r, 1942, p . 32.) 
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itself to any good actions. Insofar as international standardization was 
c oncerned, the United States and the Allies were not only faced with 
differences between the standards of the metric and British systems 
but there were major differences as between the United States and the 
British systems . When the United States entered World War I, and 
even before, it was faced with the tremendous probl em of either pro-
ducing according to current United States standards {which varied even 
as between like-type industries) and not consider how the resulting 
non-standard items would b l end with existing items; attempting to 
modify United States industry to produce in accordance with either 
the metric or British standards; or attempting to modify the metric 
and British standards to coincide with the real and fictional United 
States standards. These points were discussed at length throughout 
the war but were never conclusively resolved. 
When the United States entered World War I, it was visited 
shortly by British and French Missions. The purpose of these Missions 
was to coordinate the war effort and, after they had studie d the stand-
ardization problem, they suggested that United States soldiers should 
use existing types of military equipment and that the United States 
should endeavor to support the necessary increased production in 
those two countries. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss appeared to support this 
concept when he asked the question: 11 Why should we introduce new 
calibers on the line while rifles and guns and ammunition, in increasing 
numbers, are waiting for us to use them, with no chance of confusion 
due to different types. " 26 E x t ending this idea Bliss considered the 
matter of standard communications a nd suggested that United States 
forces shoul d train with the British rather b .an with the French. 
27 
Worl d War I standardiza t i o n d i ff iculties finally multiplied to 
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the point where the Congre ss took cogni zance of them and it reached the 
conclusion that one of the princ ipa l probl em areas l ay in threaded parts. 
This is, of course, true since i n the m anufacture of a l most every irp-
plement of war the screw thread plays a n important part. Unfortunately, 
the Congress should have thoug ht of thi s i n 1864 when Sellers was putting 
forth his basic proposals in the Franklin Institute. Now the United States 
and Great Britain were basically commi tted to a Sellers and Whitworth 
thread respective l y while Franc e p roduced in accordance with metric 
standards that were based on internatio na l standards of 1898. 
28 
Never-
thel ess, it was felt that something had to be done and in Jul y, 1918, the 
Congress appointed a National S c r ew Thr ead Commission to investigate 
and promul gate standards for sc rew thr eads. One year later, and after 
a thorough s tudy of conditions o:f screw maD"ifacture in the United States, 
26Gen. Tasker H. Bliss , q uote d i n F rederick Palmer, Bliss, 
Peacemaker, The Life and L e tters of G eneral Tasker Howard Bliss 
(New York: D odd, Mead and C o . , 1934} , p . 1 51 . 
2 7Ibid., p . 148. 
28International metric s t a ndard s we r e agreed at the Zurich Con-
ference of 1898. W hil e national metric s tandards tended to vary some-
what from the international standard, the di fferences w e re slight. (John 
Gaillard, "What Is the Pr e s ent Status 0£ M etr ic Screw Thread Standards? 11 
Industrial Standardization , A ug u st , 1945, p p. 183 - 187 . ) 
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th
e National Screw Thread Commission conferred with British and 
French . 
engineers and manufacturers of screw- threaded products for 
th
e purpose of discussing a tentative report which it had prepared as a 
basis for · t · 1 . . in ernationa standardization. But while the three countries 
seerned anxious to cooperate, no agreements were reached and eventually, 
Wi
th the coming of the peace, the idea was deemphasized. 29 
While this activity was going on at the governmental level, United 
States · d 
in ustry was finding an ever-increasing need for standardization. 
But it was also realized that unlimited freedom in drawing standards was 
leadin t 
g O much overlapping and duplication of work, and, more important, 
Was tending to defeat the very purpose of standardization by perpetuating 
unnecessary varieties and even creating conflicting standards. Acting on 
th




8, the American Engineering Standards Committee. 30 The War 
Department, the Navy Department, and the Department of Commerce 
Were· · d 
invited to participate in this committee and they accepte • 
These and the many other standardization actions that took place 
as a r 1 
esu t of World War I were, however, generally too late to have any 
29 
Combined Production and Resources Board, Report of Con-
~Lerences on Standardization of Screw Threads and Cylindrical Fi~ 
0Ud - --:--=:------ - ~-:--- ----- -- --
~' August-September 1944 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
fice, 1944), p. z. --
b 
30
The American Engineering Standards Committee was established !vi the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Society of 
th echanic~l Engineers, the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, 
f e ~mencan Society for Testing Materials, and the Americ an Institute 0 Mi · 
ning and Metallurgical Engineers. 
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rnat · 1 
· eria effect on the conduct of that war. Nevertheless, Lord Steven-
son, Vice Chairman of the Ministry of Munitions Advisory Committee 
in Great B ·t · · · 
n ain said; "If simplification and standardization had not 
been adopted, we would have lost the war. 1131 Unfortunately, these 
Wo
rd
s tended to be lost in the mountains of literature that fell upon man 
after the c l ose of World War I. 32 
With the cessation of hostilities, the military forces found 
th
emselves with huge stocks of war materials deluging their supply 
sy
st
ems. The net result was that, for many years to come, they were 
tnore engrossed in the use of this equipment than in a standardization 
Program. Industrially and commercially the .change from war to peace 
Production brought a great scramble within these groups to capture 
markets and consumers. In this scramble differences rather than 
standa d. . 
r ization had to be emphasized. Nevertheless, it was found 
that · d . 
in ustries were becoming more dependent on each other in terms 
of sub-contractors and suppliers. Further, the industries were finding 
it e:x:c d" 
ee ingly difficult to work in an atmosphere where states and even 
f 
31
Lord Stevenson quoted by Howard Coonley, "The Importance 0 St . ' . 
I a ndardization to Our American Enterpr1ze," An address before the 
f~ldu
st
rial College of the Armed Forces, February 19, 1948 {in the 1 
es of th · · B Al e Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force ase, abama). 
32
0ne point not lost at the end of World War I was the impending role f 0 
aeronautics and the need for international aeronautical stand-ards T 
C • he 1919 Versailles Peace Conference created the International 
J\T on:ention for Air Navigation and the International Commission for Air 
avigation, the forerunner of the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
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lo c alities could each specify standards applicable to the industrie s. 
This diffic ulty was highlighted i n the many conflicting s a fety standards 
that were in use in the United States. 
It had originally been intended that the National Bureau of 
Standards should develop national safety standards for industry. This 
work was recognized to be of great importance since each state had its 
own legal safety requirements, and their diversity was an embarrass -
ment and problem to industry. However, the Bureau did not act to 
provide these standards and an industry-wide conference gave the prob-
lem to the American Engineering Standards Committee providing it 
extend its membership to be more representative of industry. This 
was done, and in 1920 work on industrial safety standards was started. 
This endeavor proved successful and the American Engineering Stand -
ards Committee's standards were, in a large measure, adopted by the 
individual states. 
The same year that the American Engineering Standards Com-
mittee initiated work on industrial safety standards, it organized a 
Sectional Committee of Standardization and Unification of Screw Threads. 
This Committee cooperated with the wartime National Screw Threads 
Committee in developing a National Screw Thread Standard and, in 1924, 
the first edition of that standard was published. 
As a result of the success in safety standards, screw thread 
standards, and other areas, the stature of the American Engineering 
Standards Committee was increased and its future seemed to be assured 
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on lines similar to those of the Europea n national standardization 
b d
. 33 
o 1e s. 
While this post-World War I standardization activity was taking 
place within industry, the rising economic difficulties of the United 
States were destined to l ead to increased national standardization actions. 
These difficulties prompted Herbert Hoover, then president of the Fed-
erated American Engineering Societies, to champion the establishment 
of a committee to study ways to reduce the high cost of living. This 
committee drew attention to the manner in which industrial effort was 
thinly spread over an exces sive ly wide range of products . It considered 
that as a result there was a wastage of about fifty percent or $10,000,000,000 
a year, and it recommended that the D epartment of Commerce should assist 
industry to concentrate its effort, particularly in regard to governmental 
supplies. But this recommendation was not accepted by the government 
on the basis that it was essentially an industry problem. Then when Hoover 
became Secretary of Commerce a few years later , he dir ec ted the Nationa l 
Bureau of Standards to set up new divisions to promote the adoption of 
commercial standards and simplified practices. The Director of the 
Bureau, Samuel W . Stratton, objected that this was not the kind of thing 
that the Bureau ought to do, but Hoover overruled him and the function re-
mained with the Bureau until 1950. 
34 
33see Appendix A for a description of "Standardization in 
European Countries." 
34stratton objected on the basis that commercial standardization 
was not a research project and was loade d with controversies, long range 
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By 1926 the screw thread problem that had been dropped at the 
e
nd 
of World War I raised its head again. In that year a British mission, 
headed by Sir Richard Glazebrook, visited the United States to attempt 
to resolve the basic differences between the British Whitworth screw 
thread a d th . 
n e Umted States standard which embodied Sellers' design, 
the Arn . 
erican National Screw Thread. But the compromise offered by 
th
e British was not considered acceptable by the United States and no 
agreement was reached. There the matter rested until the exigencies 
of World War II brought it to the fore again. 35 
During the same year that the British screw thread mission 
Visited the United States, an international conference of standardization 
bod· 
les convened in New York and founded the International Federation of 
National St . . 36 
andard1z1ng Associations. Two years later, in Prague, its 
con t· 8 
ltution was approved. But the International Federation of National 
Standa d' . 
r 1z1ng Associations was, as one observer noted, "largely under 
in-i.plic t · 
8 . a 
10ns, and hazards. Commercial standards do not usually have a 
B cientific basis and Stratton felt this activity would open the National 
ureau of Standards to political attack which it later did in such notable 
contra · .. 
vers1es as the AD-X2 battery additive case. 
. 
35
The National Screw Thread Committee did not actually disband 
Until 1933 · h d the D • Six years later, to meet the need for screw t rea standards, 
d epartments of War Navy, and Commerce established the Inter-
epartn-i. t 1 ' . · en a Screw Thread Committee. 
i . 
36
The origin of the International Federation of National Standard-
;ing Associations actually dates back to April, I 921, when a Conference 
: Secretaries of the National Standardizing Bodies was held in London nd
e:r th d d A · · " e auspices of the British Engineering Stan ar s ssociation • 
.o..ttendi · d G B · · 
b ng were representatives of Belgium, Cana a, reat ritain, 
J.-1.01Iand N . 
' orway, Switzerland, and the United States. 
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the aegis of technical men and any industrial interest behind it was 
spotty •• /Further 7 the two la rge wor ld trade nations , Great 
Britain and America, were not overly energetic insofar as their 
. . 1 . d '37 respective commerc1a interests were concerne • ' The Association 
was active until World War II, but in the meantime it became Continental 
in nature and tended to be dominated by Germany when that nation 
moved into a position of technical superiority. Eventually this German 
te chnical domination became so strong that many were under the im -
pression that the Association was being used as a Fascist "tool to further 
their aggressive interests . 1138 Viewed historically, it is now apparent 
that this was to be a reaction common among all lesser members of both 
national and international standardization organizations. 
Nationally, consumers began to play an increasing role in the 
standardization process. Following World War I, there was a phenome-
nal increase in the number of industrial and technical standardization 
agencies. Countering this movement, public consumers were attempting, 
through grade lab e lling and other standards, to simplify purchasing and 
to make the consumer a more inte lligent and critical buyer. But the 
most active cons umer in the work of standardization was the government. 
Sinc e about 1920 standardized specifications for eq 'i.1ipment and material 
37 M. J. Wollner, "Standards and World Trade," Industrial 
Standardization, June, 1946, p. 148. 
38Benjamin Melnitsky, Profiting From Industrial Standardization 
(Ne w York: Conover - Mast Publications, Inc . , 1953), p . 41. 
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c ommon to the various federal agencies had been published and dis -
seminated to industry by the Treasury Procurement Division, which 
wa s the purchasing agent for all common items ne e ded by the seve ral 
departments. Its 11 General Schedule of Supplies" contained about 
1 , 600 specifications, and was the ' 'Bible" of the purchasing ag e nts 
throughout the federal offices as well as a guide for use by industry 
and business. 
In the military sphere, although the Aeronautical Board's 
dire c tive did not mention standardization, in 1921 it did make a begin-
n ing on certain related problems by preparing a standard procedure 
f o r the drawing up of experimental contracts and a uniform procedure 
for the testing of aeronautical material. 39 In 1922 the National Ad-
v isory Committee for Aeronautics urged the importance of materials 
sta ndards and agreed with the Board that the l atter should monitor the 
w ork. 4 o But the Board was not given this responsibility until fifteen 
y e ars later; instead, still another Board, the Joint Army- Navy Sta nd-
a rds Board of 1923, was set up based on a suggestion by the Engineering 
Divi,sion at McCook Fie ld and incorporated in an agreement between the 
Dire ctor of Air Services and the Navy. 41 The early history of this 
39 Aeronautical Board, " Annual Report of the Aerona utical 
Board, 11 Octobe r 19, 1921 (in the files of the Department of the Army, 
fil e : AAG 334. 7). 
40u. S. Army, Maj. H. W. Harms , Memorandum for Maj. 
T . R . Bane, May 22, 1922 (in the files of the Department of A rmy, fil e: 
A AG 334. 8). 
41 U. S. Army, Gen. Mason M. Patric k , M e mora ndum for 
55 
Board as recorded by the United States Air Force is so typical of 
l a ter national and international standardization problems and operations 
t hat it is worth noting. 
One officer was assigned from each service, including Maj. 
D. C. Emmons for the Army, and they were directed to 11 harmonize 11 
those differences, many of them "minute and unimportant" by them-
selves, that burdened the manufacturer with the stocking of mate -
rials and parts of odd sizes, dimensions, and specifications. 
Annual conferences were begun in 1924, alternating between Dayton 
(McCook Field) and Philadelphia (Naval Aircraft Factory). The 
board of officers served in addition to their other duties, and they 
were not assisted by any permanent working committees; but the 
annual conferences, opened also to representatives of the aircraft 
industry, did result in the preparation of some specifications for 
parts that could be used in common. Compromise was always 
necessary, resulting i n slight modifications of the specifications of 
the Army or of the Navy, respectively. According to an Air Corps 
report in 1927, the Bureau of Aeronautics was deferring to the Air 
Corps in about 75 percent of the cases, either because j_Air Corp!!_/ 
specifications were 11superior 11 or because the Navy was 11mor e will -
ing to compromise. 11 Exactly what percentage of specifications 
were standardized in those years is not known, but by about 1930 
'
1all the bolts, nuts, cotter-pins, washers, rivets, tie-rod termi -
nals, clevis pins, turnbuckels ••• and ;;om e/ larger items of 
equipment ••• /had been made Army- N~vy/-;tandard 11 ; / Army-
Navy/ standard drawings for such parts beZ"ame familiar to aero -
nautical draftsmen; and parts manufacturers began to feature the 
symbol 11AN 11 in their catalogs. 
Though the two services could forget rivalry to some extent, 
there were still weaknesses in the Army- Navy standardization pro -
cedure. The 11 master agreements 11 negotiated between the two serv-
ices were not published as actual procurement documents for use by 
industry, but were merely filed with each service as documents to 
be ttincorporated 11 in the published specifications of that service. In 
effect , the "master agreement11 was not a common standard but 
merely a guide to the two specification sections. Deviations and 
divergencies crept into the published specifications, many of them 
Rear Adm. N. A. Moffett, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, May 22, 1923 
{in the files of the Department of Army, file: Working Committee, 
Aeronautical Board, 11Standardization11). 
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obscure and indiscernible, especially to higher authority within 
each service, but quite noticeable and "exasperating" to the manu-
facturers who had to stock both sets of materials. In some cases, 
such as that involving the altimeter, the joint agreement was 
merely "a confession of inability to get together. 11 There were 
other difficulties as well. In one case four years were spent 
agreeing on basic structural design values for stee l and magnesium 
alloys. Joint conferences became more and more spasmodic, with 
no annual meetings between 1934 and 1936. In 1936 a Navy suggestion 
for an annual meeting was held up in the Air Corps for three months . 
The confusing explanations for this delay, first that the Materiel 
Division had not been able to decide on an agenda and a date, and a 
few weeks later, that the Navy l etter had been misplaced, indicated 
perhaps a lack of positive policy and action on the problem of common 
specifications. 42 
While the military departments were going through the painful 
process of growing up in the age of standardization, a similar though, 
perhaps, not as painful growth was taking place elsewhere. Benjamin 
Melnitsky reports that: 
By 1926 ••• the U. S. Government alone was spending 
$4,250,000 yearly on standardization. Trade associations and 
technical societies were not far behind with an annual expenditure 
of $3, 820, 000. Among the agencies then engaged in this work 
/ in the United States were/: 
191 trade and commercial organizations, 
17 professional and technical societies, 
54 U. S. Government bureaus, 
81 state highway commissions and other state bureaus, 
105 city government bureaus or departments, 
5 national standardizing organizations, and 
2 American committees on international standards agencies . 43 
In 1927 the additional work of the National Bureau of Standards 
as assigned by Hoover, which was to eliminate waste through the 
42 u. S. Air Force, Air University, Historical Division, Stand-
ardization of Air Materiel, 1939 - 1944, Controls, Policies, and Pro -
c edures, Air Historical Studies: No. 67, November, 1951, pp. 6 - 8. 
43Melnitsky, ~P· cit., pp. 45 - 46 . 
57 
establishment of standards of practice, for stock sizes, and varieties 
of specific commodities that were currently in general production and 
demand, was extended to include commercial standards. The stated 
purpose was to establish standard methods of test, rating, certification, 
and labelling of commodities and to provide a basis for fair competition. 
The next year, 1928, the American Engineering Standards Committee 
became the American Standards Association with a board of directors 
representative of not only technical and industrial societies but also of 
consumers and other interests. And so the pattern of growth of the 
discipline of standardization continued. Yet, it still lacked organization, 
unity, and common purpose. 
The depression of the thirties spurred standardization still 
further. Grade label ing and standards for commodities sold in retail 
stores became mundane topics for discussion among the public. Similarly, 
industrial purchasers found in standardization a means for lowering costs 
of materials, parts, and products. Typifying the trend, Carl Edvard 
Johansson, who in 1912 started making his famed gageblocks for the 
Amer:i::an market and who in 1923 had become associated with the Ford 
Motor Company, on behalf of the Ford Motor Company asked the Ame ri-
can Standards Association in 1932 that the inch-milimeter ratio he had 
used in 1912 be made an American Standard. Following a general con-
ference and a canvas of industry, this conversion was adopted by the 
American Standards Association in 1933, one year later. 44 Progress in 
44Industrial Standardization, October, 1943, p. 29 3. The 25. 4 
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industry standardization was occurring, but, for every gain, the re 
s e emed to arise additional negating factors. As an example, in 1933, 
the American Screw Thread Company secured the rights to the cross 
r e cess screw design owned by H. F. Phillips and went into production. 
Once the practicability of this design was proved, the Reed and Prince 
Manufacturing Company introduced a competing design, the Frearson 
cross recess screw. While the design d i fferences between these two 
cross recess screws was slight, like the Sellers and Whitworth thread 
designs, they were sufficiently different to cause major problems in 
both supply and maintenance. Militarily, the use of both screw recesses 
was impractical and , starting in 1938, the military attempted to stand -
ardize on a single design, either the Phillips, the Frear son, or a 
modified design. But support was l acking in industry and it was not 
until two full decades later that standardization on a single cross recess 
design was achieved. In the meantime the total cost of non-standardization 
defied estimation, but it was conservatively estimated that, during and 
after the war years, it cost each company $50 , 000 per year just to handle 
administratively the duplicate varieties. 45 
inc_h-milimeter ratio was standardized by American Standards Associa -
tion B48. 1 ~ 1933, 1 1American Standard Practice for Inch- Milimete r Con-
version for Industrial Use. 11 
45For a detailed accounting of the cross recess screw thread 
standardization problem see Maj. Lester M . Peters, 11The N e ed for a 
Single Standard Cross Recess for Aeronautical Screws" {a resea rch pape r 
submitted to the facul ty of the Air Command and Staff School of the Air 
University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, November, 1949)., and 
Lt. Col. James F. Haehnlen, 11 Why Isn't There an International Scre w 
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In the field of military equipment, and in particular aero- • 
nautical equipment, a new low in standardization achievements was 
reached in the years prior to World War II. Brig. Gen. Henry H . 
Arnold, acting C hie£ of the Air Corps, complained of the "very in-
tang ible results 11 over the previous eighteen years, 
46 
and endorsed, 
for the first time, the establishment of standardization as a full time 
function in the Air Corps and in the Aeronautical Board. By agreement 
between the Secretaries of War and Navy a Permanent Working Com -
mittee was established within the Board in February, 1937. 
47 
However, 
no appointments to the Board were made until 1938 due to the lack of 
funds. Ultimately a staff of about fifty officers, civilian engineers, 
and clerical assistants was assigned to the Board, but this did not come 
about until forced by the pressures of war. 
In support of the 1937 reorganization of aeronautical standard-
ization, an Army-Navy Specifications Unit was established by the 
Thread? 11 (a research paper submitted to the faculty of the Air Command 
and Staff School of the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 
A labama, April, 1949). 
46 u. S. Army, Brig. Gen. Henry H . Arnold, Memorandum for 
Plans Section, December 17, 1936 (in the files of the Department of 
Army, file: AAG 4 0 0. 1 142). 
47 This was based on a plan worked out by Maj. A. J. Lyon of the 
Materiel Division, in cooperation with Lt. C. F. Cotton of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics and approved by the Army and Navy members of the Board. 
Lyon's plan called for a permanent coordinating body to serve as re -
corder, editor, and publ isher of specifications; and the elevation of this 
agency to the Aeronautical Board, in order to insure greater support by 
reason of its being in a higher echelon. At the same time, existing agen-
cies were to be used for the actual preparation of specifications. 
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Materiel Division at Wright Field48 and a comparable unit was 
organized by the Navy at the Naval Aircraft Factory at Philadelphia. 
The 1937 reorganization of aeronautical standardization was 
e xtremely significant. Although there was a major military lesson 
r e garding standardization to be drawn from World War I, the military 
e mphasis placed on it in the post-World War I period was limited to 
production and maintenance economies. Now with the approach of 
World War II, while the policy retained this feature, it moved into the 
broader field of military requirements in the field of com bat. 
48The Wright Field unit was under the administrative control of 
the Materiel Division but under the executive control of the Aeronautical 
Board in Washington. This dual control made the Wright Field unit an 
orphan in the Materiel Command and necessitated occasional reminders 
from Army Air Force Headquarters that "all possible assistance" should 
be rendered by the operating units of the Command to prevent bottle-
necking in the Army~Navy Specifications Unit. 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORY OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STA'IES WORLD WAR II 
The General Situationo During World War II the l ack of stand-
ardization caused such a multitude of problems and, yet, so much effort 
was expended to achieve essential standardization that a detailed account-
ing, if one could ever be assembled, would fill untold volumes . On the 
other hand, a summary accounting would not provide the background 
information necessary to this thesis. 
It has been alleged that, in the years prior to World War II, not 
sufficient attention was given to the value of standardization to military 
1 
preparedness. As an example, in the post-World War II period, the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces concluded in a study that "the 
lack of standardization between /United Statei.J Departments, as well 
as between the military and industry, caused delays, excessive costs, 
d f . !12 an con us1on •••• 
It is true that on the first page of the United States Industrial 
Mobilization Plan 19 39 the statement was made that: 11 War is no longer 
1Howard Coonley, An address before the Industrial College of the 
Arme d Forces, February 19, 1948 {in the files of the Air University 
Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). · 
2 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, "Indus trial Standardiza -
tion, ',' 1949, Student Committee Report (in the files of the Air University 
Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, A l abama). 
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simply a battle between armed forces on the field - -it is a struggle in 
whic h each side strives to bring to bear against the enemy the coordi-




But it is known that resources cannot be effectively 
coordinated without the tool of standardization. 
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In pre - World War II United States, the concept of standardization 
s eems to have had recognition in many quarters. At least the record 
shows that standardization was accepted and discussed in military, in -
dustrial, governmental, educational , and other circl es. Typical of the 
pre - World War II comments on the subject was the one made in Industrial 
Standardization in February, 1941 . 
Standards are basic to the success of our national defense pro-
gram. There can be no steady flow of blankets, trucks, airpl anes, 
etc. from factories and assembl y lines of the country until agree -
ment is reached on standards for materials, for fits of parts, for 
control of quality , etc. A single government order sometimes ex-
tends to hundreds of factories, and until we have a coordinated 
system of standards which will channe l the raw materials through 
mills and factories and assembly plants to the government supply 
centers, we will not achieve the full production program which we 
are after. 4 
And reinforcing these views were the observations made regarding the 
inevitable consequences of non-standardization. Typical of these was 
the one made in Industrial Standardization in January, 1941. 
Proper standards for materials and detail design requirements 
for engine mountings, accessory mountings, and other parts 
3
United States Industrial Mobilization Plan 1939, quoted by 
Coonl ey, op. cit. 
4 Industrial Standardization, February, 1941, unnumber e d p a g e . 
would have been of considerable assistance to the French defense 
program if they had been available at the beginning of the war. 5 
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But, in spite of the outward recognition of the need for standardization, 
the failings in national standardization were great. Yet, those failings 
were as nothing in comparison to the failings at the international level 
where almost insurmountable difficulties were placed in front of the 
allies due to the lack of standardization. 6 
World War II required an unprecedented degree of international 
coordina tion--coordination that was possible only through standardization. 
However, this need was seen largely after the fact. With hostilities 
upon them, the allies faced the complex problem of what should be stand-
ardized; the difficult issue of the organization for standardization; and 
the practical question of how standardization was to be ach:i.eved. And 
forc ing an answer to all three aspects of the problem were the very real 
difficulties that were being encountered in production, training, and 
combat. In spite of this urgency, standardization was to prove difficult 
to achieve. Naturally time was of the essence, and this ran directly 
counter to standardization for standardization could be achieved only 
through negotiations. But to delay production or training pending the 
resolution of standardization differences generally was unacceptable. 
In the ensuing frustration between the need for standardization and the 
5 Arthur Nutt, President, Society of Automotive Engineers, 
quoted in Industrial Standardization, January, 1941, unnumbe r ed page. 
6 1ndustrial College of the Armed Forces, 11 Industrial Standard-
ization, 11 op. cit. 
pre ssure of time , the War P r oduction Board and the Office of Lend-
Lease Administration, in 19 4 3, :ried unsuccessfully to cause all 
foreign procur e m e nt in the United States to be based on United States 
standards and specificati o n s. 7 Obviously, such a solution was un-
ac c eptable in terms of an a llied :nilitary operation; yet something had 
to be done. 
64 
It was noted earlier that :he International Federation of National 
8 
Standardizing A ssoc iations d i d n ot continue through World War II. When 
it stopped functioning i t s work w as taken up by the United Nations Stand-
ards Coordinating Committee 
9 
which was founded in an effort to save loss 
of time and money in the m anuf a cture of arms and equipment that was 
a c cruing as a result of th e l ack of uniform standards among the allies . 
For similar reasons t he C omb in ed Production and Resources Boa.rd was 
established to coordina t e, p r i nc ipally, the production of the United States , 
the United Kingdom, and C anada , Backing the Combined Production 
Rescurces Board wer e suc h orga:iizations as the Anglo - American Con-
servation Committee s et up in London in F ebruary, 1942, to conside r 
7 Industrial Stand ardi zation, July, 1943, p. 216. 
8 1n addition, the I nternaLonal El e ctrotechnic al Commission 
suspended activity during W orl d War II. 
9The secr e taria t of th e International Federation of National 
Standardizing Associations actually was taken over by the Swiss 
Standards Association w hic h stored records and "kept up all in-
dispensable corre spondence. 11 (Industrial Standardization, January, 
1943, p . 12 . ) 
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":rn 
atters of policy of a conservation nature by the several British 
:ministries th 1 O 
, e Board of Trade, and the Mission for Economic Affairs." 
The mass of organizations established in World War II to solve 
various 
aspects of the international standardization problem was great. 
But · . 
' in this review it is not believed practical nor necessary that they 
au b ct· 
e iscussed. Instead, three activities, generally representative 
of the whole, wi·11 be 
covered. They are communications-el ectronics, 
screw th 
reads, and aeronautics. Thes e three activities have been 
select d . 
e to illustrate three different aspects of the international stand-
a rd · 
ization problem. Communications - e l ectronics represents one of the 
:rn . 
a Jor non..,.materiel, as well as materiel, areas of standardization and 
it is Wid 1 
e Y recognized as the most critical area of standardization in 
terms f 0 
both peace and war. Screw threads represents a perennial 
standard. . 
ization problem of nations ranking equal to such things as 
meas Ure:rnent 
' drawing practices, tolerancing, gaging practices, weld -
ing P . ractices 
' and basic metals . Aeronautics represents the problem 
of t 
s auctardization that is unique to a new and rapidly changing profession, 
organization 
, and piece of equipment. From these three activities (com -
rnunic t· 
a ions-electronics, screw threads, and aeronautics) parallels can 
bed 
:tawn to fit most other situations. 
10 
fe Combined Production and Resources Board, Report ~f Con-
~ rences on Standardizati·on of Screw Threads and Cylindrical Fits, 
ond ---:------ ----- -- --~· August-September 1944 (Washington: U. S. Government Print-
ng Offic~) -
, p. 33. 
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~ommunications-Electronics Standardization- - World War II. 11 
T he t 
s a ndardization of communications - electronics by the United States 
in World War II preceded all other formal mil itary international stand-
ardizat · 
ion activity. Undoubtedly this sterns fr om the singular fact that 
the fi r st re . . . 
qu1rement of any organized effort 1s the necessity to commu-
nicate. I 
n any event, the first significant discussions of communications -
ele c tro · 
nics standardization took place between Air Marshal A. T . Harris 
and Gen H 
• • H . Arnold during the United States - British Staff Conver -
sation · s 1n March 
' 1941. 
12 
In these conversations it was provided that 
the D . 
nited States and the United Kingdom would establish in London an 
Associat d 
e Communications Committee. This Committee was to have 
both D · . 
nited States and United Kingdom membership and was to be the 
suprem 
e controlling body with respect to intercommunications by radio , 
Wire . 
' Visual, and sound, affecting the armed services and merchant 
marine of the 
two nations. 
The United States-Briti sh Staff Conversations of Marc h, 1941 , 
th
at dealt · I ) with communications (hereinafter cited as 1tAnnex Vil w e r e 
lin:iited · 
in scope in that they provided principles to be observe d in inte r -
c om . 
b:lunication of United States and United Kingdom ships only, but no 
lID . . d . 
the ue to United States administrative r e strictions r ega r 1ng 
accu h ' h h ' · i b rate referencing of certain documents on w 1c t 1s sec tion s a s d 
citea. e , the full range of documents used by the author cannot be 
12 
' '.A1:> These Conversations are often c ite d by historians a s t h e 
.oC ... 1 It a· 1scussions. 
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such principles were provided for other services in view of the fact that 
no United States Army forces, ground or air, were expected to operate 
in areas, prior to September 1, 1941, where intercommunication with 
United Kingdom forces would be necessary. 
In August, 1941, the United States Army and Navy observers in 
London submitted a redraft of Annex IV to the British services and, 
after some consideration by them, a copy was forwarded to Washington. 
Late that month, Gen. H. H. Arnold suggested to Air Marshal A. T. 
Harris and Wing Cdr. J. G. Bryans of the Canadian staff in Washington 
that a Joint Communications Board be established to consider and adopt 
common communications between the United States Army Air Corps, the 
air forces of the United States Navy, the Royal A ir Force, and the Royal 
Canadian Air Force. The next month Canada and the United Kingdom 
agreed to this suggestion. 
Meanwhile in late August, 1941 , the British services had pro-
posed that a Radio Direction Finding Committee be set up with combined 
representation from the United State s and the United Kingdom. Following 
this, on September 26, 1941, the United States Chief of Naval Operations 
proposed that an Inter-Service Communications Board be set up in 
Washington on similar lines to the Associated Communications Com-
mittee in London. It was recommended that this Washington board 
would serve as the supreme controlling body in the Western Hemisphere 
for the regul ation of communications between the United States and 
British Commonwealth forces. While the proposal of the Chief of Naval 
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Operations was being studied by the United States services, on Octobe r 
14 , 1941, the British Joint Servic_!:! s Mission in Washington proposed 
its own revision of Annex IV which would establish two associated 
communications committees, one in London and one in Washington. 
These committees were to be advisory and not executive bodies, but 
the London committee was to be invested with the final say in any 
matter which required coordination between the two committees. The 
British Joint Services Mission a lso suggested that the Joint Communica-
tions Board proposed by Gen. Arnold and the Dir ection Finding Com-
mittee proposed by the United Kingdom should function as subcommittees 
of the Washington committee. 
A week later, on October 2 7, 1941 , the United States services 
advised the British Joint Services Mission that the subject of r e vision of 
Annex IV already was under discussion by a United States committee and 
that that committee had reached the tentative conclusion that a committee 
to be designated the "Inter-Service Communications Board 11 should be 
formed in Washington composed of representatives of the United States 
Army and Navy. This Board, it was felt, should be considered an in-
tegral part of the Associated Communications Committee and should have 
cognizance of associated communications in the Western Atlantic and 
Pacific areas. Recommendations of each committee (London or Wash-
ington) were to be subject to review by the other committee, but all 
recommendations were to have the approval of the British Chiefs of 
Staff and the United States Chief of Naval Op era tions and Chief of Staff 
prior t o being adopted. When adopted, implementation of recom -
mendations would be through normal national channels. 
On November 10, 1941, the above tentative conclusion became 
th e agreed United States service position and included in addition to 
proposals on composition a recommendation for the establishment of 
fourteen subcommittees. The United States suggested that the Inter ~ 
S e rvice Communications Board be formed as quickly as possible and 
that the first meetings should consider revision of Annex IV and the 
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procedure to be followed by the Board. There then followed an unusual 
step in military organization. 
Although not officially approved, the individuals designated to 
b e members of the Inter ... Service Communications Board, if it were 
a pproved, met on November 19, 1941, to redraft Annex IV and they 
c ontinued to function as a de facto communications - electronics stand ... 
a rdization organization until April, 1942. During this period the y 
o rganized themselves as though fully approved and established various 
subcommittees. Emphasis was given the r e vision of Annex IV and on 
February 4, 1942, an agreed draft was forwarded to the London com -
mittee. Subsequently, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive 
t o the London committee and the Washington Board designe d to g ove rn 
c ommunications between the United States and British Commonwealth 
se rvices, commercial air services, and merchant marine s e rvic e s. 
This directive superseded Annex IV, and it concerne d itself prima rily 
with provisions of communications arrangements between the two 
powers and with communications subjects of common interest. 
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The London Communications Committee, as it was now desig -
nated, was to have cognizance of rapid communications matters w:ithin 
a r eas of British strategic responsibility and the Washington Communi-
c ations Board was to have cognizance of similar matters within the 
area of United States responsibility. Joint communications matters 
w e re expressly excluded except insofar as might be necessary to pr e vent 
unavoidable interference between the services of each nation. The two 
organizations were directed to consider and recommend communications 
a rrangements required for combined and joint operations on any com -
bination of e lements of the two powers and ope rations involving e l em e nts 
of these powers with other nations. 
It was provided that the London Communications Committee and 
the Washington Communications Board should be of e qual standing and 
that they were to have no power of decision except as to technical 
agreements of limi1ed scope applicable only to their own areas or to 
corresponding services of the United States and the British Common-
wealth. Each body was to make recommendations to its respective 
Chief of Staff concerning action to be taken on matters of common 
inte rest and the major recommendations of each agency were to be 
subject to review by the other before submission to the United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff for final approval. 
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The London Communications Committee was to consist of one 
United States Army officer, one United States Navy officer, one United 
States Navy aviator, one United States Army Air Corps officer, one 
officer from the War Office, and one officer from the Air Ministry. The 
membership of the Washington Communications Board was to be similar 
with the addition of one officer from the Royal Canadian Navy, one from 
the Canadian Army, one from the Royal Canadian Air Force, and one 
representative from the New Zealand and Australian governments. 
When the charter of the Washington Communications Board was 
issued, the Inter-Service Communications Board was, of course, func-
tioning in its de facto status and the Washington Communications Board 
was organized by the simpl e process of calling the Inter-Service Com-
munic ations Board members to meet as the Washington Communications 
Board. This action took place on April 29, 1942, with the Washington 
Communications Board taking up the active agenda of the Inter-Service 
Communications Board. 
As soon as the London Communications Committee and the 
Washington Communications Board began to function, difficulties arose. 
It should have been seen as inevitable that two coequal communications 
agencies, one in London and one in Washington, each securing the 
approval of the other prior to seeking recommendations of the respective 
United States and United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, would come into conflict. 
Recognizing this difficulty, the United States Navy, at the first meeting 
of the Washington Communications Board, recommended that that board 
should report direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than to the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the British countered that 
their strategic spheres were more extensive than those controlled by 
the United States. Further, they held the view that the best war ex-
perience and technical knowl edge in communications -electronics 
matters was to be found in London, not Washington. Therefore, the 
British contended that the London Communications Committee should 
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remain a fully combined committee and have the right of access direct 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Acting on this conclusion, the British 
pressed for a more fully informed and representative membership on 
the London Communications Committee. The British did agree that 
combined recommendations shoul d be submitted by the London Com -
munications Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the 
Washington Communications Board, but they felt that the London 
Communications Committee should have equal status to that of the 
W a shington Communications Board. In the meantime, the United States 
s ervices had reached the conclusion that the only answer was to have a 
single combined communications - electronics standardization agency in 
Washington directly under the Combined Chiefs of Sta ff. The view as 
expre ssed by the United States Navy was that: 
Communications problems for combined operations are a t 
present handled through the machine ry of the Washington Com -
munications Board and the London Communications Committee. 
The se agencies are of equal standing and the dec ision of one can 
not be carried into e ffect without the a pproval of the other. The 
Washington Communications Board is an agency of and reports to 
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the Combined Chiefs of Staff while the London Communications 
Committee is an agency which reports to the British Chiefs of 
Staff. 13 
It is clear from the above that no communications agency fully 
representative of / United Sta tes/ and British military services 
with executive powers of decision and action now exists. This 
makes it difficult in all cases and impossible in some cases to 
reach timely authoritative decisions - -an intolerable situation 
which should no longer be permitted to continue. 
It is therefore recommended that the Washington Communications 
Board be made a single supreme combined communications agency 
and be a supporting agency to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 
Washington. 14 
Though the relationship of the Washington Communications 
Board to the Combined Chiefs of Staff was mis stated , Admiral E. J. 
King immediately recommended 11 a single supreme combined commu-
nications agency ••• ful l y representative of both British and United 
States services and having executive power of decision and action be 
set up in Washington as a supporting agency of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff. i115 
It was now apparent that the differences of opinion in the London 
Communications Committee and the Washington Communications Board 
13This organizational relationship was not concurred in by the 
British services as a statement of fact. 
14u. S. Navy, Director of Naval Operations, Letter for the Com -
mander - in- Chief, United States Fleet, subj: "Recommendation for the 
Creation of a Combined Communications Board, " June 22, 1942 {in the 
file s of the Department of Navy, serial 0257220) . 
15 U. S. Navy, Letter for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, s ubj : 
11 R ec ommendation for the Creation of a Combine d Communications Board," 
June 25, 1942 (in the fil e s of the Department of Navy, serial 10542) . 
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could not b e a djusted between those two organizations and the United 
States members of the Washington Communications Board recommended 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Washington Communications Board 
should be reconstituted as the Combined Communications Board with 
the duty of taking such action as might be necessary to coordinate 
methods, procedures, and operations used or useful in combined com-
munications and with authority to make effective agreed decisions with 
refe rence to such matters. 
Stemming from the United States recommendation to form a 
Combined Communications Board, the Directors of Signals met in 
L o ndon on July 3, 1942, to consider the rel ationship between the 
W a shington Communications Board and the London Communications 
Committee. This meeting resulted in the British c onceding that the 
United States view was more logical than the one they held and the 
Directors recommended to the British Chiefs of Staff that a Combined 
Communications Board be set up in Washington responsible to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was recommended that the Combinro Com -
munications Board should deal with combined communications matters 
of universal application and be the sole combined communications body. 
It was further r ec omme nded that the London Communications Committee 
should be replaced by the British Chiefs of Staff and that the United 
States communications staffs in the United Kingdom should b e a ssociate d 
w ith the British Joint Communications Board as consul tants. The British 
Directors of Signals considered that communications problems in the 
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various strategic areas should be handled by the joint boards. These 
joint boards would refer questions to the United States Joint Communi -
c ations Board or the British Joint Communications Board dependent 
upon which national strategic sphere they were in. 
On July 16, 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the 
first charter of the Combined Communications Board. By its terms 
the Washington Communications Board was reconstituted the Combined 
Communications Board and was to be the sole combined communications 
agency supporting the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The duties of the 
Combined Communications Board were set forth in very broad terms 
and included such action as was necessary to coordinate methods 
and procedures, operations, and all combined communications matters 
of universal application. 
Thus it was that a year and four months after the decision was 
r e ached to establish a combined United States and United Kingdom 
communications coordinating and standardizing body that one finally 
c ame into being. In the meantime the war was being fought without the 
aid of the necessary communications standards. 
One month after the charter of the Combine d Communications 
Board was approved, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to amend the 
c harter to enlarge the duty of the Board to coordinate methods , procedures, 
a nd equipment to include making recommendations for the coordination of 
r e s e arch, development, and allocation to m ee t operational n e eds. Two 
months later, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combine d 
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Chiefs of Staff further amended the charter of the Board to require the 
approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on matters of major policy. 
At the time of the first meeting of the Combined Communications 
Board, on July 24, 1942, combined agreements had been reached through 
the Washington Communications Board on three items: the Western 
Hemisphere Recognition System, the Syko System for World- Wide use, 
a nd the Self-Evident Code and Letter Coordinates. The principal com-
munications - electronics items then recognized as requiring urgent 
attention were.: priority indication, recognition and identification, 
authentication, weather codes, combined operating signals, combined 
phonetic alphabet, combined radio-telegraph procedures, combined 
radio-telephone procedures, combined teleprinter procedures, com-
bined codes and ciphers, and sector system for reporting aircraft. 
The Combined Communications Board proved to be one of the 
better allied wartime standardization bodies. It also was one of the 
f e w combined bodies that possessed the authority to carry out most 
of its own decisions. Further, because of its broad applicability it 
developed a unique stature. Eventually, most of its publications were 
being issued in Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Russian, Dutch, Nor-
wegian, Czech, Turkish, Greek, Italian, Polish, and French. Subse-
quent to 1943, the United States alone produced in excess of two 
million copies of translated Combined Communications Board documents . 
Insofar as standards were concerned, the Combined Communica-
tions Board did an excellent job in producing standard radiotelegraph 
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procedures, visual procedures, indicators, communication instructions , 
call signs, phonetic agreements, codes and ciphers, radar and racon 
agreements, frequency allocations, wave propagation stuiies, electronic 
countermeasure information, recognition material s, navigation in-
formation, crystal data, and many other things of material help to the 
conduct of the war on a combined basis. 
11Standardized11 materiel as opposed to 11 compatible 11 procedure s 
and materiel was, however, secondary. In December, 1942, the Com -
bined Communications Board did establish a Combined Standardization 
Committee to advise the Board concerning standardization of communi-
cations equipment used in combined operations, but the Board did little 
to force the production of standardized military equipment during World 
War II. 
Screw Thread Standardization- -World War II. It was noted in the 
preceding chapter that the international screw thread problem had its 
origins in a period of time that preceded World War II by a century. 
During World War I considerabl e effort was expended to eliminate the 
problem as it existed between the United States, the United Kingdom , and 
France . However, no success was realized. Between the wars, in 1926, 
another attempt was made to sol ve the United States and United Kingdom 
differences in screw thread design but this died as a result of the lack of 
United States interest. After that and prior to World War II no formal 
contac t on the standardization of screw threads was made between the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
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With the advent of World War II, the a llies, France and the 
United Kingdom in particular, placed increasing reliance on the Unite d 
States for the production of war materials. Thus the screw thread 
problem of World War I once again reared its head. United States 
industry, as in World Wa r I, found it exceedingly difficult to produce 
B r itish and French designed equipment or to produce threaded com-
ponents for British and French produced equipment. F r ance's early 
defeat, however, reduced the problem to a United States-United King-
dom issue. 
Unfortunately official recognition of the scope of the international 
s c rew thread problem was slow in materializing. In the meantime stop -
gap procedures were employed where possible. 16 But such measures w e re 
not a true answer to the production problem facing the United States and 
the United Kingdom and eventually it was officially recognized that: 
The screw thread is as basic to war production as the English 
language is to our communications. It is as e l ementary as the 
needle and thread is to our ec onomy. Unfortunately, however, the 
screw threads produced in Great Britain and the screw threads 
used in the United States are sufficiently different in certain im-
portant character istics as to cause tremendous difficulties in the 
production of thousands of essential items . This results in serious 
16 As an example, Archibald E . Smith, a United States Army 
senior ordnance engineer, prepared a truncated Whitworth thread which 
was interchangeabl e with the standard British Whitworth thread and 
which at the same time could be made under normal American industrial 
conditions and practices. But the acceptance of his compromise thread 
resulted in the use of not two but three types of threads. (Industrial 
Standardization, July, 1944, p. 131.) 
and unnecessary delays a:i.d wasteful use of manpower in the pro-
duction of goods of war. l 7 
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Since the screw thread affected production, the problem of non -
standard threads fell to the Combined Production and Resour ces Board 
for resolution. This board was established by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Canada for the purpose of integrating the production pro-
gram of the three countries. But true integ ration was impossible so 
long as the board was confronted with such basic differences as screw 
threads. 
In addition to the international problem, screw thread difficulties 
existed in the United States and, to meet aeronautical demands, an 
American Standards Association War Committee was appointed on the 
request of the National Aircraft Standards Committee 11 to develop War 
Standards on Acme Screw Threads for Aircraft. 1118 But this did not 
occur until December, 1942, a full year after the entry of the United 
19 
States into active participation in World War II. In addition, this 
American Standards Association War Committee was inadequate to the 
1 7 Combined Production and Resources Board, Report of Con-
ferences on Standardization of Screw Thr eads and Cylindrical Fits, 
op. cit. , p. 1. 
18Industrial S tandardization, January, 1943, p. 12. 
19 As a result of the emphasis on aircraft fastners--prompted 
largely by the Interdepartmental Screw Thread Committee, the Army-
Navy Aeronautical Board, Wright Field, Army Air Corps, Bure au of 
Aeronautics, Society of Automotive Engineers, War Production Board, 
and a ircraft industry- - the American Institute of Bolt, Nut, and Rivet 
Manufacturers set up a special Aircraft Fastners Division in 1943. (!_n-
dustr ial Standardization, July, 1943, p. 216.) 
80 
extent that ' t I 1 on y recognized part of the screw thread problem. 
This wa 
s soon seen, and in March, 1943, the work of the committee 
Was enla d 
rge at the request of the War Production Board "to include 
Work on A 
cme threads for other special purposes as may be required 
by the F d . 20 
e eral Services such as the Army Ordnance Department. 11 
When th A . 
e merican War Standard for Acme Threads was finally pub-
1 · 
lshed, World War II was 11 b 21 a ut over. 
Simultaneous with the expansion of the scope of the American 
Standard A . . 
s ssoc1ation War Committee on Acme threads, another 
Arn · 
e:rican Standards Association War Committee was organized at the 
request f th 0 
e War Production Board "to establish an American War 
Standard f 22 
or Truncated Whitworth S crew threads. 11 Considerable 
difficult h 
Y ad been experienced in the United States 11in the procure -
:tnent and . 
maintenance of taps, dies, gages, etc. for British Standard 
Whitworth s f 
crew Threads frequently used in the production o materiel 
for th 23 
e various allied armed forces, 11 and some solution seemed necessary. 
About this same time, on the international level, the Combined 
Producti 
on and Resources Board invited a British mission to visit the 
20 
Industrial Standardization, April, 1943, P• 114. 
,, 
21
American Standards Association, "American War Standard for .,,_cine Th 
reads 11 (standard number Bl. 5-1945). 
22
I d 943 130 n ustrial Standardization, April, I , P• • 
23
A. E . Smith, M.emorandum for the Am e rican Standards Associa -
quoted in Industrial Standardization, April, 1943, p . 130. 
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United St t . 
a es to discuss and resolve, insofar as possible, problems 
related t th . 0 
e production of threaded parts for materiel. Representa-
tives of C 
anada were also invited to participate. Unfortunately, when 
this first 24 
screw thread conference convened the United States already 
had been at 
War two years and most production designs were already 
conunitted. N 
evertheles s, considerable effort was put forth and numerous 
Project 
s Were assigned the respective national bodies interested in stand -
ard scr h 
ew t read design. Approximately a year later, in August-September, 
1944, a 
second meeting was convened, this time in London. Originally 
this :tne t· 
e ing had been scheduled for May of that year but the develop -
lnents of th 
e war in Europe made it necessary to postpone it. Now, three 
month f 
s a ter Europe was invaded, it was meeting ostensibly to iron out a 
combined 
production probl em. Had this second meeting been able to reach 
any Positive conclusions it is doubtful if those conclusions could have been 
Placed into the h 
production scheme in time to influence t e war. But little 
Was 
acco:tnplished and a year l ater, September, 1945, a third meeting 
Wast 0 
convene in Canada • 
..A.tt 
24
The New York Conference of November-December, 1943. 
Co;~~ing Were representatives of the Canadian ~tandards Association, 
a ned Production and Resources Board, National Bureau of Stand -
l"ds U · · · C "tt D . ' nited States Navy Combined Communications ommi ee, 111
ted St ' · St d d -A. . ates Army, War Production Board, American an ar s 
ssoci t· · S · t f -A. a 10n, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ocie yo 
ll.to:tn t· · d U · d S D . 0 1ve Engineers British S tandards Institute, an nite tates, K:;~d Kingdom, and ~anadian engineering firms as well as the United 
0
:tn Controller of Jigs, Tools, and Guages . 
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The cost of the failure of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Ca d na a to reach agreement on standards for threaded parts for 
militar · Y equipment was estimated at "many tens of millions of dollars 
in World War II 1125 Th ·t 1 h. h k. ff. • us 1 was natura that 1g -ran 1ng o 1cers in 
the U · t Ill ed States Army, the United States Navy, the Aeronautical Board, 
the United States Maritime Commission, and the State and Commerce 
Departm e nts should be "unanimous in their opinion that the unification 
of 6 screw thread standards should be vigorously pursued, 112 but the 
ter · mination of World War II was to see all but the end of the inter -
national effort. 
A e ronautical Standardization- - World War II. Aeronautic a l stand-- - - -- --
ard· . ization in World War II represents a collection of problems involving 
national . and international organization, domestic and foreign procure -
ment ·i· ' mi 1tary secrets, and the practical need for economy opposing the 
Practical d nee for speed. 
bat 
' 
Before World War II actually involved the United States in com -
the United Kingdom was the dominant customer of the United State s 
aircraft · industry. France also was a large customer. Thes e foreig n 
aerona . utical purchases were generally approved by the Army Air C o rps 
ard 25 A. V. Astin "Significance of the National Bureau of Sta nd -
e d sD~or Industrial Pr.ogress, " National Standards in~ Modern Society, 
• lckson Reck (N y k· Harper and Brothers, Publishe rs, 1956), 
P. 52 . ew or . 
tion . 26Wi11iam L. Batt, "International Standards A nd W orld Coop e r a-
h in Wa r and Peace " Industrial Standardization, D e c e mbe r ' 1944, 
~· 249. ' 
as a device for mainta i ning and expanding the United States aircraft 
industry. T 
0 encourage this, the Air Corps even went to the point 
of re l easing, with the approval of the Aeronautical Board and the 
Department of State, more and more of its restri cted models of air-
c raft and - . . 
aeronautical equipment for sale by United States contractors 
to t h e B · t · 
ri ish, French , and other friendly nations. 
But with the opening of the United States aeronautical industry 
tom t 
ee the needs of foreign governments came a perpl exing probl em. 
The for · 
eign governments were not only looking for the producti on of 
United s 
tates - designed equipment, they were l ooking for the production 
of their 
own designs which they often considered superior. This l ed to 
the qu t· 
es ion of the advisab i lity of introducing non- United States design 
into th 
e United States production system. As early as 1938, when 
Stone and 
Webster, Inc., was preparing to organize an agency for the 
Production in the Uni ted States of components of British and French 
aircraft h . 
' t e Aeronautical Board opposed the plan on the basis that it 
Would l ead to the building of aircraft " to foreign standards of weights 
and 
measures, of no he lp to .f..the United State.i7, " as well as result in 
lb.onopoly,, endanger mili tary security, and adversely affect the in-
dustr , . 27 
Y- s deliveries to the Air Corps. Nevertheless, it was diffic ult 
to 0 




Aeronautical Board, Memorandum No. SI 0 - 1. (Case 95 ) , 
33f ' l938 (in the files of the Department of Army, file: AAG 
• 7). 
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ry began producing more and more foreign - designed items. 
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By mid - 1940, this production of non ... United States aeronautical 
equipm t . 
en· 1n the country was becoming a threat to the integrated mobil -
ization of . d 1n ustry. France had fallen28 and its contracts in the United 
States h 
ad been taken over by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, 
int 
urn, let additional contracts based on the introduction of its own 
tyP e s of · 29 
aircraft into United States production. But while the related 
Production facilities were welcomed by the Army Air Corps, it could 
not ac 
cept the idea of those facilities being tooled to British design and 
engine · 
ering practices. The Air Corps , the Navy, and the National 
Defense Ad . 
visory Committee argued that the continuation of the pro -
duction of B . t · h 1 
ri is type aircraft by the United States industry cou d lead 
to ''s h 
Uc Program confusion, ••• dilution of engineering effort, and ••• 
increased 
general burden on the industry" that both the United States and 
the U · 30 
nited Kingdom aircraft programs would be delayed. 
Lack of standardization was, of course , at the root of the prob-
le:rn. 
Not only were there basic differences in weights and measures, but 
28 
:F' To see how a lack of standardization contributed to the defeat of 
ranee f "b F n re er to: "Non-Use of Standards Shown to Contn ute to renc h 
efeat 11 I 940 26 ' ndustria l Standardization, October, 1 , P• • 
fi h 
29
Chiefly t he four - eng ine Sterling bomber, the two - engine Beau-
g ter d . 
' an the single - engine Typhoon pursuit. 
b e 
30
T. P. Wright, Memorandum, August 7, 1940 {in the fil es of the 
Part111ent of Army, file: A. J. Lyon, Record Book No. 38). 
gages and ga · · . . . 
g1ng practices, d1mens1on1ng and tolerancing, materials, 
a
nd 
even drawing room practices varied. As an example, when it 
Was lat d · 
er ec1ded to produce the British Rolls - Royce aircraft engine 
in the u · 
nited States, one year was required to convert the British 
draw· 31 
ings to drawings suitable for use in the United States industry. 
Boweve h' 
r • t is was not something peculiar to aeronautics or as between 
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th
e United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed months were required 
for G 
eneral Motors Corporation to convert the United States Army 
0rd
nance drawings for the production of the M4 Medium Tank into draw-
ings th 32 
at could be used by the General Motors personnel. 
Since the United States objected to the continued introduction of 
Br·t· 1 
lsh aircraft types into United States industry, it was forced to offer 
for Brit' h 33 
is use United States - designed aircraft. This led to the need 
for so.rn . . 
e ad.rn1n1strative machinery to handle aircraft selection and air-
craft .tnodification problems. Acting on this, the Air Corps proposed on 
August 13 
, 1940, a combined Army-Navy-British Purchasing Commission 
Joint c 0 .tn.rnittee. This committee idea was accepted and it commenced 
operation on September 13, 1940. Standardization was recognized as a 
31 
Post B. L. Bart, "How Many Pounds in a Pood?" Saturday Evening 
~· November 16, 1949, p. 22. 
. 
32
Industrial College of the Armed Forces , "Spare Parts- -Stand-
ard1z· t· (' h f ' l f h Air a _10n, 11 1946-1947, Student Committee Report 1n t e 1 es o t e 
University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). 
33 . 
h Bowever, the United Kingdom did, at a later date, attempt to ave th 
e Halifax produced in the United States. 
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Pressing problem by the committee and a main subcommittee was given 
the task. T h 
e significance of the centralization of standardization that 
Was takin 1 . . . . . 
g P ace at this time 1s seen 1n the fact that less than thirty days 
after th· 
is subcommittee met, on November 7, 1940 , the Eastern Stand -
ards Corn . 
rnittee and the Western S tandards Committee combined into 
the N t · 34 
a 10nal Aircraft Standards Committee. Aircraft engine stand-
ards h 
• owever, continued to be handled by the Aeronautics Division of 
the Society of A t . E . 35 
u omotive ng1neers. 
Aeronautical standardization was not an easy thing to achieve. 
Yet, ·t 1 
was something desired by many. Thus it was that on February 28, 
1941' th A" 
e ircraft Section of the Office of Production Management calle d 
an air 
craft standards coordinating meeting. As a result of this meeting, 
the Standards 
Group of the Office of Production Management, Aircraft 
Section 
' Was set up to act as the standards coordinating unit for the other 
governrn 
ent agencies having an interest in aircraft standards and specifi -
cations. 
These included the "Army- Navy-British Standardization Sub -
cornrn. 
lttee; the Aeronautical Board (Army-Navy); A ir Corps; Bureau of 
Aeron . . 36 
autics (Navy); and Civil Aeronautics Authority." But be c ause of 
34 
_!_ndustrial Standardization, January, 1941, P• 12. 
S . 
35
The first group of aircraft engine standards produced by the 0 ciety f d · J 194 ° Automotive engineers, forty - two, were approve 1n anuary, 2
• Work on these and other aircraft engine standards had b een re -
que~ted by the Office of Production Manag ement. (Industrial Stand-
ard1zat· 
~. January, 1942, p. 12. ) 
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moving situation, this agency was not to play too important a 
part in th . 
e overall aircraft standardization picture. 
The Air Corps and the General Staff, United States Army, re ... 
garded t d 
s an ardization during this period as a means for insuring that 
the Unit d s 
e tates woul d benefit directly by the expanded production facili -
ties resuit1·ng 
from orders for British aeronautical equipment. While it 
was b 1 · 
e ieved that standardization would result in greater economy and 
effici 
ency throughout the industry, of prime concern was the conclusion 
that standard· . . 
ization would permit the United States to take over British 
Product· 37 
ion promptly in the case of a British defeat. The United States 
had observed the difficul ty the United Kingdom had encountered in putting 
non-st d 
an ard arms to use in the defense of the British Isles and it intende d 
to avoid s uch a problem should the United Kingdom not survive the German 
onslau h 
g t of late 1940. This policy even entered the lend .. lease discus-
sions and C h · · t d d " t · · 0ngress was assured that by emp as1z1ng s an ar 1za 10n 1n 
the Prod · 
Uction of weapons that "they could in an emergency be used by 
our o 38 
Wn forces. 11 When the United States finally was militarily in-
V-olv-ed . 
in World War II, it was largely because of the previous stand-
ardizat· 10n agreements with the United Kingdom that United States - produced 
aircraft 
could feasibl y be placed in a common pool for allocation by 
Is 
' 1 
37?· S. Army, G - 4 Memorandum for the C~ief of Staff, August 
940 {1n the files of the Department of Army, file: AG 452). 
38 
B Henry L Stimson Statement of October 14, 1941, Hearings efor h • ' h C ~ t e Senate Committee on Naval Affairs , Seventy-Sevent ongress, 1
:rst S-·- ----- ---- · h C t· f C . ~~ on H. R. 5783, To Authorize T e onstruc 10n o e rta1n 
av-alL - - - -- -
---:...:::::. ~ Defense Vessels, P• 29. 
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emming from the simpl e standardization process of selecting 
one or h 
anot er design of aeronautical equipment there evolved the desire 
to coordinat . d 
e i eas at the engineering or even the characteristics stage 
of new · 
equipment. Thus to facilitate standardization the United Kingdom 
Was given al 
most blanket approval to visit experimental engineering de -
partment . 
s in any United States plant and to fly and be flown in United 
State . 
s aircraft for th 
e purpose of inspecting their characteristics. 
Eventually it was 
decided that the best stage at which United S tates -
United .K ' 
ingdom standardization problems could be worked out was the 
mock- . 
up inspection and in March, 1941, Gen. Arnold stated as War 
Depart 
ment policy that United Kingdom advice and recommendations 
should b 
e obtained as early in the development stage as the information 
coul d b 
e obtained from them, and that the actual standardization should 
occur during h 
t e mock - up stage when the mock- up of a particular type 
Was available. 39 
39 
the A Mock-up inspection privileges were granted to the British by 
Air Fl'my Air Force partly on the premise of reciprocal privileges for 
nol:b. Ol'ce representatives in the United Kingdom. Although this was 
lnauy . . 
gl'ad granted by the British in September, I 942, Air Force officers 
Ually b · · . d . t I A 1944 ecame convinced that full reciprocity di not exis • n ugust, 
' the A · d S . that ssistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel an ervices, proposed 
.8ul" !bock-up inspection procedure be eliminated and that at the end of the 0
Pean w h · · d · · d f h Joi . ar t e Army- Navy- British standar ization proce ures o t e 
:n.t Aire f ·f· 11 f i:n.g h ra t Committee be rescinded. While not speci ica y re erenc-
t e Br·t· · 
by . . i ish, Materiel and Services made an oblique reference to them 
Pointin · 1 d · 1944 not b g 0 ut that new designs of aircraft being deve ope in would 
e av ·1 . 
ai able during the current war because of the two or thre e year 
89 
But the conduct of aeronautical standardization between the United 
States d 
an the United Kingdom was not without its problems. Part of 
these pr bl 0 
ems stemmed from the continued friction between the Army 
Air Fo 
rce and the United States Navy and the inability of these two serv-
i ce s to a 
gree on standards as between themselves. An equal or greater 
share of th 
e burden belongs to the United Kingdom which only reluctantly 
seemed to desire to cooperate in reciprocal standardization actions and 
seemed unable to establish an effective organization in the United States . 
Besides the British Purchasing Commission's air technical staff, 
Which . 
Provided representation to the Joint Aircraft Committee stand-
ardizat· 
ion subcommittee, the United Kingdom had another mission in 
Wash· 
ington headed by Sir Henry Tizard which was working independently 
among u . 
nited States scientists and industrialists, including the aircraft 
i
nd
ustry on the f h B ·t· h · f · dl West Coast. Neither o t e ri is agencies were rien y 
Wi
th 
the other. d · l · t f t t The Army Air Force wante a sing e poin o con ac 
With the D 
nited Kingdom on standardization matters and the British 
Were fi l 
na ly pressured into designating the Purchasing Commission at 
th
at Point. B · l n· · · l · ut as late as August, 1941, the Materie ivis1on comp a1ned 
to the B .. 
ritish that their organization for the making of detailed standard-
izatio d . . 
n ecis1ons was not clear. At Wright Field, it was asserted, the 
United K· h f h R l 1ngdom had three separate sections: one eac or t e oya Air 
lag b . 
l . etween experimental design and quantity product10n; and by com-p a1ni l 1 
tna . ng that too many people were present at developmenta moc c-ups, 
king the transaction of business difficult. 
Force the M" . f . 
' 1n1stry o Aircraft Production, and the Air Ministry. 
Finally 
' as a result of United States criticism , the United Kingdom 
consolidated ·t · 1· · 
1 s air 1a1son under the single jurisdiction of the British 
Air Corn · . 
rniss10n. But in the United Kingdom, itself, centralization of 
aeronaut · 1 1ca standardization did not occur until 1943 at which time it 
was placed under a branch of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. 40 
Parallelling the British l axity in establishing clear channels 
Was 
th
eir preference to deal outside of such channel s as did exist. 
Ra
th
er than working through the established United States channels 
for st d . 
an ard1zation, the British desired to deal directly with factory 
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repres t . 
en atives and United States policy- making officers. After August , 
194
0, this · G C H B d practice became chronic and Brig. en. • • rett a vis e d 
Maj. Gen. B. H. Arnold that: 
The British keep calling for all sorts of technicians to go to 
E_n~land but I yet don't understand why they don't send their tech -
nicians to the United States, go over the equipment which we ar e 
manufacturing and make their changes here or refer the matter to 
the J · ;- - d d" · 01nt _ Aircra~/ Committee for complete stan ar 1zat10n. 
During the past ten months /;ince August, 1940/ there have been 
numerous times when it has b~n practically impossible to get a 
decision out of the English in connection with standardization. I 
believe this condition is going to become worse if we ende avor to 
have somebody in England trying to standardize equipment we ar e 
manufacturing in the United States . 
May I again emphasize the fact that we must not get out of 
channels on the standardization phase. The English are extre mely 
40 . 
19 56 United Kingdom, Ministry of Supply, Standardization, Octobe r, ' p. 4. 
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difficult to deal with and we have managed to keep them in line for 
th
e Joint Aircraft Committee. If other people begin to talk stand -
ardization and the Materiel Division ; -;=-epresented on the Joint Air -
cr~ft Committee/ is neglected, we a~ going to be in a complete 
spin and get thoroughly in trouble within the next few months. 41 
Finally, the United States began to suspect the true standardiza-
tion spirit of the British. There was repeated cause for the United 
States to b 1· 
e ieve that the United Kingdom had no intention to cooperate 
in standa d . · • 
r ization on a reciprocal basis . The Materiel Division went 
so far a t . 
s O insure that a centralized record of British requests for in -
form t· 
a ion Was kept so that the United States would be in a position to 
demand 1·k · 42 
i e information from the British. The policy of British 
Participat· . 
ion 1n American standardization without reciprocal privileges 
for th 
e Army Air Force in the United Kingdom was finally challenged by 
the Dir 
ector of Military Requirements and in August, 1942, the Joint 
Airer f 
a t Committee directed its subcommittee on standardization to 
include · 
in each standardization case a recommendation that similar 
iterns 
Produced in the United Kingdom should be made operationally and 
dirnensi 1 . 
ona ly interchangeabl e with United States standard items. 
Stern . 
ming from this pressure, arrangements eventually were approved 
by- the u 
nited Kingdom whereby the Air Force could attend British 
41 
Ma. U. S. Army, Brig. Gen. C. H . Brett, Memorandum for 
oft· Gen. H. H. Arnol d, May 7, 1941 (in the files of the Department 
rmy-, file: AAG 400. 1142). 
42
u. s. Army, Maj. M. E. Cross , Memorandum for Maj. A. J. 
September 10, 1940 (in the files of the Department of Army, fil e: 
Ly-on, Record Book No. 38). 
aircraft mock-up inspections, an action denied the United States even 
though th U . . 
e nited Kingdom had access to United States mock-up 
inspections. 
In the meantime, aeronautical standardization problems were 
growing in Canada. Canada had been dependent on United Kingdom 
Productio f · . . 
n ° military supplies up to the early part of World War II. 
But th · . 
e situation was such in World War II that the United Kingdom 
could no 1 
onger supply Canada with these materials and, therefore , 
Canad 
a Was forced to look to other sources, including indigenous pro -
duct· 
ion, for its war materials. With the blossoming of a wartime air -
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craft 
production plant, Canada soon found there was an urgent requir ement 
for aeronautical standards. Thus , in 1943, an Aircraft Standards T ech-
nical c . 0
rnrnittee was organized by the Canadian Engineering Standards 
Asso · 
c iation "to set up standards and simplified practices for materials 
and co 
rnponent parts used in the construction of aircraft in Canada, and 
to coordinate these standards with the standards used in the United States, 
Great Br· · 43 
itain, and Australia. " 
The next year, 1944, found a group of National Aircraft Standards 
Connnit 
tee and Society of Autombtive Engineers personnel accompanied by 
an Ar 
my Air Force representative visiting the United Kingdom in an attempt, 
throu h 
g the study of United Kingdom industrial standards for aircraft 
43
~dustrial Standardization, August, 1943, P• 241. 
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pra t· 
c ices, parts, and materials, to obtain uniformity in United States 
a
nd 
United Kingdom aeronautical standards. 44 
With little doub~, major efforts were expended to achieve aero-
nautical t d . . 
s an ard1zat10n, but, in spite of these efforts , World War II 
Was to b . 
egin, end, and a decade was to pass with such aeronautical 
fundamentals as 45 
bomb design standardization still undecided. 
~urnrnary of Effects of Standardization- - World War__!!. Summing 
up the rn Tt . 1 1 ary international standardization experience of World War II, 
Lt. Col. Herbert M. Campbell stated that: 
• • • all that had been proved beyond a doubt was that the time 
for the development of military standards is before a war begins 
rather than during the course of battle, as was done in the years 1940 - 1945_46 
On the broader scene, the American Standards Association was 
led t 0 
conclude that it was the universal opinion "that the international 
aspect of t . . . 
s andard1zation will be far more important in the future than 
in 
th
e Past. 114 7 Acting on this conclusion, well before World War II 
terrninat d 
e , the Association joined with other groups in the United Nations 
Standard 
s Coordinating Committee and in developing Inter-American 
44 
Industrial Standardization, December, 1944, p. 266. 
bo 
45
For a discussion of the World War II problems of standardizing 
11t{:bs and shackles, see Rear Adm. M. F. Schoeffel, ''Some Adventures in 
ltary Standardization, rr Standardization, September, 1951, pp. 2 77-279. 
46 
t· Lt. Col Herbert M. Campbell, "Standardization and Collabora -
lon in th • h · 
Poi·t· e A - B - C Air Forces" (unpublished Master's t es1s, Department of 1 
ical Science, Columbia University, circa February, 1952), p. 10. 
47 
~dustrial Standardization, May, 1944, p. 92. 
st
andardization. In addition, the American Standards Association 
e
st
ablished in 1944 two post-World War II Planning Committees. 
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These committees gave special attention to international standardization 
a
nd th
eir efforts were directed to bringing about a better organization 
than had · . , 
previously existed 1n support of that international effort. It 
is h" 1st
orically significant that the Association did not emphasize mili-
tary re 
presentation on either of these committees. Apparently, reflect-
ing 
th
e times, it was believed that the military in the post-World War II 
Period w Id · I d d" t· ou not be concerned with internatlona stan ar 1za ion. But 
circum t 
s ances change and when international standardization moved to 
the fo . 
re in the post-World War II period the military were most involved. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WORLD WAR II CIVIL AND 
MILITARY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION 
~ Primary Situation, 1945 - 1946. The United States emerge d 
fro:rn w 
orld War II convinced that world peace and national integri t y c ould 
be :rn · 
aintained through the cooperation of the world's sovereign state s. 
This id 
ea Was embodied in the Atlantic Charter in 1941 and repeated in 
the D 
e c laration by United Nations on January 1, 1942. A world wa s 
desir d · 
e in which there would be "no aggrandizement, territorial or othe r -
wise " · · 
' in which the re would be " no territorial changes that do not accord 
With the f 
reely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" ; in which "the 
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which the y 
Will live" 
would be respected; in which "the enjoyment by all States , gre at 
or s:rnau 
• victor or vanquished, of access , on equal terms, to the trade 
a
nd 
to the raw materials of the world which are n e eded for their ec onomic 
Prosper1·t " 
Y would be furthered; in which "the fullest collaboration betwe en 
au n t· 
a ions in the economic field" would be brought about; and, finally, a 
World that would rest on a peac e that would "afford to all nations the 
lrleans of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, a nd• • • 
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assuran th 
ce at all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in 
freedo f 1 m rom fear and want." 
At the San Francisco Conference, President Harry S. Truman 
su.rn.rn d 
e up the United States attitude with these words: 
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We have tested the principle of cooperation in this war and have 
found that it works ••• we have shown what united strength can do 
• • • these lessons of military and economic cooperation have been 
learned 
e D • • 
Out of this conflict have come powerful military nations •••• 
But they have no right to dominate the world. It is rather the duty 
of these powerful nations to assume the responsibility for leader-
sh' 1P toward a world of peace •••• 
By their own example the strong nations of the world should lead 
th
e way to international justice. 2 
The backbone of the policy of international cooperation was 
recogniz d 
e to be international standardization and even before the war 
term· 
inated plans were being laid for the reactivation of old international 
standard· . 1 zation agencies and the creation of new agencies. Emphasis 
naturau . 1 
Y Was on civil (educational, scientific, economic, soc1a , in-
dustrial 
• etc.) rather than on military standardization. Unfortunately, 
this lb 
eant that in the United States the implementation of the policy was 
to rest in the hands of civil rather than governmental agencies with the 
result th I d'l t d · at the national policy was to become high y 1 u e or even ig-
nored . 
in favor of more intimate policies and objectives. 
I 
St U. S. Department of State, Toward the Peace, Department of 
ate Publication No. 2298 ( I 945), PP• 1 - 2• 
2
~ulletin, u. s. Department of State, July 1, 1945, p. 4. 
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Unde:r the mantle of peaceful cooperation and competition, in 
the late W ld 
or War II and early post ... World War II years there evolved 
two rnaJ·o . ·1 . 
r c1v1 international standardization bodies, the International 
Civil A · · 
viation Organization and the International Organization for Stand-
a:rdi zation. I 
n a certain sense these two organizations were a continuation 
of the 
p:re - World War II activity as was the regeneration of the Inter '"' 
national El 1 
ectrotechnical Commission, the International Te ecommunica-
tion Unio d 
n, and others. But these two organizations reflecte , more than 
the othe :rs 
• the need for standardization in the broad economic-industrial 
field and · 
in the relatively new field of high speed transportation. Tech .. 
nologi 1 ca advancements during World War II had caused a relative shrink ... 
ing of th 
e world and this bringing of communities and nations tog e ther in 
terrns f 0 
time led logically to the need for more standards. 
~International Civil Aviation Organization. The second world 
War b 
cur ed inte:rnational civil aviation , but by 1944 lf?aders of civil 
aviatio · 
n in the United States and elsewhere foresaw that civil aviation 
Would e · I · 
Xpand enormously, particularly in the interna t10na air transpo:rt 
field 
' at the war's end. This expansion was expected from the substan-
tial t h . 
ec nical strides made in the art of aircraft design and air naviga tion 
under th d . 
e rive of wartime needs. A strong conviction also existed tha t 
a la:r 1 
ge Y e:xpanding international civil air transportation industry could 
b e a f 0 rce for the promotion of trade and commerce and for furthering 
Wo:rld p eace. Above all, it was felt that the complex and precise 




ards for facilities, services, procedures, and certain technical 
equiprnent. 
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The only existing international aviation organization in 1944, 
the I t 
n ernational Commission for Air Navigation, was chiefly concerned 
With E 
uropean problems. This organization would require considerable 
reworki 
ng to meet the problems of the post-war world. The United 
States wh· h 
ic had gained the most experience with long distance transport 
du· 
ring the war had clearly established its world leadership in this field - -
but it 
Was not a member of the Commission. In view of this, the United 
States conducted 
exploratory discussions on international civil aviation 
With oth . 
er allied nations during the early part of 1944. On the basis of 
th
ese talks, the United States took the initiative and called an inter -
national 
conference on civil aviation for November I, 1944, in Chicago. 
Fifty-two of the 55 states invited attended the conference. For five 
Weeks th 
' e delegates of these 52 states considered problems of inter .. 
national . . 
civil aviation, the conference ending December 7, 1944. The 
outcorne Was the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 3 the basis 
of the I 
nternational Civil Aviation Organization. 
The creation of the International Civil Aviation Organization was, 
es sent· 1 
ia ly-, a non- controversial issue. The need for standards for the 
conduct f . 0 international aviation and the need for those standards to be 
S 
3
Contained in U S Civil Aeronautics Board, Aeronautical 
tatut • • 
~~Related Material (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
lee, 1954), pp. 339 - 345. 
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formulated on a world-wide basis was recognized both by the commer-
cial · 
interests and by the government. Accordingly, there was a broad 
basis f 0 
support in the United States and elsewhere. 
~ International Organization for Standardization. In earlier 
chapters th f 
e orerunners of the International Organization for Standard-
ization th . . . . 
' e Internat10nal Federation of National Standardizing Associa-
tions and the Uni·ted Nations Standards Coordinating Committee, were 
discussed. 
The International Organization for Standardization was 
founded in 1946 as an outgrowth of the latter organization. Twenty - five 
state · . 
s Joined in the original discussions which resulted in the creation 
of the I t 
n ernational Organization for Standardization and the First 
Provisio l 6 
na Assembly was held in London in October, 194 • In 1947, 
th
e International ff'l d · lf Electrotechnical Commission a i iate itse with the 
Internat· . . . 
ional Organization for Standardization as a technical division. 
The International Organization for Standardization is billed as 
the ''w 
orld' s clearinghouse for the development and promotion of inter -
nat· 
lonal standards. Through _Lthe International Organization for Stand-
ardizat· 7 . . . 10
.:: the national standards bodies of 33 countries coordinate 
th
eir sta d · · · t t· l t d 114 n ards in the interest of 1mprov1ng in erna. 1ona ra e. 
In the United States, the International Organization for Stand-
ardiz t · 
a ion, backed by the officials of the American Standards Association, 
4 
for S Arne rican Standards Association , The International Organization 
--~n,p. 3. 
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was brought . t b . . . . in o eing with little resistance. It was not , however, 
given d' 
ire ct governmental support in that it was looked upon more as 
a civil ag h . . 
ency t an as an international governmental agency even though 
other states were 
represented in the organization by governmental rather 
than civil bod. 
ies. A contributing factor to the Un ited States view was the 
fact 
th




a rdization was being discussed, the government was no longer an 
active p .. 
articipant in the formation of American Standards Association 
Policy. 
This had been brought about as a result of certain legal rulings 
and the 
general return to the laissez faire theory. 
~ Post-War Security. Post- war security of the United 
States Was 
envisaged as a blend of several elements: the maintenance 
of national 
security by the unilateral use of the nation's own resources ; 
them . 
aintenance of the security of the Western Hemisphere by a collective 
agreement of the states of the region; the elimination of the threat of the 
aggressor states by disarmament and control by the allies; the develop-
tnent of 
a Permanent system of collective security operated by all states 
Wi
th
in the framework of the United Nations; and finally, the support of 
the Whole by a constant attention to the maintenanc e of great power unity. 
The faith that was placed in this approach was near complete. 
By the 
end of World War II the mobilized military power of the United 
states d d f' Was second to none. But as victory approache an con ide nce in 
Post-
war political solutions increased there arose a public and Congressional 
clarnor fo ·1· 
r rni itary demobilization along with the aforementioned 
return to th I . 
e aissez faire theory. 
In response to this popular demand, United States military 
forces 
were severely reduced. Between August 1945 and July 1946, 
the Unit d s 
e tates Army strength of eight millions was cut back to two 
rnillions. 
Further , because the bulk of the army personnel consisted 
of relatively untrained replacements , the combat efficiency of the few 
existing . 
units was less than 50 percent of the wartime standard. This 
srnau and . 
inexperienced army was scattered widely in Europ e and the 
Far E . 
a st; in Germany, Austria, and Italy; in Japan, Korea, and the 
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Pacific Islands. F 
The effectiveness of the Army Air orce was similarly 
reduced. 
Of 2 I 8 combat air groups in being at the e.nd of 1945, only two 
effect· 
iv-e groups remained in early 1947. Personnel of the Air Force 
had dropped from 2. 3 millions in 1945 to • 4 millions m 1946, most of 
Whorn we · · d re inexperienced and inadequately traine • During the last 
half of 1946 
' the Air Force lost another 100 , 000 men and combat air-
craft r d. 
ea iness which normally should average about 75 percent fell to 
18 Percent. While the pressures of demobilization actually helped to 
!tlaintain the strength of the United States Navy, that service also 
suffer d 
e severe c utbacks. Personnel dropped from 3. 4 millions to 
1 • 6 rn ·11 i ions and the active fleet was reduced from I, 200 to 300 combat 
ships. 
Naval aircraft likewise were reduced from 37, 000 to 8, 000 . 
Reflecting the general military sentiment, the Chief of Staff of the 
Dnited States f h A' F Air Force reported to the Secretary o t e ir orce, 
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June 30, 1948: 
"One prefers not to speculate on what might have 
happened only one year after V - J Day, ••• if our Air Force had 
been called upon 
to resist aggression or to suppress a recurrence of 
CO:rnbat t· . 
ac 1v1ty from an uncontrolled element in one of the occupied 
countries. ,,5 
In the process of the demobilization of the United States military 
:might, the Combined Chiefs of Staff arrangement and its standardization 
activiti f I . 
es e I into disrepute. On the one hand , the United States tended 
to view th· . 18 association with a colonial power as an uncomfortable post-
war pol ·t· 1 1cal arrangement. On the other hand, the need for such an 
organizat· 
ion was no longer considered necessary in light of the allied 
victor . . . . 
Y and the establishment of the United Nat10ns orgamzat10n. Also 
influen . 
cing this was the widespread distrust in official circles in the 
Dnited States of United Kingdom objectives. This feeling of distrust 
had · 
e:xisted to varying degrees during World War II, but seemed to be 
on the 
ascendency during the latter portion of that war. 
Although some official circles did begin to develop serious con-
cern ab 
out the possible consequences of the rapid dismantling of the 
lnilitar 
Y organization and the severance of the military ties of the United 
States 
' no steps were taken to modify public opinion, and the Congress, 
l:'eflectin 
g the then prevailing opinion, retrenched progressively on 
5 
of p Gen. Hoyt S . Vandenberg, quoted by John C. Sparrow, History 
G ~l Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington: U. S. 
O'irern:rn ::::--:----_:__:--=.:.:::..~ -- --
ent Printing Office, 1951), P• 370. 
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military . . 
appropriations and finally, in March, 194 7, allowed the 
Sel ective Serv1·ce 
Act to lapse. At the same time United Kingdom 
demobilization, 
which had been delayed in the 1945- 1946 period, was 
moving into full swing. 
Meanwhile , between the formal surrender of Japan {September 2, 
1945
) and the end of the next year, several high-level post-war confer -
e nces h d 
a convened. These included four meetings of the Council of 
Fore ign M· . 1n1sters, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the United 
States th . 
' e United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, three meetings of the 
Gener 1 
a Assembly of the United Nations, and a Peace Conference. 
The details of these conferences are now well known. In them 
it was 
gradually revealed that, behind the documents by which the 
Grand A11· 
lance had been cemented and in which the outlines of an inter-
national 
system of state relations had been recorded, the major powers 
had from the h d · b start pursued objectives w ose 1vergence was o scured 
by their ha · 1 t th d . v1ng been expressed in such genera erms at contra 1ctory 
interp . 
retat1ons were always possible. In the course of the attempts at 
Po
st
- World War II settlement and as national post-war policies were 
deveio ed . 
P in action it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not 
co:r:nm. 
ltted to a cooperative international effort for peace and security 
of all nations. In brief, the Soviet Union appeared to be renewing the 
thesis 
of World revolution that its wartime allies hoped had b een 
abandoned. 
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Communist regimes were maintained in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Poland, and Rumania. The self- insta lled communist regimes of Albania 
and Yugoslavia were supported. Local communist parties in France , 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Korea were encouraged in political sabotage 
and in Greece and China were indirec tly supported in open civil war. 
Direct pressure was brought to bear on Turkey and Iran. And the antici-
pated joint control of enemy states was being made unworkable. 
In the course of 1946, the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached a stalemate regarding Germany. In this and other disagree-
ments with the Soviet Union the wartime Anglo-American association 
was revived. More and more the United State s , which in 1945 assumed 
the role of mediator between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, 
began to identify its interests with those of the United Kingdom. The 
importance the United States now attached to the continued position and 
influence of the United Kingdom was reflected in the British Loan Agree-
ment of 1946 in which the United States provided $4. 4 billions in credit s 
to the United Kingdom. 
As the threat of the Soviet Union became more apparent, attention 
was drawn to the military question. If the relations with the Soviet Union 
were to continue to deteriorate, war was a distinct possibility. And if the 
United States was to be involved in a war with the Soviet Union there was 
every possibility that at least Canada and the United Kingdom would be 
a llied with the United States. The interests of these three states vis a'. vis 
the Soviet Union were essentially the same; the Unite d States a nd Canada 
105 
were still linked in the Permanent Joint Board on Defense; by its own 
admission the defense of the United Kingdom depended on the United 
States strength; and the range of United States operational aircraft 
was such that their employment against the Soviet Union depended to a 
g reat extent on the use of forward bases in the British Commonwealth. 
But before discus sing how the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada reacted to this worsening international situation, it would be well 
to return to the Western Hemisphere. 
Western Hemisphere Security. One of the elements of post- World 
War II security of the United States was envis aged as a system of 
collecti ve security of the Western Hemisphere. This policy had a history 
extending back to the days of Simon Bolivar and the 1826 Congress of 
Panama. In fact, the Tre aty of Confederation which was signed by the 
delegates to the Congre ss of Panama is alleged to have set the precedents 
for the future development of the inter-Am erican political system. In 
a ddition, it provided for the collective defense of the Americas against 
armed attack, the precepts for the Inter American D efense Board. 
With the outbreak of World War II in Europe in 1939 an emergency 
Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers was convened in 
Panama City. A second Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the American Republics was held in Havana in 1940 
a s a result of the fall of France. At this meeting it was declared that an 
attack on the part of a non-American state against any American state 
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Would b . . . 6 
e considered as an attack on all the signatory nations. The 
Third M t· ee ing of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Repub1· 
ics , held in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, went on to recommend: 
The immediate meeting in Washington of a commission composed 
of military and naval technicians appointed by each of the Govern-
;nents to study and to recommend to them the measures necessary 
or the defense of the Continent. 7 
In Washington, on March 30, 1942, the newly appointed delegates 
of the 21 A __ 
.n..rnerican Republics met in the inaugural session of the Inter 
A.mer· 
lean Defense Board. By December, 1945 , the Board had outlined 
the broad bas1·s for inter-American military cooperation in various 
resoI t· 
u ions dealing with security against sabotage, production of 
str.ate . 
gic materials, naval and air bases, anti - submarine defense, 
standardi t · f ·1 · 8 za ion of material, and other subjects o a m1 1tary nature. 
In line with United States policy and reflecting the general situation there 
now d 
eveloped a feeling that the Inter American Defense Board organiza -
tion sh 
ould continue on a permanent basis. This concept of permanency 
Was dis 
cussed at the Inter - American Conference on Problems of War and 
Peace h l . 
e din Mexico City from February 21 to March 8, 1945. Stemming 
fro:r:n th . 
ese discussions a Resolution IV was adopted which recommended: 
6 
Pl . Inter American Defense Board, An Introduction to Mutual Sec urity 
ann1n b 
~g -.X..~American Republics, P• 4. 
IA.DB 
7
Inter American Defense Board, Background and Regulations of 
~' p. 2. 
8 
Plan . Inter American Defense Board, An Introduction~ Mutual Security 
~g ~~American Republics, P• 7. 
That the Governments cons1.der the creation, at the earliest 
possible time, of a permanent agency by the representatives of 
e ach of the General Staffs of the American Republics, for the 
purpose of proposing to the said governments measures for a 
closer military collaboration among all the Governments and 
for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. 
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That the Inter - American Defense Board continue as an agency 
of inter-American defense until the permanent body, provided for 
in this recommendation be established. 9 
Under Revolution IV, the Inter American Defense Board began 
considering measures looking toward the creation of the "permanent 
agency" and a proposal for the creation of an Inter-American Military 
C ouncil was drafted and forwarded to the governments. But this pro-
p o sal was not acted upon.. 
In 194 7, the Inter - American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was 
s igned in Rio de Janeiro at the Inter-American Conference for the main-
te n a nce of Continental Peace and Security. This treaty elaborate d on the 
p revious agreements concerning c ollec t ive and individual measures to be 
tak e n against aggression. 
The United Statesi The United Kingdom, and Canada Act. Simul -
taneous with the military consolidation of the Western Hemisphere, the 
Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada 
discussed the problems of employing their forces in a future war and 
ag re e d that, if such employment were to be undertaken on short notic e , 
c onside rable dependence would have to b e placed on each other's 
9rnter American Defense Board, Background and Regulations ...5?i_ 
the IADB, p . 3. 
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ardization was considered nec e ssary since the forces, equip -
ment a d d . 
' n octrine of the three military forces of the three countrie s 
Were d. 
iverging rapidly. Therefore, it was agreed that the plannin g 
st
affs of the three countries should meet and discuss in general te r ms 
th
e Problems of standardization and coordination of research and develop -
ment. 
The se national planning teams met in November, 1946, and agreed 
to a set f 0 
recommendations to be passed to their respective countrie s 
for a 
Ppr oval. In essence, these recommendations were that the naval, 
ar:rny-
' and air forces of each country should be able to operate with the 
services f 0 the others and in certain cases as integrated forces; that 
re serves f 
0 materiel should be held to allow operations to be carrie d out ; 
a:nd, to all 
ow a rapid turnover of industry from civil to war produc tion , 
that 1 
p anning should insure that in all fields the available resources w e r e 
Used in the 
most advantageous and economical way. To carry o ut thes e 
ob · 
Jectives th h bl. h ' e national planning teams proposed t e esta 1s ment of 
Parallel national standardization agencies joined into an international 
al"l."a 
ngement. 
These objectives and proposals were accepted by the Chiefs of 
Staff of the 
three countries without significant alteration. Canada acte d 
Pl"o:rnptl 
Y- and established a Joint Standardization Steering Committee. 
Bowevel" 
• in both the United States and in the United Kingdom opposition 
developed to h bl f t d d' t · Th ' t e joint approach to the pro em o s an ar 1za 10n. 1s 
U:nwi11 · 
ingness to approach standardiza tion from the joint l eve l proba bly 
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stemmed from the different service approaches to the problem and an 
initial unwillingness on the part of the Royal Navy and the United States 
Navy to coordinate naval matters with the Royal Canadian Navy. Aggra -
vating the issue was the bitter debate in the United States over Air Force 
autonomy. 
By mid - 1947~ the United States, United Kingdom , and Canadian 
armies were in a position to pursue the standardization program recom-
mended by the planning teams , but on a single-service rather than a joint 
basis. Six months later, in January, 1948, the Royal Canadian Air Force, 
the Royal Air Force, and the United States Air Force convened top staff 
personnel in Washington to discuss the possibility of proceeding with 
aeronautical standardization. By mid- 1948 , after considerable inter-
c hange of correspondence between standardization specialists in the 
three air forces, those specialists, organized on a tripartite basis, 
met in Ottawa, London, and Washington and inaugurated a United States, 
United Kingdom, Canadian international military aeronautical stand-
ardization program. Officially this body was termed the Air Stand-
ardization Coordinating Committee. 
While the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian armies 
and air forces acted to carry out the 1946 conclusions regarding stand-
ardization as a counter to the threat of the Soviet Union, the navi es 
of these three countries were unable to come together on a joint basis 
until 1950. However, some spe cific standardization projects were 
undertaken on an ad hoc basis. 
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Now while the military services of the United States, the United 
Kingdom 
' and Canada acted to improve their combined capability through 
standardization 
' the international situation tended to worsen. 
~ International Situation Worsens. In March, 1947,. the 
foreign . 
nunisters met in Moscow to discuss the drafting of peace 
treaties for 
Germany and Austria. But they were unable to agree on 
Germany's 
fate and they left Moscow at the end of April with the prob-
lem. 
no nearer solution. The schism in the wartime alliance that had 
defeated the 
Axis now appeared irreparable. 
Another Foreign Ministers Conference held in London in November 
1947 
' COnf" irmed the stalemate. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet repre -
sent t· 
a lVes walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. Post-war 
cooperat· 
lon between the Soviet Union and the Western States had ceased. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was exerting direct and indirect 
Pres sure . 
1 n many parts of the world but more notable in Persia, Turkey, 
Greece 
' Manchuria, Korea, South - East Asia, and Malaya. 
By early 194 7 public opinion in the Western States had reluctantly 
accept d 
e the fact that the Soviet Union was no longer an ally. In March 
of that 
Year President Truman asked the Congress of the United States to 
authorize 
the support of free peoples who were 11 resisting attempted sub -
fogation b . rrIO Th C 
Y armed minorities, or by outside pressure. e ongress 
IO 
Dnited Pres ident Harry s. Truman, A ddress to the Congress 
Ma S tates, March 12 1947 quoted in The New York Times , 
rch 14 ' ' -- -- --, I 942. 
of the 
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responded by authorizing an appropriation of $400 million for aid to 
Greece and Turkey and the dispatch to those countries of American 
c ivilian and military missions. But the situation throughout Western 
Europe was no less alarming. In spite of emergency aid from the 
United States, these states were on the brink of economic ruin. And 
the danger was not just economic; it was also political. 
Progress in the Security Council of the United Nations had by 
now become paralyzed by the use of the power of the veto. Political 
cooperation by the Soviet Union was lacking. And behind this lack of 
political cooperation or pol itical aggressiveness the Soviet Union con-
tinued to maintain about 4. 5 million men on a war footing. In addition, 
the Soviet Union was engaged in organizing the armies of its satellites 
along Soviet lines despite treaty obligations to the ccntrary. Opposing 
this tremendous political / military force was virtually nothing except 
the possession of atomic weapons by the United States. Without a doubt, 
W e stern political power was on the verge of collapse in the face of the 
overwhelming strength of the Soviet Union. Faced with this threat to 
their existence, the Western States finally reacted. 
The idea of a defensive alliance between like - minded states 
within the framework of the United Nations had been voiced by Winston 
Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946. Howe v er , 
a t that time the Western States were not prepared to embark on such a 
c ourse of action. But by 1947 the threat was much clearer and public 
opinion was rallying behind the idea. In March, 1947, Franc e a nd the 
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United Kingdom joined in the Dunkirk Treaty. In September, 1947 , 
the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs , Louis S. St. 
Laurent, in addressing the General A ssembly of the United Nations, 
expressed the concern that some nations could be forced into seeking 
greater security by association with one another. On January 22, 1948, 
Ernst Bevin put forth a proposal in the House of Commons for a form 
of western union of Belgium, France , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom. The United States backed this idea in general. 
While it was being discussed by the states in Europe, a communist 
coup d'etat took place in Prague. With the communist threat thus assum -
ing potent reality, the five states signed the Treaty of Brussels on 
March 17, 1948, pledging themselves to set up a joint defensive system 
as well as to strengthen economic and cultural ties. On March 31, 1948, 
the Soviet Military Administration in Berlin issued an order which pre -
vented the movement of military passenger trains across the border e n 
route to Berlin unless baggage and passengers were checked by their 
personnel. Berlin was blockaded. On April 30, 1948 , the Defense 
Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff of the five Brussels Treaty states m e t 
in London to study their military needs. From July onwards Canada 
and the United States attended these meetings with a non - member status. 
In September, 1948, the Brussels Treaty states decided to create a 
military agency, the Western Union Defense Organization. Meanwhile, 
on April 28, 1948, St. Laurent put forth in the Canadian House of Com-
mons the idea of a single mutual defense system , including and supers e ding 
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the Brus l 
se s Treaty arrangement. 
by- Bevin. 
A week later this idea was welcomed 
At the same time Senator Arthur Vandenberg was preparing, 
in con ul . 
s tation with the United States Department of State , a Resolution 
that w ld 
ou sanction the entry of the United States into additional r egional 
collective defense 
arrangements. On June 11, 1948 , this Resolution was 
Passed by the Un1·ted States Senate. 6 
On July 2 , 1948, preliminary talks 
Were Uild 
ertaken between the United States Department of State and the 
A:rnb 
assadors of Canada and the Brussels Treaty states. These talks 
ended 
on September 9, 1948, with a recommendation for a defensive 
treat 
y of alliance which was accepted by the governments. 
While this action was taking place on the European scene, the 
Ninth I 
nternational Conference of American States , held in Bogata in 
1948 
' created the Organi,zation of American States to supercede the Pan 
A:rnerican D · "d 
n1on. The Organization of American States was prov1 ed 
With an . 
Advisory Defense Committee to consult on call and both the 
functions 
of this Committee and the Inter American Defense Board were 
de1· 
lneated in the Charter of the Organization of American States , thus 
lT.lakiug th 
e Inter American Defense Board a permanent structure. 
~ !i_orth Atlantic Treaty And Subsequent Developments. On 
Dece:rnber 
10, 1948 , the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty commenced. 
1'hen 
on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the 
F'oreign 
Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark , F rance, Iceland, 
Italy-, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United 
l<:i:n.gdo:rn 
• and the United States. Within five months it was ratifi ed 
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by the parliaments of the member states. Later Greece, Turkey , 
and Western Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty. 
In furtherance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense 
consolidation, the first session of the North Atlantic Council now took 
place in Washington. At this September 17, 1949 , meeting the Council 
took steps to establish the organization necessary to implement the terms 
of the Treaty. Among other things the Council established a D efense 
Committee, composed ordinarily of Defense Ministers, and charged 
with the task of drawing up unified defense plans for the North Atlantic 
area. It suggested specifically that the military part of the organization 
should include a Military Committee and certain Regional Planning 
Groups. 
At the second session of the North Atlantic Council, on November 
18 , 1949, a Defense Financial and Economic Committee was established. 
In addition the Council approved the action of the Defense committee in 
e stablishing a Military Production and Supply Board. Acting on the 
recommendations of this Board, the Military Committee, at its fourth 
meeting on October 24, 1950, endorsed the idea of military standardiza-
tion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and established a Military 
Agency for Standardization. 11 
l l Lord Ismay reported the justification for the Military Agency 
for Standardization (originally called the Military Standardization Agency) 
as follows: 11 Two of the limitations to effective co-operation between 
armed forces of a coalition of nations are : 1. plurality of types of 
weapons and equipment; 2. differences in systems of staff work and 
military doctrine. The former complicates the problem of supply and 
The n e xt spring, at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of 
.M:inist 
ers of Fore ign Affairs , in April, 1951, the instrumenta lit y of 
the Inter A . 
tner1can Defense Board was given further emp hasis with 
the ad . 
option of the "Inter - American Military Cooperation11 resolution 
Wh' 
lch stated that: 
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th ~he expansionist activities of international communism require 
e immediate adoption of measures to safeguard the p e a c e a nd sec · 
urity of the continent. 12 
By the next spring, it became increasingly apparent that the 
Perma 
nent structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization required 
further 
Sfrengthening , and in 1952 the p e rmanent staff was reorganized 
and cons 1 · 0 
ldated in Paris under Lord Ismay. One of the foremost r e spon -
sibi} · t· 1 
ies of th1's · d h new International Staff was logistics , an t at staff soon 
became 
engaged in a standardization program of its own, commonly r e-
ferred t 
0 
as the Groups of Experts. The Interna tional Sta ff , howe v e r , 
approached 
standardiza tion from the aspect of production rather than 
fron-i th 
e aspect of military operations as did the Military Ag e ncy for 
Stand 
ardizat· ion. 
By now it had become apparent that no extensive international 
Program 
of cooperation could succeed without standardization, in fac t , 
rtia· 1
ntenan k h d 'ff ' Cult ce, while the latter render close team wor muc mor e i 1-
Sta • It Was With those limitations in mind that the Military Age ncy for 
ndard· · O Th Ye 1zation was set up 11 Lord Ismay, NAT , e First Five ars l • • • • ---- --~, --2±2. -~ (Netherlands: Bos c h ... Utrecht) , P• 79. 
12I d . 
S e . nter American Defense Board, An Intro uctlon to 
~llr1h p . -.-
---.:X ~ by the American Republics , p . 12. 
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the very backbone of international strength and the counter to the Soviet 
threat lay in one thing: standardization. In keeping with this conclusion 
military international standardization was extended beyond the original 
programs of the Inter American Defense Board and the United Statesi 
United Kingdom , and Canadian arrangements, into and beyond the North 
A tlantic Treaty arrangement. Through the A ir Coordinating Committee, 
the United States military departments exerted an influenc e in the stand-
ardization programs of the International Civil Aviation Organization; 
through the American Standards Association the military departments 
had certain influence in the work of the International Organization for 
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission; 
military aid programs were turned largely in the direction of stand -
ardization of armaments; in the South East Asia Treaty Organization 
and with Japan and Spain standardization was to be emphasized time 
and again. 
But the mere recognition of the extreme importance of standard-
ization as an element of national and international str ength and the 
creation of a multitude of organizations for the purpose of achieving 
standardization, military and civil, did not thereby insure that stand-
ardization would be achieved. In fact, there is serious question as to 
whether the divisive forces that create and perpetuate non-standardiza-
tion are not superior to the motivations for standardizations. This 
aspect of the standardization problem will be discussed next. 
CHAPTER V 
UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION 
11 T he picture of The /United States/ Government as an organic 
unit ••• is especially misleading in the field of standardization. 111 
The Overall View. If one were to look in the index of a recent 
is sue of the United States Government Organization Manual, the official 
organization handbook of the federal government, under the word 
11 standard" would be found these listings: . 
Standard Stock Catalog, Federal 
Standardization, and Inspection, Office of Cataloging (Defense) 
Standards, Bureau of 
Standards, Bureau of Programs and /Civil Service Commiss ion/ 
Standards Division /Civil Service Co~mission/ 
Standards Division / General Services A dmini;tration/ 
Standards for grade~ for farm commodities -
Standards, National Bureau of2 
But it would be a gross error to conclude from this that e ight listings 
accounted for the United States governmental organization for and 
interest in standardization. 
1E. C. Crittenden, 11Contributions of Government and Private 
Agencie s to National Standards, 11 Dickson Reck (e d.), National Standards 
in a Mode rn Economy (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 
1956), p. 33. 
2 U. S. General Services Administration, Unite d States Govern-
ment Organization Manual 1955 - 56 (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office), p. 761. 
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In 1941, Samuel P. Kaidanovsky reported to the United States 
Senate on the activities of forty - six governmental agencies engaged in 
some phase of work with consumer standards to include basic research 
and t e sts leading to or affecting standards and the direct creation of 
consumer standards or specifications. 3 Obviously this listing was 
limited by the fact that only consumer standards were covered. Further , 
since that date standardization has b ecome more widespread in its use 
and has involved more governmental agencies . Thus , although some cen-
tralization of effort was realized in 1952 , 
4 
the organizational picture 
has become infinitely more complicated at the national l evel. However, 
this is but a part of the organizational problem connected with standard-
ization for a very large part of the United States standardization effort 
is concentrated in state agencies and, a still l arger portion, in civil 
bodies. 
All of the states of the United S tates engage in standardization 
of a scale almost equalling that of the federal government. Many areas 
of standardization exist only at state level as powers reserved to the 
states, as an example the standards for licensing of many professional 
and trade p ersonne l as well as standards involving such basics as 
we i ghts and measures. Complicating this situation is the fact tha t 
3 u. S. Congress, Temporary National Economic Committee, Con-
sumer Standards (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941) , 
P• 5. 
4 u. s. Congress, Public L aw 436 , "Defense Cataloging and Stand-
ardization Act," 82d. Cong., 66 Stat. 320 ; 5 U. S. C. 17 3g. 
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many states use their power of standardization to create and maintain 
specific differences between themselves and other states. Most 
numerous, perhaps, are the difference s maintained to protect state 
interests by creating interstate trade barriers. 
5 
On the United States civil side, and excluding the many plants 
and corporations that maintain their own standardization activities, of 
the some 3000 national and interstate organizations representing various 
industries, over 450 carry on standardization and simplification activities 
in one form or another. 6 In addition to these industry bodies, there are 
a l arge number of professional and other societies that engage in various 
forms of standardi zation and simplification. 
Thus, on the whole, one must reluctantly conclude that an organ-
ization for standardization does not exist in the United States. This idea 
was expressed by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces a decade ago. 
In the United States there is no one body, either of a wholly 
industrial or combined industrial governmental nature, that has 
any authoritative directive to aggressively push standardization 
forward • • • • It is regretted that the present system does not 
allow any one authoritative body to survey the various fields and 
initiate, or have initiated, action toward more rapid standardiza-
. 7 t 1on •••• 
5Industrial Standardization, February, 1942, p. 39 , lfLack of 
Standards as Trade Barrier Hinders U. S. Defense Effort." 
6Robe rt A. Martino, Standardization Activities of National 
Technical and Trade Organizations (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1941), pp. 1 -2. 
7 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, "Industrial Standardiza-
tion, " 1949, Student Committee Report (in the files of the Air Univers ity 
L ibrary, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama) . 
- - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -
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In making a parallel observation, Lt. Col. A. D . Gough of the 
Unite d States Army noted that "there is no agency to which the State 
D e partment can go for information regarding the U. S. Government 
8 
p olicy or position on international standardization . 11 Of course, 
one could ask why the Department of State did not itself establish the 
Uni t ed States policy for international standardization. If this question 
wer e asked, it might reveal the organization inadequacy of the Depart-
m e nt of State to formulate a national policy in this compl ex area. While 
the e xecutive branch of the government may claim the right to decide the 
inte rnational phase of the question, the legislative branch claims equal 
righ ts to decide the national phase of the question. But, since the 
que stion is not really divisible, only the most e laborate joint govern-
m e ntal machinery could produce a policy. However, beyond this Cyril 
A insworth noted that there is the feeling that standardization is not even 
the business of government. 
Standards, as we know them, are rul es that have been established 
as a result of voluntary action on the part of industry; they are 
written on the consensus principle, hence government action, as such, 
c an hardly be considered the motivating force. 9 
8 u. S. Army, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. J. K. Christmas, 
A pril 21, 1949 (in the files of the Department of Army, file: Stand-
ardization Policy). 
9 cyril Ainswor,th, quoted in Combined Production and Resources 
Board, Report of Conferences on Standardization of Screw Threads and 
Cylindrical Fit~ London , Aug~-September 1944 (Washington: U. S. 
G ove rnment Printing Office, 1944), P• 28. 
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have, with the exception of United States policy regarding 
the I 
nternational C 
ivil Aviation Organization, essentially contented it-
~lf b . 
Y issuing · 
s tandardiz . 
innocuous statements in general support of international 
ation but never outlining a real policy or program. 
The A " 
--. ---22'.. ~oordinating Committee and International Standardizat ion. 
The 
e:x:cept· 
ion regarding United States policy in the International Civil 
A.v· 
iation Or . 
ganization and the United States organization in which such 
Polic,, . 
J is f 
P:racticaJ 
orn:iulated must be t th nl discussed for it represen s e o y near 
approach to the international standardization problem taken in 
the lJ . 
ll1ted Stat 
es. It is, however, a governmental approach and a 
special. 
lZed 
approach for a specialized problem. Further , it fails to 
Cons .d 
l er ade 
quately the fact that the internati onal standardization that 
occu 
rs in the Inter t· I · · · · O · t · · d 11' at d · 
Othe:r 
na 1ona C1v1l Aviation rgan1za 10n 1s up c ~ 1n 
Othe 
orga . 
n1zations that are monitored in the United States by means 
:r than the 




As in all h D 
other international standardization matters, t e epart-
of Stat 
l)"'. e , by itself, coul d not reasonably expect to formulate the 
~~lted S 
tates O . . 
P 0 licy for the International Civil Aviation rgamzat10n. 
!'his 
Wa 8 recog · nized early in 
Ot 
ganizat · 
United States / International Civil Aviation 
ion relations 
th • On the other hand, the Department of State was 
e o I n y- go 
Ve:rnn:iental department that could, by its terms of reference, 
t ePt 
e sent the 
Dni ted States in the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
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F o r t unately, the coordination of aviation policies and programs already 
had b e come a national problem involving more than one governm e ntal 
department and, by interdepartmental agreement, a coordinating agency 
consisting of the Departments of State, War, Navy, and Commerce had 
10 
been established 1n March, 1945. In September, 1946, this agency 
was formalized as the Air Coordinating Committee with an expanded 
membe rship. l l One of the primary functions of the Air Coordinating 
C ommittee b ecame the formulation of United States positions on tech-
n i cal, economic, and legal matters for the guidance of the Department 
o f State and the United States representative to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. Since the Air Coordinating Committee sought 
i n d us try advice and assistance in the formulation of its positions, a 
near national approach to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
stand a rdization problems was possible. 
The true effectiveness of the Air Coordinating Committee 
may b e open to question, but it was the only real attempt in the 
10 u. S., 11Interdepartmental Memorandum, Regarding Organi ·~ 
zati o n of A ir Coordinating Committee, 11 March 27, 1945 (in the files of 
the Department of Air Force, file: ICAO Policy). 
11 u. S. Executive Order 9781, 11Establishing the Air Coordinat-
ing Committee, 11 September 19, 1946. Membership was subsequently 
expanded by Executive Order to include the Departments of _State, Tre asury. , 
P os t Office, Commerce, Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Civil Aero .. 
nautic s Board; and the Federal Communications Commission. Aviation 
repr e sentation conventionally included the Airc raft Industries Association , 
t h e Air Transport Association, and the Airline Pilot's Assoc iation, but 
oth er groups were called in from time to time depending on the problem 
und er consideration. 
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United States to solve the international standardization organization a nd 
policy que stion. 
The Forces ~f Decentralization, Profit, and Practicality. The 
caus e of t h e lack of organization in the United States in the remaining 
fie l d s of standardization is historic and a reflection of the United 
State s syste m wherein the re is a definite tendency, if not a desire, to 
avoid fed e ral centralization of anything that can be managed on a lowe r 
l eve l . Reinforcing this desire to avoid centralization of standardization 
is the p r ofit motive. On this point Benjamin Melnitsky states that: 
Industrial standardization has validity only if it pays off--
e ithe r in the hard cash of increased profits or in the equally valid 
c ounte rparts of heightened customer good will, improved pro -
duction, bolstered employee morale, better relations with supplie rs, 
a nd the like. Failing to do so, standards can be l ifted gently by the 
corne r and dropped into the nearest trash receptacle. 12 
But p r ofit is usually a local determination. Therefore , if profit is to 
be the sing le motivating force behind standardization, there is little 
nee d to consider centralization and much justification to avoid it. If the 
deci sion r e garding standardization is to be made on no basis othe r than 
company or corporate profits , then governmental organization and con-
trol s hould be avoided for the government cannot and should not function 
on that single basis. Actually, government participation in standardiza -
tion may b e expected , in many instances, to work as a force direc tly 
oppos ing profit on the local level. It is p e r h aps, the unfortunate role 
12Benjamin Melnitsky, Profiting From Industria l Standardization 
(New Yo rk : Conove r-Mast Publications, Inc . , 1953), p . 17. 
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o f government to seek a greater good for the mass than to protect any 
i n dividual profit. 
Beyond the force of profit as an element in maintaining the lack 
o f United States organization for standardization is the inability in the 
U n ite d States to approach standardization on other than a so-called 
" p ractical" basis and, thus, to avoid any theoretical considerations. 
The use of the word "practical11 in itself as an explanation of the United 
S tate s approach to standardization has an interesting effect for, used 
as a n antonym of the word "theoretical, 11 it tends to define "theoretical" 
as "impractical. 11 This has a far·- reaching effect on organization for the 
mo re centralized the organization the more it would tend to be " theoretical" 
in i t s deliberations, while the more local the organization the more it 
w ould tend to be "practical" in its deliberations. An international stand-
ardization mission of the Organization for European Economic Coopera-
tion observing this problem was led to comment that: 
It was obvious ••• that American engineers have a strictly 
practical approach to their work , and any attempt to get them to 
discuss it from one particul ar angle , such as that of standardization, 
met with little response. They are fully alive to the benefits of 
standardization, but if they do not see those benefits in the particu-
lar work they have in hand, they have no compunction whatever in 
disregarding it. It is undoubtedly the same independence of out-
look that has resulted in the organic growth of so many standardiz-
ing agencies just when and where they may happen to have been 
required. 13 
13organization for European Economic Cooperation, Some 
A spe cts of Standardization i n the ~· _§. !:• and in Europe (Paris : Org an-
ization for European Economic Cooperation, 1953), p. 25. 
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The Trend Toward Centralization. In spite of the foregoing, the 
United States organizational picture is not all dark and dismal. While 
standardization tended to originate on the local level, with the passage 
of t ime, there has tended to be some c e ntralization of effort. This was 
a na tural conditioning brought about by the need for larger markets, 
ma ss production, product assembly and integration, specialization, a nd 
competition for orders from sources that demanded standardization in the 
ite ms that they purchased. Profit remained the guiding element of stand -
ardization, but the conditioning effect of these other elements on the 
profit motive led progressively to integration above the strict local l evel . 
A s a result organizations began to be created having a prime or single 
task of standardization. Foremost among these was the American Stand-
ards Association, the National Aircraft Standards Committee, and the 
Ame rican Society for Testing Materials. 
Effect of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission. 
- ------
T he spontaneous movement toward greater centralization of standardiza-
tion and thus the greater extension of the standards and corresponding 
e limination of non-standard items ran directly counter to the principles 
l a id down in the Sherman Act which declared unlawful 11 every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspi racy, in restraint 
o f trade or commerce among the several states • •• • 1114 The possibility 
14u. S. Congress, Act of July 2, 1890 , 26 Stat. 209; 15 
U. S . C. , sec. 1. 
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o f this contingency had been seen by Herbert Hoover who, as Secretary 
o f Commerce, in 1922 requested an informal opinion of the Attorney 
G e neral as to the legality of trade association activity in general and 
i n cluded in his request the question: 
May a trade association, in cooperation with its members, ad-
vocate and provide for the standardization of qua l ity and grades of 
product of such members, to the end that the buying public may 
know what it is to receive when a particular grade of quality is 
specified; and may such association, after standardizing quality 
and grade, provide standard form of contract for the purpose of 
correctly designating the standards of quality and grades of product; 
and may it standardize technical and scientific terms, its processes 
in production, and its machinery; and may the association cooperate 
with its members in determining means for the elimination of waste-
ful processes in production and distribution and for the raising of 
ethical standards in trade for the prevention of dishonest practices? 15 
Naturally this question was a key consideration in the organization 
for standardization. But the hedged reply of the Attorney General really 
did little to he l p clear it up. 
I can now see nothing illegal in the exercise of the other activities 
mentioned, provided always that whatever is done is not used as a 
scheme or device to curtail production or enhance prices, and does 
not have the effect of suppressing competition. 16 
Standardization does, of course, tend to limit or even eliminate 
c ompetition, it does enhance prices, and it does curtail non- standard 
production. Obviously if producing and consuming industries agree to 
standardize on a certain type of cross-recess screw, competing types 
w ill be eliminated, prices will be enhanced, and non-standard production 
l 5Quoted in Industrial Standardization, April, 1946, p. 47. 
1 6rbid. 
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curtailed. But the attitude of the Federal Trade Commission and the 
courts during the twenties and early thirties generally was limited to 
treating standardization as illegal only when it was used for illegal 
purpos e s. In the late thirties and thereafter this attitude tended 
towa rd modification. 
In Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v. Federal Trade Commis -
17 
sion , it was alleged that the members of the Institute: 
••• had maintained an unlawful combination to restrain competi -
tion in the manufacture, sale and distribution of milk a nd ice cream 
cans in interstate commerce ••• and that they had standardized 
and promoted uniformity in their products for the purpose of l essen-
ing competition. 
The basic question, nevertheless, was whether the Institute acted 1n 
combination or by agreement for the purpose of fixing prices, or 
wheth er its activities contributed to such result. The Institute argued 
that milk and ice cream cans were a standardized product and from 
this it was argued that uniformity of price was a natural rather than an 
artificial result. But, while the court saw merit in the argument that 
some products such as salt, sugar, and oil might be standard by their 
nature, they could not agree that a can was in the same category. In 
this case the court felt that the meticulous effort made by the Institute 
to standardize their products was a strong cir cum stance in support of the 
Commission's finding that their activities were the result of agreement 
contrary to the Sherman Act. 
I 7 152 Fed. (2d) 4 7 8 (C. C. A. , 7th , 1946). 
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In~ Howard Paper Company v. Federal Trade Commission, l8 
the c 
o:rnrnission 
ordered the respondents to cease and desist from ,, 
adopting or rn . . 
ainta1ning uniform standards governing creping ratio, 
Sizes 
, or Weight f 
s o crepe paper, or the sale of seconds or close -outs , . . ;- -
• - a~; uniform 
prices for crepe paper. 11 Here the petitioners 
al."gued 
Unsucc f 1 
ess u ly that crepe paper was a standard product of con-
sistent 
quality made of the same tissue paper and creped on standard 
111ach· i:nes so th
at the resultant product, irrespective of manufacturer, 
Was .d 
1 enticaI. 
In B d 19 ~ Crown and Cork Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 
the Co111rn. . 
ission found that, upon organization of the Crown Manufacturers ' 
Assa . ciat· 1011 
of America, "one of the first things it did was to bring about 
lnol."e 
complete 
standardization of product in that, by agreement of the 
lnanufactul."ers 




Y all :manufacturers were identically the same. 11 The court 
Ported the 
Commission in its cease and desist actions because the 
stand 
al."dizat· 10
n achieved led to or at least made possible the further 
stand 
al."dizat· 10
n of discounts, differentials, prices, etc. 
F':i-o:rn the above and other standardization cases it is apparent 
that th 




6 Fed (2d) 899 (C. c. A., 7th, 1947), cert. den. 329 U.S. 946). • 
19 
l ?6 Fed. (2d) 974 (C. C. A. , 4th, 1949). 
~ .... ---- ~ .. - ~ -~---= -. -.-... ---.-.- ----. -_ _ __ -=--::::- - ~ 
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i lle gal acts. Further , z ealous standardization may even be looke d on as 
evidence of a scheme in restraint of trade. As James D. Hayes stated: 
••• it appears that there is danger even in an agreement on what 
the standard shall be in that the Federal Trade Commission and the 
courts will accept that agreement as evidence of agreement on other 
matters which the law forbids competitors to agree. 20 
I n other words, 'since standardization facilitates price fixing and restraint 
o f production it can always be pointed to as evidence of acts contributing 
to that illegal end. This was an important consideration in the deve lop -
m e nt of standardization and the standardization organization. And it 
did not lessen with time. Even during the Korean War John C. Green 
pointed out that: 
Nothing in the present emergency legislation nullifies or cancels 
the antitrust legislation. The Department of Justic e is charged 
with implementation of that legislation and they do not contemplate 
going out of business for the duration. Hence, may I caution i n-
dustry groups who plan to sit down together and work out stand-
ardization and simplification programs to give full cognizance to 
the antitrust interpretation of their activities. I think I can say 
that the Department of Justice is sympathetic to the proble m, but 
they are not going to overlook violations b ecause they are under-
taken during the present emergency. 21 
Again, in 1956, the Air Research and Development Command of 
t he United States Air Force commented that: 
Legal problems ••• arise_in attempts of firms to cooperate 
/for standardization purpose~/ . Fear of accusations of conspiracy, 
20 d James D. Hayes, "Stan ardization and the Antitrust L aws, 11 
I n dustria l Standardization, April , 1946 , p. 76. 
21 John C. Green, "Industrial Mobilization and Standardization, " 
S tandardization, January, 1951 , p. 14. 
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price fixing, and other actions in restraint of trade damp any 
e nthus iasm for such cooperation. We can conclude that expecting 
industry itself to standardize for any normal motive on /aircraft 
a nd missile components 7 is unrealistic. 22 
The extent of the concern of industry over the legal implications 
o f sta rrlardiza tion is clea r ly seen by the frequency with which the Americ an 
S tandards Association and others raise the subject and attempt to e xtract 
from those in a position of authority a statement of policy. But the state -
m e nts of policy provided to industry merely convince industry that the 
d i v ision between legal and illegal standardization is hardly clear if , in 
fact , such a division does exist. Thus, though industry may be assured 
that government is not hostile toward "legal" standardization programs , 
23 
the r e is little consolation in those words. 24 
These legal difficulties with standardization led to the broad 
adoption of the operational principle that standards always should b e 
voluntary in their application. This is discussed further in Chapter 
V I II, but as regards organization it led to the conclusion that the stand -
a rdization organization should reflect the desires of both consumer and 
22 u. S. Air Force, Air Research and Development Command, 
L ette r for Western Air Development Commani, subj: "Standardization 
o f Aircraft and Missiles Components, 1 1 November 23, 1956 (in the files 
of the Department of the Air Force, file: AFDDS - 1). 
23Ephraim Jacobs, 11 The Legal Implications of Standardization, 11 
T he Magazine of Standards, January, 1956, p. 27. 
24An excellent discussion of the question, 11 Is Standardization 
L e gal?'' was written by John F. Sonnett, Assistant United States Attorne y 
Gen eral, and is contained in Industrial Standardization, Dec ember, 1948 , 
pp. 192-195. 
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producer. It was reasoned that if a standard was arrived at after con-
sulting no.t only the producers but also the marketers and consumers, 
including government, then whatever restraint of trade that resulted 
from the adoption of the standard would be reasonable. The legality of 
this conclusion has never been tested, but it has led to the establishment 
in the American Standards Association of the 11 all-interested~parties 11 
procedure of standardization. This, in turn, has tended to lead to a 
greate r centralization of the standardization organization and also to 
the creation of a more complicated structure. 
The United States Government in Conflict. While the Federal 
Trade Commission l ooks at standardization as suspect of other things, 
the Commission, itself, advises that it has found it necessary, in some 
instances, to impose minimum standards on competitors in the exercise 
of its authority to prevent unfair methods of competition. ZS Beyond this, 
gove rnment has found it very necessary to accept in wartime the prin -
cipl e of limiting competition and fixing prices. 26 It must, of course, be 
realized that the legality or morality of acts done at the direction of the 
Z5u. S. Congress, Temporary National Economic Committee, 
Control~ Unfair Competitive Practices Through Trade Practice Con-
ference Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission (Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 16. 
2 6see the 11 sympathetic II position taken by the Department of 
Justice regarding wartime simplification as outlined in Industrial 
Standardization, September, 1941 , p. 247. 
gove rnment are not governed by the same codes as the acts done by 
non-g ove rnmental bodies. 27 
During Worl d War II , the United States government found it 
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nece ssary to institute a system of price controls. But such a system 
could not be imposed on the nation unless it was founded on a system 
o f sta ndards. And for it to be enforced it was necessary for the con-
sum e r to know the standard to which his purchase conformed. Opposing 
the system of standards as an element of price controls were groups of 
manufacturers and distributors who contended that establishing standards 
a nd requiring grade labeling destroyed brand names and advertising. 
S upporting the opposition to standards and grade labeling , Representative 
C ha rles A . Halleck stated that: 
Grade labeling is the opening gum of as sinister a move as could 
well be figured by the bureaucrats to despoil our economy for the 
benefit of the socialist system of production for us e and not fo r 
p r ofit. 28 
Against the opposition, W. S. MacLeod, the Director , Standa rds 
D ivision of the Office of Price Administration, was able to show how hidde n 
pri c e increases had been made through quality deterioration, thus d e f e at -
ing t he price control program. But, in addition, he was able to show tha t 
the us e of standards and grade l abeling did not have a deleterious effe ct on 
27This was a maj or consideration in the United States' withdrawal 
fro m the American Standards Association. In this instance , the gove rn-
ment did not wish to make l egal by its presence some thing that might 
otherwise be illegal. 




es nor advert1·s1·ng. 29 N th I It f · ever e ess, as a resu o certain 
sryandd· · 
Is tr1butor pressures the Taft Amendment to the Emergency 
Price 
Control A t 
c was passed. This Amendment specifically prohibite d 
the Off · Ice of p . 
rice Administration from requiring grade labeling on any 
cornrn 
Odity and from 
standards w 
using standards in price regulations unless such 
ere already in general use in the trade, were required by 
gover 
nrnental 
agencies, or where the Administrator could find no 
Practicable 
alternate for securing effective price control. The effect 
of this leg . 1 
ls ation on the activities of the Administration was significant. 
But 
When the .. 
Adm1n1stration removed the requirements for grading and 
grade lab . 
ehng meats, the Office of Economic Stabilization stepped in to 
cont· inue h 




ablishment of standards and grade labeling, price controls 
Were . 
I:ncapabJ 
e of enforcement. 30 
With · 
In a year of passage of the Taft Amendment limiting the 
author· 
ity of the Office of Price Administration, Representative Halleck 





centered around the Administration's use of standards that 
e
sta
blished subsequent to the passage of the Taft Amendment. In 0 
PPosition to 
the Administration's use of standards, Representative 
John 
'Taber · 
~oduced an amendment to the Second Appropriation Bill 
29
Ind · 9 2 0 ~l Standardization, July, 1943, pp. 20 - l • 
301 d . 
~l Standardization, December , 1943, P• 298. 
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p rohibiting the use of government funds to pay the salary of any Ad-
m inistration employee who used standards or specifications other than 
those already in general use. 31 Although this amendment was finally 
limited to processed fruits and vegetables, it was passed, giving at 
l ea st temporary victory to the anti-standardization forces in the United 
Sta tes. 
Office of Price Administration administrator, Chester Bowles , 
w a s quick to protest this action and asked that Congress reverse its 
b an on the use of government standards in pricing canned goods since 
the ban made impossible proper enforcement of price ceilings on canned 
f ruits and vegetables and made the American consumer the victim of 
"d d . . 32 wi esprea price increases. The issue, however, was never really 
s e ttled before the end of hostilities removed it from consideration. 
The American Standards Association and the United States 
Government in Conflict. Complicating the national standards organiza ... 
t ional arrangement, when the United States government severed its 
f ormal connection with the American Standards Association in 1948, it 
d id so with some degree of violence for it upset a government/industry 
r e lationship that had been growing for decades. 33 The extent of the 
31 Industrial Standardization, August, 1944, p. 156. 
32Industrial Standardization, September, 1944, p. 181. 
33 11 For years / American Standards Association/ work has been 
slow ly coming into more intimate contact with the Go~rnment--Fede ral --
State-- Municipal. The war has speeded this up --especially in our r e la -
tions to the Federal Government, and still more particularly with the 
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violence was such that some persons who had previously served as 
governmental representatives to the American Standards Association 
actually believed for a time that they were going to be subjected to 
prosecution. 34 
The attendance and participation in meeti ngs of technical and 
profe ssional organizations by United States government personnel has 
a lways been necessary to proper performance of their work and has had 
a two - way national benefit. First, it assisted government personnel in 
keeping abreast of new technological and scientific developments of 
interest to the government; second, it served as a means of acquainting 
civil organizations and personnel with the prevailing thought of the 
government on subjects of interest to both. As stated by the Visiting 
Committee of the National Bureau of Standards: "It is recognized that 
effec tive private control and leadership j_in standardization/ involve 
Army, Navy, and the War Agencies. These relationships will be much 
more important in post- war years. 11 (Industrial Standardization, May, 
1944, p . 92.) 
34rn June, 1948, the U. S. Army issued its policy governing 
participation in the activities of private associations. In this policy it 
stated that: ttrt is the view of The Judge Advocate General that a Govern-
ment department or agency cannot accept l egally a membership in a 
private organization without authority of Congress. JAGT 1947 /9 333. 
See a lso 5 U. S. Code 83; 22 U. S. Code 262; 31 U. S . Code 551; and 18 
~ l?· Code~." (U. S . Army, Memorandum 600 - 1_0 -5, "Participation 
in Activities of Private Associations, it June 30, 1948.) Were this not 
enough to frighten those who had been participa'ting in activities of the 
American Standards Association, the U. S. Army included in its policy 
a sweeping statement pointing out that individuals had to insur e that their 
discussions with private associations were not in conflict w~th " Anti 
Trust laws. ti Thus, the threat of the Federal Trade Commission a lso 
was brought to bear on the individual. 
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government participation and cooperation. tr
35 
However, there has 
e xisted some difference of opinion as to whether the government 
should participate at only the operating l evel or the policy level or both. 
During the years past, the participation by government personnel 
in technical and other societies proceeded under varying administrative 
controls of the different government agencies without specific legislation 
s e tting forth the basis upon which such participation could be exercised. 
But Section 8 of the Act of June 26, 1912 did provide that: 
No money appropriated by this or any other act shall be expended for 
membership fees or dues of any officers or employee of the Unite d 
States or of the District of Columbia in any society or association 
or for expenses of attendance of any person at any meeting or con-
vention of members of any society or association, unless such fees, 
dues, or expenses are authorized to be paid by specific appropria -
tions for such purposes or are provided in express terms in some 
general appropriation. This section shall not be so construed as 
to prohibit the payment from the appropriations for the D epartment 
of Agriculture of expenses incidental to the delivery of l ectures, 
the giving of instruction, or the acquiring of information at meet-
ing s by its employees on subjects relating to the work of the D epart-
ment authorized by law. 36 
With respect to this general problem of governmental membership 
in technical and professional organizations , the Comptroller General 
i ssued many decisions which, to some extent , varied. In earl y years, 
' 
the Comptroller General held that the law must be interpreted to mean 
that it prevented both individual and governmental membership. However, 
in later decisions this view was modified to allow membership of a 
35Industrial Standardization, F ebruary, 1945, p. 31. 
3 6u. S . Congress, Act of June 26, 1912, Stat. 184 ; 5 U. S. C. 
83 . 
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g overnmental agency in a technical or professional organization where 
t h e membership was sought because of the services to be furnished to, 
o r benefits to be derived therefrom by, the agency itself. But in the 
p ost - World War II period, increasing emphasis was accorded the idea 
o f limiting governmental membership on technical and professional 
organizations to a liaison basis. In 194 7, The Judge Advocate General 
o f the United States Army concluded that a government department or 
a g e ncy could not accept legally a membership status in a private organ-
, 
37 ization without the authority of Congress. In 1953, the Congress, itself, 
fe lt so strongly about the subject that special language was placed in the 
Department of Defense appropr iation act stating that funds available for 
t rave l would not be available for expenses incident to attendance at meet-
ings of technical, scientific, professional, or other similar organizations 
38 
w ithout the approval of the secretary of the department concerned. This 
s t ipulation was repeated in the following year's appropriation act and made 
pe rmanent. 39 As a result of this Congressional directness, great stress 
wa s placed on controlling governmental attendance and participation in 
37 u. S. Army, JAGT 1947 /9333, quoted in U. S. Army, Memo -
r andum 600-10-5, "Participation in Activities of Private Associations, 11 
J une 30, 1948, and Army Regulation 1-210, "Administration, Participa -
t i o n in Activities of Private Associations, 11 December 14, 1949 . 
38 u. S. Congress , "Department of D efense Appropriation Act, 
1953," Public L aw 488 , Sec. 606, 82d Cong. , 66 Stat. 531. 
39u. S. Congress, "Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 
1954, " 67 Stat. 349. 
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meetings of technical, scientific, professional, and similar organiza -
tions. This tight control was a highly discouraging influence and led 
to a certain degeneration of the overall organization for standardization. 
In the area of American Standards Association/ governmental re -
l ationship, the strict rules of association had the effect of replacing 
the past close partnership with a loose , informal arrangement. To 
f urther aggravate this, the government liaison personnel, as a result 
of the changing conditions, were sufficiently unsure of their status as 
to reduce seriously their effectiveness as coordinators. 
In defense of the current organizational situation, however, it 
must be pointed out that Department of Defense policy reads that nationally 
r e c ognized industry and technical society standards and specifications 
w ill be used to the maximum extent practicable in the development and 
de sign of materiel and in the preparation of military and federal stand-
ards and specifications. 4 o This policy also points out that "the depart-
ment developing standards and specifications shall assure that adequate 
c o o rdination has been effected with those sections of industry concerned, 
inc luding potential and new suppliers. 1141 
While this policy was well- intended, practically the re was a 
q ue stion as to its implementation. With no central coordination point, 
eve ry governmental person engaged in standardization would have to 
40 u. S. Department of Defense, Dire ctive No. 4120. 3, "Defens e 
S tandardization Program, 11 October 15, 19 54. 
41 Ibid. 
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have had cognizance of the areas of interest and activities of a signifi -
cant portion, if not a ll, of the some 50 governmental and 450 civil bodies 
engaged in standardization. Beyond that, coordination would be most 
difficult since most of the 500 participants ope rated on their own uni -
lateral policies and for their own unilateral ends. 
United States governmental/industry fundamental standardization 
re lationships are two - fold. First, in the case of the D epartment of 
Defense and several other a gene ies, the government primarily is in the 
pos ition of a consumer producing specifications and standards. But, 
internationally these same agencies may also be in the position of 
coordinators of industry, research, etc., for national and international 
bene fit. Second, some agencies such as the Department of Commerce 
have specific responsibilities to assist industry in industry-orientated 
standardization. Somewhat in competition to these two approaches is 
the national and international role of the American Standards Association. 
The position of the moment seems to be that industrial groups 
intere sted in obtaining a national standard have an American Standards 
Association and a governmental channel open to them. Naturally this 
opens the way for a certain amount of organizational confusion. 
At the time the Commodity Standa rds Division was transferred 
to the Deprrtrnent of Commerce, there was certain expectation that the 
Divis ion would urge on its applicants the desirability of presenting 
their requests to the American Standards Association. In practice this 
has not resulted. Further to confuse the organizational issue, to a 
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certain extent, the policies of the American Standards Association and 
the Commodity Standards Division are in conflict. 
In the international scheme, although both the American Stand-
ards Association and the government agencies may be discussing the 
same item with other nations they may never coordinate with each other. 
Neither do they make a practice of availing themselves of each others 
inte rnational facilities. 
United States Representation~ the International Organization for 
Standardization. Without going into the standardization policies and 
procedures of the Federal Supply Board, the Departments of Labor and 
Agric ulture, the Air Coordinating Committee, and others, the difficulty 
in the Un:ited States in carrying on a coordinated civil/ governmental 
standardization program should be apparent. Fundamentally, there 1s 
no civil or governmental organization or organizational arrangement that 
can reflect a constant, single, unified expression. In this respect it is 
interesting to note that, although the American Standards Association 
and the government served their formal relations in 1948, in 1949, when 
the question was raised as to whether the American Standards Association 
should participate as the United States member of the International Organ-
ization for Standardization for aircraft standardization (ISO TC/20) 42 and, 
42 The international stapdardization of aeronautical items had b een 
initiated by the International F ederation of National Standardizing Asso-
ciations, but before any progress could be made World War II caused 
the ce ssation of its activities. When the International Organization for 
Standardization was organized in 1946, a subcommittee was set up to 
review the projects of its predecessor as a basis for action. The project 
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if so, whether the Air Coordinating Committee might serve as a channel 
f o r obtaining the position of the United States government on questions 
arising out of this membership, the Air Coordinating Committee decided 
t hat the problem was one of primary concern to the aviation industry. 
This decision was made in consultation with the Air Transport Associa -
t ion and the Aircraft Industries Association. But the aeronautical sub .. 
j e cts under discussion in the International Organization for standardization 
were identical to standards agreed or under consideration by the govern-
ment in other international organizations . Further , several months 
prior John Gaillard of the Civil Aeronautics Administration had gone on 
r e cord that~ 
••• in the Technical Division of the /Civil Aeronautics Administra -
tion/ they had two or three projects o;;: aircraft servicing standards 
and that there was a definite need for a channel to get international 
cooperation in the aircraft field. Mr. Gaillard said that his chief 
was head of the Technical Bureau of the Civil Aeronautics Adminis -
tration and his chief's interest in the international developments 
was the reason why the speaker attended the present conference 
j_on ISO TC / 2 0/. 4 3 
on aircraft was tentatively initiated and the secretariat allocated to the 
Canadian Standards Association.. Canada was selected because it also 
was the seat of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Inter ... 
national Air Transport Association and would thereby permit quick inter-
change of information on aeronautical standardization among the affected 
international bodies. In 1948 the National Aircraft Standards Committee 
requested the American Standards Association to present five of its stand-
ards for ground- to-aircraft servicing connections as the basis for work 
in ISO TC / 20. Shortly thereafter , Canada declined the secretariat on the 
basis that it lacked technical facilities, and the United States was requested 
to assume the secretariat of ISO TC / 20. 
43 American Standards Association, 11ASA Conference on Inter ... 
national Cooperation in Technical Committee ISO TC / 20 on Aircraft of the 
Inte rnational Organization for Standardization, March 28 , 1949'' (in the 
fil e s of the Association). 
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How the United States government could have no interest in a 
subject which it was actively discussing and for which it stated a need 
is difficult to explain. The history of the transference of national 
re sponsibility to industry is equally difficult to explain but indicativ e 
of the overall organizational problem. 
Since the National Aircraft Standards Committee was a key 
figure in the United States position regarding representation on ISO 
TC/20, an explanation of its original position with reference to this 
q ue stion is worth viewing. 
Mr. Allen, 
44 
in further explanation of the /positim of the 
National Aircraft Standards Committee/, stat;d that since the 
aircraft industry was using military standards that were m a nda -
tory, and since the development and evolution of these standards 
were the concern of military and governmental agrocies, the 
/Committee/ felt that it was necessary to have some statement 
"Zoncerning-the attitude of the Government in regard to the policy 
to be followed in this country, before the i_Committe!:__/ could take 
a definite position in regard to American participation in the inter -
national project. The standards to which he had reference actually 
were the property of the military services and were used by the 
aircraft industry because they were mandatory in all military con-
tracts. Component parts made to such standards were also used to 
the fullest extent possible in commercial production. In order to 
be able to state a definite attitude, the /Committee/ felt that it 
should be guided by an expression of opinion from the military 
services. 45 
B e yond this the Committee felt that the decision on international coopera -
t ion had to be taken by the people who specified the equipment to be used 
44Marshall F. Allen, Secretary, National Aircraft Standards 
Committee, Office of the National Chairman. 
45American Standards Association, "ASA Confe r e nce on Inte r ... 
na tional Cooperation in Technical Committee ISO TC/20 e tc., "__sp. 
c i t. 
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na tionally. These were the military services and the airline operators 
rath e r than the aircraft industry. But the military services expressed 
only a l ack of interest in the activity of ISO TC /20. This led Cyril 
A i n sworth, the Technical Director of the American Standards Associa -
tion, to point out that military and civilian operation could not be separate d 
i n t his field. Beyond this he reported that the D epartment of State was 
ve ry interested in the International Organization for Standardization 
• • • project on Aircraft which they believe to b e important. 
j_ The Department/ was very much in favor of international stand-
ardization work as a means of facilitating and extending American 
business and protecting our foreign trade. The State Department 
wanted to cooperate fully but /-:;;aised/ the question of the military 
a spects of the international w"c;'rk. 46-
The inability of the American Standards Association to reach a 
decision on United States participation in ISO TC/20 led to an agreement 
with its interested members that a statement of policy should be r e queste d 
from the Air Coordinating Committee. This resulted in the decision a l rea dy 
referenced. Although ISO TC /20 paralleled certain military international 
work and although some governmental departments had expressed an 
int e rest in the ISO TC/20 activity, from the policy and operating side 
of g overnment no interest was expressed and the problem was l eft to 
industry. In other words, it could be concluded that the United States 
gove rrunent had no interest in international aeronautical standardization. 
Obviously industry was confused by the governmental decision. 
The National Aircraft S tandards Committee, in particular, being harness e d 
4 6Ibid. 
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to governmental standards could not readily envisage how it could carry 
on an inte rnational standardization program without governmental coordi-
nation. Therefore, the Aircraft Industries Association and the engine, 
propeller, and accessory groups stated only a minor interest in ISO 
TC /20. Thus, the Air Transport Association, as the only major con-
sumer of aeronautical products outside of the government, was led to 
agree to take the secretariat of ISO TC /20. On this basis the American 
Standards Association accepted the secretariat of ISO TC / 20 for the 
Unite d States in June, 1953. However, from that time on no cooperation 
was obtained from American groups despite repeated requests from the 
American Standards Association for help. 47 Having no other alternative, 
the American Standards Association subsequently relinquished the secre -
tariat of ISO TC / 20 which was then reallocated to the British Standards 
Institution. 
Thus, through a several year cycle international aeronautical 
standardization started out on a broad governmental/industrial / consumer 
basis in the United States; was reduced to an industry consideration by 
the government; was deferred to consumers by industry; eventually was 
ignored by consumers; and finally was dropped as a matter of Unn:ed 
States interest. But, in the meantime, Europeans and otters who were 
4 7 At the first meeting of ISO TC /20 held in 1951, the Unite d States 
had one representative present, an observer. He reported that th e d e le -
gates of the other countries had expressed their keen disappointment that 
the United States was not more adequately represented. At the next meet-
ing in 1952, there were no United States delegates present whatsoever. 
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seeking the international standardization of aeronautical items were 
con fronted with the difficult fact that United States influence in such 
standardization was inescapable but United States participation could 
not b e obtained. 
-!!: Summary of the United States Organizational Position Regard-
ing Sta ndardization. The foregoing and related organizational problems 
had e xtensive implications when the task of associating the United States 
with the international standardization movement was undertaken. 
Internationally, the United States had not treated standardization 
as a na tional problem; quite the opposite was true. Further, while the 
Unit e d States formally endorsed the principle of coordination of stand-
ards, that principle was not universally accepted by industry, govern-
ment , consumers , nor other starrlardization interests. Complicating 
the e ntire problem was the existing, but often unrecognized, fact that 
there was a great amount of functional overlap among the many inde -
pendent or semi-independent civil and governmental standardization 
bodie s. Since a similar overlap could be found at the international l evel, 
it wa s not at a ll uncommon to find many civil and governmental bodies in 
the United States discussing and coordinating a single problem in several 
inter national organizations, supposedly representing the United States 
in e a ch instance, but more than likely producing and agreeing to differ -
ent s olutions in a ll instances . The extent of duplication and confus ion 
that exists in this form is vast, but the full inte rnational situation is 
further complicated by the lack of any central guiding polic y and the 
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practice of many bodies to discuss and, perhaps, agree for the United 
States to international standards when, actually, they do not possess 
the inherent decision- making powers to do so. In many instances this 
fact may be l egally covered by the skillful use of words, but such tech-
nicalitie s, although real, make little favorable impression on foreign 
nationals and governments. As regards international and even national 
standardization, the United States is bankrupt. This situation was 
commented on by a mission from the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation in this manner : 
••• there is no real integration of the machinery to secure joint 
working of Government and industry in the preparation of standards 
and the position of the Government vis a vis the /American Standards 
Association/ is ••• ambiguous • 
• • • the principle of coordination of standards, both nationally 
and internationally, is recognized officially, though it is not univer -
sally accepted by industry, in the United States. The procedur e of 
the /American Standards Association} and its participation as a 
member body in the work of the /Int;rnational Organization for 
Standardization/ is proof of that:- But just as the national tradition 
of independenc~ of action has been a powerful factor opposing the 
coordinating function of the /American Standards Association/, so 
it has been a still more pote-;_t factor militating against inter-;_ational 
co-operation at the technical committee l evel. 48 
48organization for Europ ean Economic Coopera tion, op. cit., 
pp. 2 7 and 29. 
CHAPTER VI 
UNIFICATION OF STANDARDIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
11 
••• there is no integrated machinery j_in the United States/ 
to ensure from the outset that there is the maximum practicable co -
o r dination of Government and industrial standards and the fullest shar -
ing of the work of standards preparation. 111 
The General Problem of Unification. The fact that the United 
States does not have a national standardizing body should not be inter-
preted to mean that one is not needed nor ,that there have not been 
attempts through the years to establish one. Certain obstacles to the 
cre ation of such a body were outlined in the preceding chapter. Those 
objections did not, however, play a decisive role in preventing the 
United States from benefiting from a national standardization body. 
It should be obvious to any thinking person that the man, men, 
o r agency that controls United States national and international stand-
a rdization would not only be uniquely powerful in the United States but 
uniquely powerful in the world. In fact, there are many that fear the 
cre ation of such an all - powerful czar for it is felt that his authority 
c ould surpass even that of the present major governmental departments. 
I organization for European Economic Cooperation, Some Aspects 
o f Standardization in the !:!· .§• A. and in Europ e (Paris: Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation, 1953), p. 13. 
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That this has not happened in those countries where a truly national 
standards body has been established is little proof to the skeptic that 
it could not ha ppen here. Attempts, therefore, to centralize stand-
ardization in the United States under a single authority are generally 
looked upon with suspicion. 
Howard Coonley reported in 1948 that: 
During the war there was evidence that the Department of Com -
merce wanted to take over the whole job of standardization. That 
resul ted in an investigation by the Under Secretary of Commerce, 
Wayne C. Taylor, which in turn brought out a recommendation by 
his special survey appointee and later by a committee of indus -
trialists that the responsibility for standards should be vested 
in private enterprize through / the American Standards Association/, 
and that the Department of Co-;;merce should confine itself largely 
to the fields of research and advice, but not refuse to develop 
standards where the group which came to them did not want to go 
to /the American Standards Association/. 2 
During World War II there was an enormous expansion of United 
States industry which was coupled with the creation of new articles and 
materials and great progress in science and invention. This all called 
for a corresponding increase in standardization. But standardization 
seemed to lag behind the need. To solve the problem of growing stand-
ardization needs two plans were presented. First, it was suggested that 
the Department of Commerce should take over and enlarge as a govern-
ment function the work of standardization then being done by private bodies. 
Second, it was suggested that the American Standards Association should 
2 Howard Coonley, "The Importance of Standardization to Our 
American Enterprize, 11 An address before the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces, February 19, 1948 {in the files of the Air University 
Library, Maxwell Air Force Base , Alabama) . 
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enlarge its activities so that it could handle 11any standard or standard-
ization project which deserves national recognition, whether in the field 
3 
of engineering, accounting, business practice, or consumer goods. 11 
This was the basic controversy and question that prompted the Visiting 
Committee of the National Bureau of Standards to recommend an industry 
conference to consider a solution. This conference ruled in favor of ex-
panding the functions of the American Standards Association and limiting 
the work of the National Bureau of Standards to fundamental standards 
and methods of measurement and the development of data needed in 
standardization activities such as the American Standards Association. 
It was reasoned that the development of standards rested on negotiation 
to which it was felt the Department of Commerce could contribute litt l e. 
But since the development of standards called for facts, research on 
testing methods, and market analysis, it was believed that the Depart-
ment of Commerce and the National Bureau of Standards did have a role 
to play and it was in this latter field .. 
Based on the conclusions of the conference of industrialists, 
W ayne C. Taylor, Under Secretary of Commerce, appointed a Policy 
Committee on Standards, headed by Charles E. Wilson, to advise the 
Department on the outlined conclusions. In June, 1945 , the Policy 
Committee reported its findings to Gano Dunn, the Chairman of the 
Visiting Committee of the National Bureau of Standards. In general 
3 Amer ican Standards Association, Resolution, May 19 , 1944, 
quoted in Industrial Standardization, February 1945 , p. 30. 
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they agreed w ith the earlier findings that no unified standards procedure 
existed in the United States, that a United States standards body was 
ne eded, and that the American Standards Association, appropriately 
expanded, could fill that requirement. 4 
Within a month the American Standards Association acted to 
modify its constitution removing the restriction that limited its activities 
5 
to the engineering field. The succeeding month, September, 1945, 
representatives of twenty-two member bodies of the Association m et 
and unanimously agreed that the American Standards Association should 
be incorporated, preferably under a federal charter. The majority con-
sidered a federal charter necessary to place the Association on a par 
with the organizations of the other nations with which it would have to 
negotiate and because "it would give the .£. American Standards As socia -
tion7 Congressional recognition which would be helpful not only in its 
work with government organizations in the United States but also in its 
relations with other national standards associations. 116 
On February 28, 1946, Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Com-
merce, responded to the industry recommendations on the organiza tion 
for standardization, agreeing in general with thos e recommendations , but 
4 Charles E. Wilson, "Report on the Policy Committee on Stand-
ards," Industrial Standardization, July, 1945, pp. 145 - 149. 
5Industrial Standardization, August, 1945 , p. 175. 
6 Industrial Standardization, November, 1945 , p. 259. 
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poi n ting out that the Department of Commerce 11 does not plan, nor can i t 
hop e to monopolize this field of activity. 117 This action was haile d as 
11the first occasion on which Government has indicated its willingness t o 
give back to private e nterprize some of the freedom it has lost •• •• 118 
Running throughout this period of negotiation between industry 
and the D e partment of Commerce was a single thread of thought , name ly, 
that standardization was a problem of industry and not of government--it 
involve d industry policy and not national policy. Standardization was 
l ook e d upon as an industry problem to which industry should find its own 
solution. Standardization outside of industry was largely ignor e d . But 
it wa s four years later before the Department of Commerce-industry 
appr oved recommendation that the Divisions of Simplified Trade Practic e s 
and Commercial Standards (renamed the Commodity Standards Div ision) 
be transferred out of the National Bureau of Standards was acted upon. 9 
It is rather significant that the post- World War II need for a 
Uni te d States standardization body was , almost traditionally, voic ed 
from two primary sources: the American Standards Association and t h e 
Gene ral Services Administration. With almost equal tra dition , opposition 
7 U. S. Department of Comme rce , L e tter for Cha rle s E . Wilson, 
C hai rman, Policy Committee on S tandards, February 28, 1946 (in the 
fi l es of the American Standards Association) . 
8Howard Coonley, 11Standards and F ree Ente rprize , 11 Industrial 
Standardization, April , 1946, p. 7 1. 
9standardization, November, 1950 , p . 302. 
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w as voiced from most other sources. Therefore , employing demo -
c r a tic principles, it would appear that only a minority desired such a 
b o dy to be established. But, on closer analysis, it might appear that 
tho se most informed on the standardization problem advocated the 
c reation of a United States national standardizing body, while those 
l east informed or most desirous of protecting a vested interest least 
de sired such a body. 
It is difficult to contest the statement that in the United States 
t h e two bodies most experienced in standardization are the American 
S t andards Association and the General Services Administration. Beyond 
t hat, these bodies have been fortunate in having some of the most able 
professional standardization men at their helm. To these men and these 
agencies standardization bordered on a life and death proposition. In 
c omparison, .other agencies tended to treat standardization as a part-
time and often minor consideration. In addition, they often manned 
their standardization offices with personnel only secondarily intereste d 
i n s tandardization. 
While, by about the mid - 1920s, the question of a national stand-
ardization body was resolved by most nations in favor of the creation of 
s uch a body, this question did not even seriously present itself in the 
United States until after World War II, two whole decades later. lO 
lOThe American Standards Association did print a l engthy 
a rticle in 1932 on the question of 11 Does Industry Need a National Stand-
ards Agency? 11 
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The American Standards Association Attempt !._o Form~ National 
Standards Body. Subsequent to the formation of the Arn erican Standards 
Association in 1918, ten United States government departments joined it 
as active participants. These departments had the same status as the 
othe r member bodies of the Association and many of the Association's 
committees were headed by prominent government personnel. However, 
the government was not in a position to control the Association (nor was 
indus try in the Association in a position to control government) and 
industry did not wish such control for it believed that governmental con-
trol could work to industry disadvantage in securing the most advan-
tageous standards. On the other hand, government was one of the major 
consumers of industry and it also had a responsibility to the public to 
achieve the maximum return per dollar expended. In this context, there 
was considerable concern expressed as to whether governmental partici-
pation in an industry- dominated standards organization was in the public 
interest. 
The demands of World War II forced many of the fears and con-
siderations of government vis! vis the American Standards Association 
to the background and during the war a close relationship between the 
Assoc iation and government evolved. Reflecting this close association, 
in July, 1944, the Ordnance Department of the Army presented the 
Association with the Distinguished Service Award. In this pres entation, 
Brig. Gen. Stewart E. Reimel, after reviewing the tre mendous service 
the Association had rendered to the war effort through its standardization 
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a ctivities, expressed the Ordnance Department's: 
••• hope and firm belief that this great work of providing stand-
ards for industry will be carried forward with undiminished zeal 
in the post-war years. The continued advancement of American 
industry, with which our national security and our national defense 
are so closely bound, can be served in no better way than by ex-
tending the formulation of standards which have been so essential 
to our successful wartime program. 11 
Following the Ordnance Department's recognition of the Association's 
ac tivity, in April, 1946, the Navy presented the Association with the 
United States Navy Certificate of Achievement. A part of this citation 
read: 
It is of the greatest importance that /the wartime/ teamwork 
continue in peacetime. In order to keep cost low a~d to keep 
government and industrial operations geared harmoniously to -
gether, it is necessary that, as far as possible, all differences 
between government standards and general industrial standards 
for products used by both shall be eliminated by cooperative e ffort. 
12 
But the elimination of the differences between governmental and 
industrial standards required a system of central coordination that was 
poss ible only in a truly national standards body. This the American 
Standards Association recognized and the Association honestly conceived 
itself to be this body. Modifications of the Association's organization 
were, however, necessary to achieve this end. Nevertheless, these 
modifications were not really radical, rather, they seemed simply 
a l ogical extension of the industry/ government wartime ar rangements. 
11 Industrial Standardization, September, 1944, Insert. 
12Industrial Standardization, April, 1946, p. 81. 
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In early 1948, Howard Coonley addressed the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces on the broad subject of standardization in the 
United States and summed up his general comments by pointing: 
••• to the necessity for strictly centralized coordination of the 
national standardization work, with participation on an equal footing 
by the Armed Services and industry. Evidently, a prerequisite to 
a successful setup in this regard is that the Armed Services, as 
well as industry, have compl ete internal coordination in their ap -
proach to the problems on which the fullest cooperation is needed. 13 
There was, of course, considerable evidence, much of which is presented 
in this thesis, that neither the government nor industry were very well 
coordinated in the fie l d of standardization. However, Coonley had con-
siderable confidence that the American Standards Association could 
serve as the coordi nating body to bring industry and government together. 
A year earlier W. Averell Harriman, the then Secretary of Commerce, 
had expressed a similar thought to the president- elect of the American 
Standards Association, Frederick R. Lack. 
14 
It was in this outward atmosphere of cordiality that Representa -
tive Kenneth B. Keating of New York and Senator Ralph E. Flanders of 
V ermont introduced in the House and Senate on May 10, 1948, bills pro -
viding for a federal charter for the American Standards Association. 
This action had been approved by the member bodies of the Association 
on May 5 and was designed "to unify the standards and specifications of 
13Howard Coonley, "The Importance of Standardization to Our 
American Enterprize, "_£p• cit. 
14Industrial Standardization, January, 194 7, p. 1. 
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both G 
overnrn t . 
en and industry and increase the flow of goods in inter -
state a 
nd foreign 1 5 
commerce. " To achieve this end, the proposed 
charter . 
included a . . 
prov1s1on whereby the departments and agencies of 
the 
governrn 
ent could be l egal members of the Association and designate 
lilel11bers to 
serve on the Board of Directors and lesser bodies of the 
A.ssociat· ion. 
This latter action was now viewed wi th considerable con -
cern b 
ecause: 
n; • in the reorganization of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the 
Partll) t f 
hib · en° Defense, ••• itwasfoundthatalawofl912pro-
1ted th T 
civil. e rni 1tary organizations from becoming members of any 
lia. Ian organization. As a result, the Armed Services now have 
Ison r th -
11 a er than active membership on / American Standards .ci.ssoci t· -
a 10E:_ / committees. 16 
Sill)ultaneous with the action taken by the American Standards 
A.s sociat· 
Ion to h. . 
ac Ieve federal recognition, it acted to incorporate itself 
llnder th 
e laws of the State of New York. Such action was considered 
nee 
essary- . . 
Pending Federal recognition in order to relieve members of the 
Board 
of Directors and the member bodies of indi vidual responsibility for 
actions of t . . 
he Association. On August 2, 1948, the final steps of 1ncor -
Porat· 
Ion of h 
t e Association under the laws of the State of New York were 
corn l 
P eted. 
But as a corollary to the state incorporation it was necessary 
for th 
e A.sso · · b b d ciation to accept the resignations of those mem er o ies 
Which 
Were d I t · ---------epartments or agencies of the federa governmen since legal 
15 
~ I S tandardization, May- .June, 1948, P• 24. 
16Ib ·d ~-
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considerations allegedly prevented their maintaining membership in a 
state-incorporated body. 
The withdrawal of governmental membership from the American 
Standards Association served to separate government from the Associa -
tion, but the ties between the two were being severed on yet another 
score. 
During World War II, the American Standards Association had 
been on contract to the government to do many tasks in the standardiza -
tion fie ld. This led to difficulty when it was ruled that a government 
employee could not participate in an organization doing business with 
the government. What had occurred in the Association / government re -
lationship was that contracts had been given the Association to produce 
standards which, in turn, were produced by committees having govern-
ment membership. Obviously this association was right considering the 
problem, but, unfortunately, l egally it was wrong. As a result , govern-
ment personnel, interested in their personal, future, began to back away 
from association with the Association. 
Against this background, the bill to incorporate the American 
Standards Association under a federal charter was passed to the execu-
tive agenc ies of the government for comment. Here long delays were 
encountered and, before the end of the year was reached, it became 
obvious that public hearings could not take place and the bill would ex-
pire at the end of the 80th Congress. 
158 
The next year the bill to federally incorporate the American 
Standard Association was reintroduced, but it did not pass. 
Had the American Standards Association been authorized a fed-
e ral charter, the basis for a single United States standardization body 
w ould have been laid. But now the Department of Justice recommended 
a gainst the bill. The reasons for this action are involved and are best 
d e scribed in the words of the Department. 
The Department of Justice considers this bill undesirable in that 
it would make the term " American S tandard" the exclusive property 
of the American Standards Association and in that it would expressly 
authorize Government agencies to become voting members of that 
Association and of the Standards Council. 
The term 11American Standard" is a generic or descriptive term. 
If it were made the exclusive property of a private organization, 
others entitled to use it d escriptively would be precluded from doing 
so and the opportunities of using it in misleading advertising would 
be many. 
To authorize Government departments to become voting members 
of the American Standards Association is undesirable. There is 
nothing to indicate that liaison participation, such as now exists, is 
not adequate to meet the needs of Government departments in per -
forming their statutory duties. Liaison participation permits coop -
eration between members of the Association and Governm e nt 
representatives in collecting and exchanging information and opinions 
on matters of common interest. Government representatives may 
attend meetings of the Association, of various technical committees, 
and of sectional standards development committees. They can re -
ceive the benefit of discussions with industry representatives and 
make contributions of their own. There is little to suggest that 
non-voting liaison participation cannot be just as effective as voting 
membership, and no general legislation is needed to permit Govern-
ment departments to continue this practice of participating in the 
Association's activities on a liaison basis. There is no suggestion 
that Government representatives may not take part in the activities 
of private organizations in the performance of their public duties. 
Express legislative authorization of direct membership participa-
tion ••• would be objectionable for seve ral reasons. In the first 
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place, it might be a serious barrier to the antitrust enforcement 
policy of this Department. It is recognized that some programs for 
the development and application of standards and simplified practices 
'may be in the public interest. Such programs can r e sult in economies 
whic h can be passed on to the buying public. If not accompanied by 
price fixing, and knowle dge of the standards is gene rally diffused, 
competition on a price and quality basis may be furthered. On the 
other hand, standardization programs can be integral parts of plans 
to fix prices, restrain competition, and limit production. In view of 
these possibilities, the Government should be free to police stand-
ardization programs and bring antitrust actions or other kinds of 
actions where warranted. Attack upon improper practices become s 
more difficult where the practices result from association activities 
in which Government representatives participate pursuant to express 
congressional authority • • • • The impediment resulting from 
Government participation as a voting member in the American Stand-
ards Association is a practical, factual impediment, and cannot be 
removed by putting words in the statute. 
Beyond this, it is desirable for Government departments to re-
frain from direct participation as members in majority-rule organ-
izations which they do not control. This becomes particularly true 
where, j_as with the American Standards Associatio~/, the organiza -
tion is bound to be held out or viewed as a quasi- Government associa-
tion. This results from the very fact of a Federal incorporation 
itself, from the declaration of policy ••• calling for a unification 
of the standards and specifications "of both Government and industry, 11 
from the statement ••• that one of the purposes is "to cooperate with 
the Government of the United States ••• in standardization matters, 11 
and from the provisions ••• that the Comptroller General shall pre -
scribe the rules for auditing Association accounts and shall rec e ive 
copies of the annual audit. The provision for active Government par -
ticipation as voting members in the conduct of the Association's affairs 
serves to emphasize this effort to identify the organization with the 
Government itself. 
Accordingly, the Department of Justice is unable to recommend the 
enactment of this bill. 17 
This refusal to support the federalizing of the American Standards 
Association left entirely unsolved the question of the national standards 
l 7u. S. Department of Justice, Letter for the Chairman, Committee 
o n the Judiciary, Honorable Pat McCarran, December 13 , 1950 (in the files 
of the Department of the Air Force, file: American Standa rds Association). 
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body for the United States. In fact, the Department of Justic e position 
never once took into account the need for such a body and how that need 
should or could be satisfied. Instead its opposition was centered on the 
desi re to suppress standardization as a contributory monopoly practice, 
and to retain a free hand to process anti-trust suits. It contended that 
fede r a lizing the A merican Standards Association would give it a quasi -
governmental status and tend to make its standards national. But, rather 
than a reason for refusing a federal charter to the Associat ion, this was 
the very reason for giving it a federal charter f 
Having been decisively defeated, the American Standards Associ -
ation e l ected not to pursue actively its desire to fill the need for a 
national standardization body through federal chartering. Instead, by 
indirect reference and subtle statements it continued to press the idea 
that the Association still welcomed governmental participation in its 
ranks 
18 
and still believed that the Association should fill the national 
standardization vacuum. 19 
18As an example, on a chart on the flow of standardization in the 
United Statesi the note was made that: 11After 30 years of joint operation 
of ASA with industry, ten government departments and agencies with-
drew membership in 1948, at the time of state incorporation of ASA. 
T echnical cooperation continued. No change in ASA membership structure 
took place and government agencies may again have membership when -
eve r their policies permit. 11 (Comfort A . Adams, "National Standa r ds 
Movement--Its Evolution and Future, 11 Dickson Reck (ed.), National 
Standards in a Modern Society (New York : Harper and Brother s , Pub -
lishers , 1956), pp. 28 - 29.) 
1 9As an example, Vice Adm. G. F . Hussey, Jr •. , managing 
director of the American Standards Association, stated in Novemb er, 
1950: 11 Today the need for achieving standardiza tion , so that the 
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In retrospect, certain points made by Senator Ralph E. Flanders 
i n his introductory remarks connected with the proposed federal charter -
ing of the American Standards Association are worth noting for, though 
stated almost a decade ago, they represent the still current United States 
o rganizational problem. Of primary significance, Flanders observed 
t hat : 
Standards are of f .undamental importance to governmert and in-
dustry alike. And it is highly important that there be the closest 
teamwork between them in the development and in the use of stand-
ards which are of primary concern to both. To insure this close 
relationship in standards work, the senior Senator from Wyoming 
and I are introducing a bill, a major purpose of which is to make 
it clear that it is the policy of the Congress to encourage intimate 
and effective cooperation between the Federal Government and 
industry in the establishment of common standards acceptable 
and useful to both--in our peacetime economy and in preparation 
for defense. 20 
This statement is fundamental to the question of organization. 
Standardization is of joint concern to industry and government. In addi -
tion, it is of concern to consumers, academicians, and, in fact, the 
products required by the military can be produced speedily and economi-
c ally, is greater than ever in the emergency which confronts the country. 
It is, therefore, again essential that the Armed Forces should be able to 
a v ail themselves of the facilities of the American Standards Association 
in solving their own urgent problems with the aid of industry. Within the 
past two years, legal questions have been raised which are preventing the 
full utilization of ASA machinery by the Armed Forces. Means must be 
found to eliminate these road blocks and once again make available to the 
Armed Services the free use of this time-tested system of all-party- at-
interest standardization. 11 (Standards, December, 1950, p. 318.) S e e 
also The Magazine~ Standards, April, 1958 , p. 123. 
20congressional Record, October 6, 1949, 81 st Cong. , 1st 
S e ss. , Vol. 95, Part II, p. 13978. 
Whole nat · ion. 
tru1 
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Thus , any organization for standardization, if it is to be 
y national 
. ' must adequately reflect these multiple interests. Fear -
ing governm 
indust 
ent dominance, industry tends to state that it is an all -
ry Probl em. 
state th . 
Fearing industry dominance, government tends to 
at 1t is 
'I'h. 
ls ha b s een 
an all - government problem. It is , of course, neither. 
States 
recognized in practically every nation except the United 
• This conditi'on, h 
owever, is a rather recent development for the 
nation 
Was w l 
. e 
1 
on 1he road to obtaining a truly national standards organ-
ization b 
y t:he end of World War II. 
F'or 30 
level . Years, Government departments participated fully at all 
s in th - -
Work f e ~ork of the / American Standards Association/. As the 
anoth 
O th
e.!_ Association/ progressed, one Government a;tivity after er s h -
Were 10 oug tor accepted member-body status until in 1947 the re 
Labo such Government member-bodies--Navy, War, Commerce r .A . ' 
liousi ' griculture, Interior, Treasury, Federal Works Agency, 
Offi ng and Home Finance Agency, and the Government Printing ce. 
In 1948 -
tion7 the member bodies decided to incorporate the j_Associa -
nafu u
nd
er the laws of the State of New York, but because of the 
re of th · · · · h act of e organization to seek Federal incorporation t rough an 
legal C~ngress. Immediately before State incorporation, based on 
of th rulings by various departmental solicitors and counsel, each 
bod e .F'ederal Government activities withdrew from their member -
in a\ 
st
atus on the ground that it had no authority to hold membership 
str tate .. incorporated association. There was thus pulled from the 
Uctur f - - . . 
F'u h e O the / Association/ a solid group of 10 foundation stone s . rt e:i:- _ _ . 
rep ' ce:i:-tain of the Government departments have instructed their 
tic. resentatives on technical committees who have continued to par -
ipa te in th 1 · 1 · · 
ab.d t ese important deliberations to act on y 1n a ia1son status 
ha-. 
0 
cast no votes In the light of the legal rulings which ve gu·d • • •• 
see i ed the action of the department and agency heads ther e 
lns no · ·t· t b b stat . Way of restoring Government act1v1 1es o mem er- ody 
Us in th .A · · h t f · act· 2 e merican Standards Association s or o congressional 
~ . 
21Ib . 
---.:..d,, p. 13980. 
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The damage done to the concept of a national standards body by 
the refusal to grant the American Standards Association a federal 
c harter was decisive. The effect was seen in December, 1949, when the 
bill to grant the Association a federal charter was still pending before 
c ongress. 
Whatever may have been the original ideas which prompted some 
to believe that a Federal charter for /the American Standards 
Association/ would be of great value to national standardization, 
they become dwarfed in comparison with the necessity of providing 
a means for full government participation •••• 
/The American Standards Association cannot! continue to function 
as a national clearinghouse and on the basis that a consensus has 
been shown, approve as "American Standard, 11 standards in which 
the government does not have substantial interest, then in regard to 
standards in which the government does have an interest wink at the 
absence of government vote and declare that a consensus does exist. 
For thirty years industry and government have worked together in 
the operation of /the American Standards Association/ as a national 
clearinghous e fo; standards. That chain of years is-now broken. 
The remedy rests in the Federal Charter •••• 22 
But the remedy was not to be forthcoming. 
The Bureau~ Federal Supply Attempt !_o Form~ National Stand-
a rds Body. Coincident with the American Standards Association's unsuc -
c e s sful attempts to organize an overall United States standardization body 
and to obtain a federal charter, elements within the government were pur -
suing a like but equally unsuccessful course. In part this governmental 
ac tion was directly counter to the mood of the post- World War II period 
w hich was to decrease rather than increase governm e ntal centralization 
a nd influence. In part this governmental action, whic h was timed with 
22standardization, December, 1949, p. 327. 
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the resubmission in Congress of the bill to federally charter the 
American Standards Association, by its timing also tended to be a 
c ompetitive move on the part of government to achieve what would 
otherwise be achieved if the Association were granted a federal charter. 
In retrospect this seems confusing since the governmental backers of the 
g overnmental attempt to organize an overall United States standardiza -
tion policy body were also the backers in government of the plan to 
f e derally charter the American Standards Association. One explanation 
of this is that the governmental backers of the governmental attempt to 
organize an overall United States standardization policy body may have 
conceded that the American Standards Association federalizing idea 
was doomed to d efeat and, therefore, they were merely moving in to 
fill the vacuum. Another explanation could be that the governmental 
backers had come to the conclusion that they served to lose too much 
if the American Standards Association were federalized and, therefore, 
they desired to counter the Association's actions by presenting a going 
governmental standards body. 
Not too much information has been made public regarding the 
attempt of the General Services Administration to form a national stand-
ardization body. However, in 1950 , two years after the General Services 
Administration initiated its actions to form a national body, Willis S. 
MacLeod took his loosing case to a Company Member Conference during 
a National Standardization Confer ence. Here he contended that: 
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The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act plac~d 
broad responsibilities in /the General Services Administratio!:: / 
for government-wide poli~ies, methods, and procedures covering 
property management and supply. This required a re-evaluation 
of our standardization activities to broaden their scope. We have 
re-examined the interdepartmental relationships and programs in-
vol ved in the whole field of commodity standardization. 
Prior to the pas sage of the Act, while the need for a government-
wide program of commodity standardization had long been regarded 
as essential to the proper functioning of Federal supply operations, 
such a program had never been fully established because of lack of 
clear statutory authority and because of inadequate funds for staff. 
Certain e lements of the program had been in existence operating 
independently. Standardization of commodities, including the 
elimination of unnecessary and uneconomical types, grades, and 
var i eti es of commodities has been accomplished as an incidental 
by-product of specifications, cataloging, and inspection operations. 
Federal specifications, which are widely used not only by Govern-
ment but by public purchasing agencies and industry, embody a 
considerable degree of standardization. The Federal Standard 
Stock Catalog also achieved some standardization. The Commodity 
Standards Division of the Department of Commerce, recently trans-
ferred from the National Bureau of Standards to the Office of In -
dustry and Commerce, makes available to the Government its 
Commercial Standards and Simplified Practice Recommendations, 
developed on request of industry and with its collaboration. The 
military departments have also achieved some standardization 
incident to their military specifications and standards work. These 
activities contribute to government-wide standardization but do not 
achieve it • 
• • • previously no organized effort has been made to operate a 
formalized standardization program concentrating on those products 
in common use which offer the greatest savings to the Government. 
Nor has there been any full - fl edged program to coordinate govern-
ment-wide standardization activities to assure uniformity in and 
eliminate duplication of standardization work, to fully utilize avail -
abl e standards data. 
Under the present program of the / General Services Administra-
tion/ these things will be done. 
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/ Under General Services Administration chairmanship/ there is 
a Federal group which correlates Government standards-policy. 23 
The action of the General Services Administration to centralize 
standardization met resistance particularly in industry for it was an 
end which industry feared and against which it had so painfully and 
meticulously waged war. 
Shortly after the General Services Administration took action 
to centralize standardization, Wallace R . Bennett, president of the 
National Association of Manufacturers forcibly commented that: 
••• it is essential that all who support the American system of 
individual responsibility and enterprize take active part in the 
voluntary standards mov ement--because the alternative is stand-
ardization which is not voluntary but directed and controlled by 
government. 
We have ample and daily evidence toward compl ete economic 
control on the part of many Federal Government officials. In 
standardization as well as other areas of our economy they are 
willing and eager to take over. 24 
Following this statement, the American Standards Association and its 
associates conducted an accelerated anti - government standardization 
campaign. 
Most power groups have their friends and champions in Congre ss , 
the battle ground of the nation. Congressional statem ents, of course, 
have more effect on the executive branch of the government than do 
2 3willis S. MacLeod, quoted in Standardization, February, 1951, 
pp. 48, 49, and 58. 
24wallace F . Bennett, "Management Take s Position on Stand -
ardization Policy, 11 Standardization, August, 1949 , p. 199. 
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miscellaneous statements on the outside . And in Congress the American 
Standards Association seemed to have a champion in Senator Ralph E. 
Flanders. In 1948 and 1949 it was he who introduced the bills to grant 
a federal charter to the Association. Now, Vv.ith the General Services 
Administration seeking the centralization of standardization, it was he 
who took the stand on the be half of the opponents to governmental cen-
tralization of standardization. 
If you control an industry's standards, you control that industry 
lock, stock, and l edger. On the day that standards become a govern-
ment function and responsibility, as is now being threatened, the 
government will take a very long step toward the control of American 
industry. That is a step which will reach into every manufacturing 
and operating company, big and little , and consequently will affect 
e very consumer in the country. 
There is now a heightened danger that the intensified pressures 
of war preparedness will cause the consensus principle in standards 
to be thrown out and War Standards to be handed down by dictate. 
There is a greater danger that the government, using the war 
e mergency as an opportunity and an excuse, will not only take over 
full powers in standards activities but will fail to relinquish them 
when the emergency ends. Z5 
Such pressure coul d not go unnoticed, and it, coupled with 
interna l governmental hostility to the Gereral Services Administration, 
soon brought the downfall of the Administration's attempt at governmental 
centralization of standardization. And when the downfall came, Unite d 
25Ralph E. Flanders, quoted in Standardization, February, 1951, 
p . 4 7. See also Ralph E . Flanders, 11 How Big Is an Inch? 11 The Atlantic, 
January, 1951, pp. 44 .. 48. The importance the American Standards 
Association attached to the words of Flanders can be seen in the fact 
that the Association offered free reprints of his remarks on standardiza-
tion, a practice not generally followed by the Association. (Standardiza -
tion, February, 1951, p. 47.) 
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States standardization policy and organization remained as ineffe ctive 
a s it was in the beginning. 
CHAPTER VII 
TBE INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY ON INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDIZATION 
The N t 
- ~ of Industry Influence~ International Standardizat ion 
in th 
---!: United Stat 
--.::.::'. ~ - ' In many of the preceding chapters it was apparent 
tha t ind 
Us try-, 
as a collective unit, played a significant part in t he 
na tiona1 a . 
n.d 
international standardization programs in the United States . 
A.ctuau 
Y-, it is questionable whether the United States gove rnment or the 
Dnited St 
s tand 
ates industry is the greater force in causing and preventing 
al:'dizat· ion. Consumers, and of course the government is a con -
sulnel:' 
' do Play an important part in the standardization scheme a s do 
acade:tn. 
lcians. But the role of these latter two forces is minor in 
Coll) 
Pal:'ison 




e left out f · h t ff t 0 the standardization process wit ou grave e e c • 
l°l)any-
cases d" 
In practice, both the consumers and the academicia ns 
In 
government too can be left out of the sta ndar 1zation process 
But to . • 
ignol:'e industry's interest in standardization to any significant ex-
t e llt . ls to co . 
urt disaster. Industry is, of course, a strong, orga nize d 
J:loJ· 
ltica1 f 
orce which can mobilize vast stre ngth to combat any sig nific a nt 
threat to 
its views and its interest as it see s them. This has not gone 
U11not · 
Iced in any section of government and there is ofte n a bowing to the 
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desires of industry even though such action may seem counter to 
some interests of the nation. After all, in a democratic system of 
government the politician must first get elected before he can function 
in government. And to be elected, the politician often must bow to the 
will of his supporters even though he may not agree with them. To 
incur the displeasure of strong elements within the society is, for the 
politician, to be destroyed. This the many elements within the govern-
ment recognize and, so that they too may survive, they often bow to the 
will of the strong influence so as not to incur the displeasure of those 
influenc e s and the politician and thus destroy themselves. This is 
essentially the democratic process and it is seen at work equally as 
we ll in standardization as in other national policy questions. Demo-
cratic government must proceed on the basis of doing what seems 
prope r for the future of the state yet never displeasing any powerful 
segment of the state to too great an extent. It is in this light that 
industry must be considered in the standardization scheme. 
The Attitude ~ United States Industry Toward Standardization 
Organization. Prior to World War II, government/industry standardi-
zation questions rarely existed. With World War II this no longer was 
the case. Instead the matter of government/industry relations reached 
the l eve l of rrintense controversy." This was stimulated, to a very 
large extent, by the wartime work of the Offic e of Price Administration 
in its attempts to correlate standards, grade l a b e ling, and price control . 
Previously standardization had been confined almost exc lusive ly to 
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industrial goods. Now, by Office of Price Administration action, it 
was well extended into the area of consumer goods. This injected 
new elements into the controversy and brought the matter to an 11 e x -
p l os ive state. 11 One group felt that only the government could deal 
e ffectively with the consumer goods problem. Another group felt 
t hat the consumer goods problem should be the exclusive property of 
business. 
When in 1944 the standardization controversy was brought to a 
head, it was over the question of consumer standards and the related 
roles of the Department of Commerce and the National Bureau of Stand-
ards. T here were, however, attempts to broaden the question. But 
questions not relating to the Department of Commerce and the National 
Bureau of Standards or consumer goods were either looked on as 
secondary matters or were ignored. 
It was in this setting that the Secretary of Commerce called a 
conference of fifty of the nation's leading executives in industry and re-
tailing to recommend the future functions of government and industry in 
standardization. 1 That the recommendations of this conference would 
favor industry and advocate a hands-off policy on the part of government 
c ould be expected. But that the policy formulated by this group would 
form the basis of most post- World War II standardization actions could 
not be expected. While industry and other advice is often sought by 
1For a detailed accounting of the recommendations of this con-
f e rence, s ee Industrial Standardization, F ebruary, 1945, pp. 29 ~ 34. 
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gov-el"n.rn 
ent, it is seldom accepted by government without great modifi ... 
cation. 
After all, it is only logical that non ... governmental and govern-
ll'.!ental · 
V-1ews f 
requently will not be synonomous. But in this particular 
case, 
apparently what was good for industry and retailers was considered 
good fo:r 




ng the problem, m 1946, the primary issue was whether 
the 
Problerns 
of the post- World War II period "shall be left for the govern-
ll'.!ent to solv 
e , or whether those who are directly concerned with them 
Shall f" 1nd 
a Way to work out a solution of their own through cooperative 
action ,,2 
• The 
implication made by industry was that government was 
i:ncapab1 
e of solving the nation's standardization problems while industry 
wa 
s capable. 3 




ry believed could be 
i11 the 
obtained if government did not interfere 
stand d. 
ar 1zation process. "The public should look primarily to 
business 
rather than Government, to evolve the performance data it 
Will 
want. 114 
This was the attitude expressed by Carroll Wilson, Con-
Stilt 
ant to the 
D epartment of Commerce. 
Refle t· H B B c 1ng the popular mood of industry, enry • ryans, 
Pl"esid 
ent of the American Standards Association, stated that: 
2 
);'l"ee Bn I-Ienry B. Bryans, "National Standardization- -Adventure in 
terprize, ff Industrial Standardization, January, 1946, p. 2. 
31b.ct -2: . 
4 
1944 Carroll Wilson, quoted in Industrial Standardization, February, ' p. 29. 
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Peoples all over the world are turning to their governments to 
solve the innumerable complicated problems that face them •• 
The outstanding exception is this country. Here, I am sure you 
will agre e, business, labor, and government spokesmen take the 
opposite view. They are confident that private initiative can pro-
duce superior results. 5 
And so it was that the trend throughout the world to make stand -
a rdization a joint effort of government, industry, and consumers was 
oppo s e d in the United States by the powerful influences of industry. It 
may have been that industry took this position actually to create a part-
ners hip by preventing the government from assuming full responsibility 
for standardization- -an objective of many persons, particularly a strong 
faction in the Department of Commerce. But the industry tactic of 
belittling government operations in the field of standardization did noth-
ing to enhance industry/ government post-World War II cooperation in 
that field. 
The Problem ~Industry and Government Coordination ~n the 
United States. In 1946 the Industrial College of the Armed Forces quote d 
Howard Coonley, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, American 
Standards Association, as stating: 
I can imagine no more fruitful cooperation between industry and 
the armed forces at present than a thorough review of purchase and 
performance specifications, sizes, and material requirements for 
goods which the Army now needs or may need in the future. Such an 
undertaking on a cooperative basis between industry a nd the armed 
forces might well prove the difference between immunity from foreign 
influence or succumbing to it. The Allies suffered severely in the 
early stages of the fighting for lack of interchangeability of components 
5 Henry B. Bryans,~· cit. 
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and of standard srecifications that are requisite for large scale 
sub-contracting. 
From Howard Coonley' s statement one could draw the c on-
c lusion that industry/government coordination and coope ration h a d not 
b een satisfactory. Actually, although the United States governm e nt 
was the n represented in the American Standards Association and al -
t h o ugh there were many channels for industry/government coordina tion, 
the e nds sought by the two were often in disagreement. This was, p e r -
haps, seen with no greater clarity than in the argument over the need 
f or standards as an element of price control and the broad opposition 
t h at developed against minimum standards--an opposition that eventua lly 
f orced governmental investigation and the imposition of restrictions on 
t h e use of standards in the price control process. Of course, without 
minimum standards, the imposition of price controls was meaning l e s s 
fo r the producer, wholesaler, and retailer could merely lower quali ty 
a nd thus achieve a relative price increase within the price control 
c e ilings . And this was done to a considerable extent during the war . 7 
But, whether or not the ends desir e d were the s a me or different , 
both industry and government realized that the coordination of the othe r 
was desirable. However, this was a selec tive process. Industry, on the 
one hand desired to maintain governmental influe nc e in its de c i s ions a t a 
6 Howard Coonley, quoted in Industrial Colle ge of th e A rm ed Force s , 
" Spa re Parts - - Standardization, 11 Student R e port (in the files of the Air 
Univ ersity Library, Maxwell Air Forc e Bas e , Alaba ma) . 
7see as example Industrial Standardization, 1943, pp. 20 5, 210 , 
238 , 263, and 298. 
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minimum . Equally, government on the other hand desired to limit to 
a minimum industry influence in its d e cisions. Thus there was d evelope d 
a mut ual principle of minimum coordination as between industry a nd 
gove rnm e nt. However, officially the principl e of coordination was 
give n much greater emphasis. 
Commenting on the subject of coordination, Charles E. Wilson 
stated tha t : 
O ne of the really priceless dividends we derived from the last few 
y ea rs is a demonstration of the fact that industry can co - op e rate 
inte lligently with Government. 8 
In a similar tone, B. C . Boulton pointed out that in standardiza -
tion coop e r a tion is the keynote. 
Eac h group must recognize the real interests of the other groups 
a nd dir e ct its efforts so that these basic interests are promoted 
a nd not injured. 9 
When the post- World War II military standardization sche m e 
c a m e into being it was surrounded by a wealth of security restric tions. 
Na tur ally these restrictions prevented any significant coordination of the 
program with industry. But, subsequently these restric tions wer e lifte d 
a nd an e lement of the jus tification for that action wa s the ne e d for c oordi -
na t ion with industry. Later, all involved national military p e rsonne l 
e ngaged i n this standardization effort were individually c h a rg e d with 
insur ing complete national coordination to include coordina tion with 
8charles E . Wilson, quoted in Industrial Standardization, 
Feb r ua ry, 1946, p. 49. 
9B. C. Boulton, "Standardization Tomorrow?'' Industria l 
Stand a rdi zation, February, 1946, p. 49. 
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civil bodies. This stated principle of coordination followed closely the 
Department of Defense principle later laid down for the domestic stand-
ardization program which stated: 
The department developing standards and specifications shall 
assure that adequate coordination has been effected with those 
sections of industry concerned, including potential new suppliers, 
where appropriate. The impact of the proposed standardization 
upon the ability of industry to produce in the quantities required 
must be assessed before final decision to standardize is made. 
Also, advantage can be taken of industry suggestions for improve -
ment through application of the latest technological advances . It 
is essential that the industry be aware, at an early stage, of the 
changing requirements of the Armed Forces and be given an oppor -
tunity to evaluate the proposed change in the light of technical 
soundness; foreseeable costs or procurement delays; need for re -
tooling; new processes or techniques required; training of the labor 
forces and the effect upon full and free competition. 
Coordination shall be accomplished with a representative cross -
section of industry, including a proper distribution by geography 
and size of business, and including both trade association members 
and unaffiliated companies, and, where appropriate, trade associa -
tions, tee hnical societies, and other standardization organizations. 10 
But, while the principle of coordination could be expounded, its 
a pplication and enforcement were not easy. Full partnership proved 
m ost difficult, for both parties suspected that the interests of the othe r 
w ere too self~centered. 
The National Aircraft Standards Committee, when considering 
ae ronautical standardization within the framework of the Inte rnational 
O rganization for Standardization, took the position that they could play 
n o part since aeronautical standards were basically the product of its 
la rg e st consumer, the government. On the other hand, the Committe e 
lOu. S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 4120. 3 , "Defens e 
Standa rdization Program, 11 October 15, 1945. 
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held t ha t in the fr a mework of the A merican~British- Canadian stand-
ardization program the military pursued a course which would prevent 
the government specifications and standards from being modifie d with-
out international coordination. This , the Committee felt, would rele -
ga t e the specifications and standards to the impotence of the eng ineering 
library shelf. The basic conflict of interest show here is more than 
o bvious. 
Of course international standards are less flexible than national 
standards which, in turn, are less flexible than industry or company 
standards. But this does not mean that they are, therefore , unwise or 
unnecessary. When one .agrees to become a party to a standard involv-
ing more than himself, he tends to lose some of his freedom of action. 
This consideration was one of the biggest obstacles to the amalgamation 
of the several industries and societies into the American Standards 
Association. Many recognized that international standardization in-
volved an even greater loss of freedom of action. And many s egments 
of industry were little desirous of losing any of their pre rogatives for 
the cause of international standardization in the national interest, con-
tending, of course, that such a step would not be in the nationa l interest. 
It is obvious that difficulties will arise when two bodies holding 
differing views and serving different ends attempt to c oordinate their 
e fforts for a common end. Nothing attests better to this than the seg -
mented standardization organization in the Unite d States. H ere mutual 
interes t and not unive rsality are the basis of the organization and the 
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standards they e volve . But, if mutual interest as opposed to universality 
form s the basis of orga nization the n the resultant product will neces -
sarily be limited. Yet, to bring opposing ideas together may be to 
produ ce nothing. That this has in fact b e en the result c a n be s een in 
many o f the so - called standards of the present. 
In the area of aeronautical standardization, Europ e ans complain 
tha t it is pointless to attempt standardization unless the United States 
par tic ipates in the process , for the predominance of United States pro -
duc t i 01 is such that standards drawn without consideration of the Unite d 
State s design and thinking would be pointless. 
11 
Howe ver , the United 
Stat e s a eronautical industry has not bee n inclined to coope rate with the 
E u r opeans or anyone else on an international standardization effort a nd 
e ven h a s raised objections regarding limited governmenta l e fforts in the 
fie ld. A fundamental position of the aeronautical industry has be e n 
that inte rnational cooperation in the area of standardization c ould c om -
. th U . d S ' . f . f d . 1 d h ' 12 promis e e nite tates position o airer a t pro uction e a e r s ip. 
Bey o nd this, the aeronautical industry has expressed a c once rn: 
••• over the possibility of this program compromising the d es ig n 
prerogatives of the Industry when international standardization 
e nters the field of detail designs. Industry is prepared to oppos e 
l lorganization for European Economic Coope ration, Som e Aspe cts 
of Sta ndardization in the U. S. ~- and in Europe (P a ris: Organiza tion 
for European Economic Cooperation, 1953) , p. 28. 
12National Aircraft Standards Committee , "Notes on the 19th CMAS 
Mee t i ng, 17-18 February 1954, NAS, Alameda, California " (in the fil e s 
of the Department of the Air Forc e , file : National Air c r aft Stand a rds 
Committee ) . 
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this program at high levels unless they are assured that it will 
serve the be st interests of the /United States 7, both in Industry 
and Government. They feel that the Industry may not be able 
to take full aj.vantage of the advancement of the art in any given 
field if the / United States/ is committed too strongly to interna-
tional standardization agreements. 13 
Obviously such industry positions could not go unnoticed in 
government, and the nature of the threat probably did much to weaken 
industry/government cooperation and coordination. While the govern-
ment pers::mnel had no intention of doing anything harmful to United 
States industry, and industry never showed that the governmental 
standardization programs were harmful to industry, a barrier tended 
to be drawn between the two groups. 
Governmental Protection of United States Industry. In conducting 
international standardization operations, governmental personnel have 
a lways been plagued with the shadow of industry. Complicating the 
problem was the fact that while in the United States government and in-
dustry were relatively separate elements, in many of the foreign countries 
with which the United States conducted international discussions industry 
and government were as one. 
Since the most significant post-World War II international stand-
ardization programs were those conducted by the military, the military 
handling of the problem is worth noting. Within the military internatioml 
13National Aircraft Standards Committee, "Minutes of the 19th 
Meeting of the Council for Mil itary Aircraft Standards, 17 F ebruary 
1954" (in the fi l es of the Department of the Air Force, file: National 
Aircraft Standards Committee). 
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standardization program an industry patent and proprietary p:rcblem 
soon manifested itself. 
The problem of patent and proprietary rights is very involved. 
Each nation wishes to protect its own industry which is tantamount to 
protecting that industry's patent and proprietary information. But it 
is difficult to protect that information and at the same time conduct 
international standardization discussions. One solution offered was to 
accept the principle that no technical, industrial, or trade inforrr.a.tion 
would be discussed in the international standardization prog rams unless 
it were wholly government owned or proven not to involve patent or pro-
prietary information. This approach to the problem was, however, im -
poss ible of implementation for each potential discussion involved scores 
of items of equipment each of which might potentially involve thousands 
of individual patents or types of proprietary information. To research 
the full patent and proprietary implications prior to entering upon an 
international discussion would mean only that the discussion would never 
take place. Further, most of such research would be wasted for only 
the item finally selected as standard really required a resolution of the 
patent and proprietary rights. Thus, it was eventually agreed that the 
only reasonable solution lay in agreeing internationally to protect the 
patent and proprietary rights of each other, and treaties to this end 
we re drawn. 
In furtherance of the policy of protecting industry, the military 
c arefully marked all drawings , specifications , etc. used in international 
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standardization discussions with a notation pointing out that the informa-
tion was made available with the understanding that all patent and proprie -
t a ry rights originating in the information would be respected. In the 
c ase of personal visits by foreign nationals to United States installations, 
governmental and private, elaborate steps were taken to require the sign-
ing of agreements by responsible governmental personnel of the foreign 
nation to insure the protection of United States industry patent and pro -
prietary information. 
Obviously restrictions such as those outlined above did little to 
e nhance the program of international standardization, but they seemed 
necessary if United States industry was to be protected. No govern-
mental person wished to be involved as a material party in a patent suit 
a gainst the United States government, and every precaution was taken 
t o prevent such an eventuality. 
The net effect of the threat of industry was that personnel 
a voided where possible the discussion of anything that seemed to involve 
patent or proprietary information. Thus it was that the desire to pro -
te ct industry coupled with the threats of industry worked to prevent 
c onsidering for international standardization many items. As a result, 
b oth government and industry suffered- - government because it limite d 
the scope of international standardization discussions and industry 
because many of its products were never considered for standard 
int e rnational use. 
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This divergence of ends 
effect on international standardization for industry had to 
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· .tnents for the interchange of patents and the results of 
ent ·r 
ha l le research are the types of arrangements that have per -
Ps bee · d · h Th n .tnost commonly criticized dunng an since t e war. 
e C:tit" . . fol' . lc1srn has in substance alleged that representatives of 
elgn c f · t· nica . 0 .tnpanies have wormed out o domestic corpora ions tech-
i:n 1 Information that was of military value, and that the unsuspect-
of g
1
_dornestic concerns have in return secured information that was 
1 tt1e ·f d h · al'l:' l any use. Cross - licensing agreements an t e1r attendant 
es ~nge.tnents in this view are looked on as a vehicle for high-class 
Plonage. 
tw Co111.tnonly cited in this connection are the prewar relations be-
be:en Bausch and Lomb and the German firm of Carl Zeiss and 
13
0 
Ween the A.tnerican Bosch Corporation and the German Robert 
Sch C f 'nf t' d' s,r 0 .tnpany as well as the exchange o 1 orma ion regar 1ng 
Jl1thet· ' . 
le rubber that took place between the Standard Oil Company 
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of Ne J 
A ~ ersey and I. G. Farbenindustrie. The position of the D1er1can co . 
balan rnpanies referred to has in general been that on ce they · 
Establish gained , and many of their arguments are persuasive . 
fol" th ~ent of the facts in thes e cases is very difficult,, e ven 
e trained t h . . 
of the . ec n1c1an. It seems evident, however , in view 1ncreas · 
and ind us t . ing part played in modern warfare by scientific 
scruti . rial technology, that such arrangements must be 
nized with great care in the future. 14 
Thus it · 
ls seen that government is suspicious of industry; con -
cerned that . 
i
nd
ustry w:il.l place national interest second when see king 
Pl"ofit . 
inte l"nationally. 
Obv-iou 1 . 
s Y if both industry and the nation are to survive some 
co!tlPl"on-. . 
~~,1se b t 
e We e n the opposing needs of the two must be found. This 
seeltl 
s Possible 
only if industry agrees 
ciuest f O.r . 
lnte.rnational standardization. 
he 
to join with government in the 
e:n noted 
by Boward Coonley. 
In this some hopeful signs have 
;i~n7 !n l 948 after _{the International Organization for Standardiza -
too-k: ad set up sixty- nine individual projects, the United States 
an a t· . . 
the c lVe part 1n only nine. Of these the Americans a ssume d 
· sec.retar · t f · F t· · 1:n t la o seven. At the same time, ranee p a r 1c1pated 
~~ - . -1.nte Y seven projects and held twelve secretariats. Now /the 
l"national O · · d d" t· -/ h · ht -Pl"o · rgan1zat1on for Stan ar 1za 10n as e1g y - one 
Jects and th u · · :-- b h ' · thirt . e nited States has partic1pat1ng mem e rs 1p 1n 
i:n th Y- six, holds the secretariat of eight, and has observe r status 
e rest. 15 
This · . 
. ls an improvement, but it is still a somewhat dubious p osi-
t10:n 
to be h 
eld by the technological and industrial leader of the fr ee world. 
~ 14c 
... ,: ..Y"iew • C. Abbott "Economic Aspects of Power , " Harvard Busine ss 
---..:.'. , July, 1948. ' 
b· 15B 
.ti 1Ck:s 011 .R oward Coonley, "The International Standards Move m e nt, " 
cl.r.Pel" eek (ed.), National Standards in a Mode rn Society (Ne w York: 
and B ---- ----- -- -
l"others, Publishers , I 956) , P• 36. 
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The United States Industry View. If the interest of industry is 
limited only to its own specific ends, then industry/ government coopera-
tion will be most difficult. As indicated, government must take account 
of industry's needs, but industry need not be forced to take account of 
g ove rnment's needs. And one of the points industry representatives 
made in 1945 regarding the organization of the American Standards 
Association was that, while government should participate on the work-
ing or technical level of the Association, it should not participate at the 
policy level. This sentiment was repeated again as l ate as 1958 by Cyril 
Ainsworth. 
The emphatic preference of industry for the present democratic 
set- up, eliminating a ll fears that any form of political control would 
creep in, has been repeatedly confirmed in the subsequent 38 y~ 
exper ience. During that period the present system of handling 
standardization work is notable for the continuous, active coopera -
tion at the technical level between government and the /American 
Standards Association/. 16 -
L est there be any misunderstanding on this point, it would seem 
that American Standards Association president, H. Thomas Hallowell' s 
words will clear it up. 
As president of the American Standards Association, I will do 
everything within my power to carry out the directive which Ameri-
can industry has given us. 
That directive, as I understand it , is~ act~ an instrument 
of private enterprize as clearinghouse and catalytic agent in 
international standards work; to serve as a bridge between industry 
l 6cyril Ainsworth, 11DINNSA, 11 The Magazine !:!._f Standards, April, 
1958 , p. 123 (underlining added). 11DINNSA 11 is used by industry to mean 
''Does Industry Need a National Standardization Agency? " 
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and government in standards matters; and to express the viewpoint 
5?.i_ American industry at the internatior:aT l evel , ••• fT 
More to the point, perhaps, is the report on the United States 
representation to International Electrotechnical Commission Committee 
TC-40: 
Through company furnished experts and special financial support 
provided by the Radio - Electronics- Television Manufacturers 
Association, ••• the U. S. delegation was able to effectively 
present the viewpoints and protect the interests~ the Q• _§. 
electronics industry on a wide and challenging list of international 
standards covering electronics components. 18 
In Summary. Lord Ismary reported that in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization "it has now become the accepted practice for groups 
of experts, nominated by the various governments, not only to discuss 
their plans and problems around the table , but also to visit one another's 
factories and examine in the greatest detail technical processes and 
methods of production. Thus the benefits of the l atest advances can be 
shared by all. 1119 This is, of course, exactly what indus try does not 
want. Industry's first concern is profit and not sharing. No industry 
logically wishes to assist a competitor to become a better competitor. 
In fact, the opposite is true. Thus, looking at the problem of 
l 7The Magazine of Standards, January, 1956, p. 17 (underlining 
added). 
18American Standards Association, "Report of the Technical Ad-
visor for IEC Committee TC ~40 to the U. S. National Committee of IEC 
on the . meetings held in Munich, June 25 to July 6, 1956, " August 2, 1956 
(underlining a dded) (in the files of the Association). 
19Lord Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years, 1949 - 1954 
(Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht), p. 130. 
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i nternational standardization and technical collaboration from the 
v iewpoint of United States industry, one can readily understand the 
concern that exists lest the program go too far. But looking at the 
narrow interests of industry, one can also see why United States 
industry cannot represent the nation in inter national standardization 
for United States industry cannot be expected to seek ends which may 
be good for the nation but disadvantageous to industry. 
CHAPTER VIII 
DETERRENTS TO STANDARDIZATION 
,, 
it is not a question as to whether one can afford stand-
a:i:-dizat· 
ion 
• • • the question is, 'Can one afford to be without it? 1 • , , l . . 
Det 
~ in General 
seen - ---- • In the preceding chapters it has b e en 
that the 
th road to standardization is littered with obstacles. In fa c t , 
e :nuln b 
er and 
variety of these obstacles may well appear to m a ke the l'oad to 
standard . 
a ization impassable. It is thus appropriate that som e 
tte:nt. 
1011 be 
a c corded the source and nature of some of these obsta cle s. 
Perhaps 
the greatest obstacle or deterrent to standardiza tion was disc 
Ussed . 
in Chapter I. This was the psychological reaction to stand-a:i:-d . 
lzat · 
lo:n Wh. . . 
a 11 lch is shared in varying degrees by many: the idea that 
Stalld 
S a:i:-dization is some form of malicious dictatorial regimentation. 
tatl.da:i:-d. 
lZatio 
t:i. "' n to the majority of these people is the antithesis of freedom --
........._ bete 
~ noire . . . . 
a:i:- . --..:...:::• To discuss the logical aspects of the discipline of sta nd-
d1zat · 
lon With h 




~~, no · 
clise llUddle ground. For them standardization is a creeping 
ase 
that in t· . 
1.tne, if left to grow, will reduce man to an impersonal Cog . 
lti. a 
great · · 
~d cor.nplex social machine. 
l lJ 
~Sb • .; _ ohn F 
~l St • C r ar.n er ' 
~n, 
"Economic Aspects of Standardization, " 
July, 1947, p . 164. 
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Few are the people who do not harbor some distrust or fear 
o f the discipline of standardization. And usually this distrust is not 
founde d on a single reaction but on a multiple reaction if not a multiple 
fear. Beyond this, standardization is impeded by a complex of aged 
fallacies and modern counter - concepts. In addition, standardization 
tends to be impeded by relatively unrelated requirements such as 
national security restrictions and national research and development. 
In this chapter there will be discussed several of the more signi:f.-
icant deterrents to standardization. National security and national re -
search and development, while significant deterrents to international 
standardization in that they emphasize and protect the national rather 
than the international solution, will not be discussed here since a com-
plete, worthwhile review of these deterrents is not possible within the 
limits of this thesis. 
The Political Deterrent. International organization has purpose 
only in the sense that it furthers national objectives. It follows that 
progres s within international organization can proceed only if the 
national political thought supports that progress. As an example, mili -
tary international standardization is designed to prepare for coalition 
warfare, nothing more or less. This being the case, then the minimum 
politica l decision necessary to carry on an international military stand .. 
ardization program is the political support of that condition. But this 
mini mum generally also .is the maximum political guidance g iven that 





Wa:i:-f t is not enough simply to prepare for coalition 
a:i:-e 
Unles h 8 
t at implies full political support of preparation for all cob.ting . 
enc1es . 
' whlc h it does not. 
Wa:i:-f 
a:i:-e one . 
Pol. . 
18 






W· t e economic and other deterrents to the program. 
lthout th. , 
One must know the type of coalition 
Proceeding from there, there must be political 
ls Pol ·t· 
high 
1 






evel, the entire effort could be expected to degenerate 
Waste of resources. 
Bven 
lliz as between the United States and Canada, where it is recog .. 
ect that th 
Cl e compel11'ng forces f h · f · h ose o t e atomic era are orc1ng t e nations 
l." togethe 
Sh0 r, Canada has emphasized that "this closer association llld ••• 
ll<t be 
confused with the loss of our political freedom. 112 
But c 
ertain political freedom must be lost to the individual and llatio,.., 
~~ an.d 
merged . 
is to be 1nto a greater whole if international 
other th 
standardization 
an a myth. 
1'he E; 








In this process of international economic com -
' contin . 
Ow:o. uous efforts are expended by each nat10n 
1?:i:-od . 
Uctivit,r 
J and economic stability and superiority. 
to enhance its 
In this proc e ss , 
4:o. a 2.t,. 13 
C:a ddl."e 8 b • Pearson Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ca nada, 
llad 8 ef ' · 
<l:ti.q a, n ore the Canadian Club, Montreal, April 27, 1956, quoted in 
~ ~ecb::artment of External Affairs, Information Division, Statements 






uing attempt to capture 
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lna:rket 
• A.nd n t· 
a Ions vying for 
ell) h 
p asiz 
greater portions of the world 
a world market are inclined to create and 
e Product or 
tion commodity differences. International standardiza .. 
' exce 
Pt for cert . . 
int ain 1nconsequentials, is the antithesis of this .. .. 
e:rnac 
lonaJ stand d . . 
A..s ar 1zat1on tends to standardize quality and design. 
such . 
it tends 
co to limit international competition to the fundamentals of 
St Of J 
abor 
c and mate rials. 
Ou.Id h 
ave 
Thus effective international standardization 
a negat· 
bi h Ive effect on the foreign markets of the nations having 
g e:i- 1 · . 
l V1.n 
stand g a
nd labor standards. No doubt, effective international 
a:i-dizat· 
Sta lon Would be a leveling influence on international living 
nda:rds 
. and eco . 
l:ti.t nom1c structures. 
e:r.na t · 
lo.na1 
It also would tend to limit areas of 
· c 0 mpe titian. 
lnte:r 
national 
standa d" · ' is t1. r 1zat10n program, particularly in the United States , (lat 
even a 1 · 
Posit· ittle program can have a serious effect on the international 
lon of 
comp t· . 
g:ta e It1on among certain industries. Further, a little pro .. 
~ is 
l1":lere1 
l.'es Y the beginning of a larger program. And the end economic 
Ult is 
so111eth. 
:fol' tb. ing not widely desired in the United States. It is perhaps 
And one of the basic fears that surrounds any 
ls l'ea 
a son that those portions of international standardization that are l'es 
Ponsib· . 
Otb Ihty- of the United States industry tend to be ignored. But the 
e:r Side 
of thi · 1 · · Stclt s International economic coin is equal y impressive. As 
ed b 
y 1-ferbert J. Wollner: 
A. su . 
0 :ti.ly PPher separated by thousands of miles from a purchaser can 






be examined and tested, and the standards against 
13e y Will be compared. 3 
Yo11d this 
, standard· . 
Petit· Ization makes the world market available for com-
Ion a nd not th 
l"e e exclusive property of some nation or industry by aso11 
oft h 
ec nical diff 4 
beca erences. Further, it enhances price competition 
Use it 
can 111ak 
cost. 5 e component parts or raw materials available at less 
F'i nauy, 
that b it tends to eliminate trade barriers by creating a language 
0th 
suPPlier a d 
n consumer understand. 
Whether the 
We · economic good of international standardization out-
lghs the 
econo.rnic b 
ad is yet to be decided, particularly in the United Stat es. 
But Unless it is d "d d · £ f • • 1 t d d' such W ec1 e in avor o internationa s an ar ization, 
OJ.'k: Will 
Proceed slowly at best. 
l'he n 
t . ~ eterre t f loll i ~~ ~ Negative Concept. International standardiza -
s a 
l'elat· 
thel." ively new endeavor. Only in the field of sea navigation has 
e been 
al:l.d . any really long history of international standardization. Nations 
1l1dus tl'ie s 
e-0.c es have been more inclined to create and emphasize differ -
than 
ton 
ote and emphasize likenesses. Even militarily, much past 
s 3 
tall lie be 
rt J. Wollner, "Standards and World Trade," Industrial 
n, June, 1956, pp. 147 .. 148. 
e 1A ' 
.)(:tell . -<"l.S an e . . 
-0.ot s1v-e1 . Xa.rnple, Germany designed a hght fixture that was used 
:f · be yin So th . b 
.l..)(:t,, Used u America in which a United States designed ulb could 
'-1.J." • B 
e al:ld th 
0
Wever, the German bulb could be used in both the German eu· 
nited States fixture. 
io Sr_ 
l."ei "-0.tel'n . . 
.Scl." gl1 sou ational grading facilitates the use of raw materials from 
:i. ews l'ces h" Ph·11· _-Oto t can be ' w ile such finished products as i ips cross. recess 
l.-0. tul." he tlnited Produced cheaper in are~s of lo':' labor cost and importe d 
11
• can b S tates for incorporation into United States products whic h , 
e sold internationally at a more competitive fig ure . 
effol"t h 
as b 
. een eXFend d . 
lt wa e in the creation of differences. As an example 
s a 111 ·1 , 
1 ital"y de .. 
i.n t;, cision to create the variety of railroad gauges in use -e.ul"op 
e. Diff 
"as . erent gauge railroads were a military obstacle to in .. lo.n. 
A.long th 
e sam r 
l'rli]Ji e 1nes, Gerrrany in Worl d War I developed a 76 
lr.ie tel" 
gun Which 
tau , conveniently, could fire the al lied 75 millimeter .Qd b 
Ut, in t 





St:i,,i Y coupled with a persistence to think in terms of 
ct llat· 10na1 0 Per ti 





to the program. 
As a result, there has developed a widespread 
'l'he d · 




observe particularly in the immediate future. Beyond 
hel"e 
al"e th 
tiol:l. e Popular views that standardization leads only to stagna-
• Sp . 
eak:1n . 
g on this point, Charles J. Eiwen noted that: 
One 
al"d· of the c . h 
lzatio 0 mmonest misconceptions we encounter is t at stand ... 
n 111 eans stagnation of scientific progress. 
'l'his · 
to th ls an , b 
e impression that provides one of the greatest o stacles e:n . succe 
gineel" ss of the standards engineer's efforts. Although the 
!hat en . engaged in gathering the latest technical information knows 
(!i gineer · · 1 k · 
s w0 l'k: . 1ng standardization is a dynamic, forward - oo mg effort, 
l"esuJt ls 111ade more di fficult because of this misconception. As a 
U.1:1 • ' not 1 d d · 1 ts sh on Y do engineering design, development an pro uct10n 
to Y a Wa f t · d · · · supp Y rom standardization but even managemen 1s 1s1nchned 
labelJedo:i-t Whol e-heartedly a standardization effort for fear of being 
slug · h . 6 gis or even backward- looking. 
6 
i:to-:he F'i:f;:a:i-Jes J. Eiwen "Standardization Research, "A paper presented 
• c:, 
0 ti A.:nn 1 ' · · 1
iat· ' b. ua Meeting of the Standards Engineers Society at Wash-
~' A.p ~- ' quoted in United Kingdom, Ministry of Supply, Standard-
l'iJ, 1957, p. 9. 
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.A.s a :r 
a esult of the . 
:ny- Sta d negative approach to standardization, hardly 
n a:rd· 
lZation pol' 
el"ll.Phas. lcy or paper has been written that does not 
lze that 
standard· · . 7 
tJ ization should not be an end in itself. 
nfort 
:n unately 
atiol:laJ ' detailed justification in support of standardization 
o:r int ' 
~ ernational · 
0 i:-e of ' is sometimes most difficult to assemble and 
ten tb 
· a:n not 
J.:n the consumes more time and effort than would be spent 
actual 
h Process of 
as Pl standardization. Thus, the emphasis of "need rr 
aced 
'.t'b a Very effect· 
e llat lVe road block in the way of standardization. 
Ure 
of th· 
that.· is road block 1·s easily seen in B. C. Boulton's statement 
Wne 
ai:-d. ll Pressed . 
lzat· , engine . . . 11 a 11d lon has er1ng executives will genera y agree that stand-
Sta too far i some value but that the benefits are too intangible 
llda n the fut · · :td 8 w ure to warrant more than a low priority for 
O:rk in · . 8 W comparison with today's urgent tasks. 
. bat is 
l.iat· not rec . l.o.u ogmzed by the negativists who argue that standard-
Should 
not b 
e pursued for the sake of standardization is that the 
le ( A 
ss . ~s a 
d.ef· l.t is ll e.xa111 1 
J" l.llit Clear th P e, World War II War Production policy stated: "Un -
,, %.e, ; benefit . at a simplification or standardization project will be of 
i sta.tld 943, p '
1 
lt should not be undertaken. rr (Industrial Standardization, 
"~l:'ese ai:-dizati• ? 1 • ) Similarly the United States Air Force states that: 
~l. e:n on ls • . 
¾·l:' J:.'0 ' Stand . not an end in itself. Unless practical benefits can be 
11ita l:'ce lteguia rd1zation should not be attempted." (U. S. Air Force, 
8lt" i:-y- s atio 8 I · 
0 J Sh ta.nd . n 1-6, "Specifications andStandards- .. nternat10na1 -0.J ai:- d ard1zat · ) . . M 
<l Y if e tbi . 10n Programs, rr October 18, 1955. BenJamm elnit-
s t aph1· s " 1ew d d' t· "h 1 J::> o h .i:- led . and stated that industrial stan ar 1za ion as va ue 
l:' .i:-l:'od V1go:r · h J · 0 iit· Uce f . 0usly to specific industrial problems m sue a manner 
1ca 1.Ug l'."\ or it · · M 1 · k tio ~ l:'o 8 User demonstrable profit. 11 (BenJamm e mts Y, 
.Us ~Ind . M p ' Inc ~l Standardization (New York : Conover- ast ub -
• • 1953) 
<l.i:, 8 • p. 1. ) 
cJ. 13. C 
• Boult · 1 s , E'eb 0 n , "Standardization Tomorrow?" Industria tand-
:ruary, 1946, p. 30. 
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benefits of standardization frequently are of a general nature and cannot 
be expressed in dollars and cents. Nowhere is this brought out with 
g reater clarity than in the testimonials gathered by the American Stand-
d A 
. . 9 ar s s soc1a tion. If these testimonials show one thing, it is that the 
benefits of standardization while recognizable , mostly after the fact, 
can seldom be priced and, with even less frequency, demonstrated 
prior to the accomplishment and implementation of the standards. 
It is rather unfortunate that those most interested in advancing 
s tandardization are the ones who voice this negative argument with the 
g reatest frequency and vigor. Typical of these statements is the one 
made by the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom: 
Standardization is a tool which, when properly used, is 
beneficial, but it is a means to an end. Those who standardize every-
thing are more harmful than those who oppose standardization, because 
they would not be satisfied with nothing {sic) short of regimentation, 
which is certainly not what is required in a modern civilization. IO 
But the Ministry of Supply, in commenting on the operation of the 
Briggs Motor Bodies, Dagenham, Essex, stated that "the doctrine of max-
. d 1· d · h ll 1murn stan ardization" was app 1e wit great success. Obviously, if 
one speaks of mass production and its modern counterpart, automation, 
he can only embrace the idea of maximum standardization. Instead of 
9standardization, October, 1951, pp. 305 - 336. 
10 united Kingdom, Ministry of Supply, Standardization, April, 
l 9 5 5, p . 3. 
11 United Kingdom, Ministry of Supply, Standardization, April, 
l 9 5 7 , p . 18. 
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finding reasons to standardize, the modern production engineer must 
find r ea sons not to standardize. Yet, persons of broad standardization 
backg round literally will rationalize themselves in circles pointing out 
that stand a rdization should not be pursued for the sake of standardization 
because stand ardization is only a concept and not a direct benefit. This 
is, of course, much like saying honesty, virtue, fellowship, etc. should 
no t be ends in themselves but should be pursued only when some direct 
benefit can b e demonstrated. That other benefits do arise from the 
pursuit of these ends is obvious; yet, one is not required to first seek 
o ut t hos e other bene fits in detail. However, while standardization is 
often linke d with virtue, honesty, etc., it is seldom given a comparable 
s tatus . 
Most opponents and many proponents of standardization will go 
to great pains to point out that all houses need not look alike; they will 
a llege that the pursuit of standardization as an end in itself would pro-
duce nothing but a world of sameness; they will state that standardiza-
tion approached as an end would result in the production of nothing but 
q uarter inc h stove bolts when the world needed many varieties of bolts . 
But all of this could not be further from the truth. These persons 
s imply fail to understand the process of standardization; they fail to 
conside r that standardization can be both flexible or rigid d epending on 
the problem. And if the problem involves variety, as in the case of 
home design, then the standardization solution excludes the single 
a nswer. Yet, it must be pointed out that the proponents of this 
196 
en wi ing y subscribe to the standardization principles conceptual d e terr t ·11· 1 . 
of modular d 12 coor ination and preferred numbers, conceding that even 
ur wi in imits o standardization. variety can occ ·th · 1· . f 
If national and international standardization is to succeed , it 
must be approa h d . . 1 c e positive y. To require that the concept be defended 
on each and . , every issue will be to insure its ultimate destruct10n. 
~ D e terrent of Decentralized Action. There is a large and 
s eemingly gr . d' t ' b owing school that believes that standar 1za 10n can e 
a ccomplish d e best on a decentralized basis. 
This principle underlies 
much of the 1
3 
h ept of complex United States organization. But t e cone 
decentraliz d d d ' t' tend to be opposing forces. 
e action and broad s tan a r iza ion 
It is a fu d . t d rdization, the act of 
n amental contradiction to insist that s an a 
- ---------------
12Th odular coordination 
have be e systems of preferred numbers and m d' t' nor unneces -
en of . ff t· g tandar iza 10 
sary var· immeasurable help in e ec in s d mbers is the 
iety. S . t of preferre nu 
applicati tated simply, the sys em . d irable progres-
sion so aon of logic to the selection of numbers i~ al e:lues available 
8 to 1 · · h ·nf' ite numerica v to the d . imit reasonably t e i in d mbers designers 
es1gn f preferre nu ' . 
in separ er. As a result of the use O . b -vnected to arrive 
ated 1 . dination can e e~r . 
at unifo ocations and without coor . ...,..odular coord1na-
r11:1 de . . t dard items. lVJ. 
tion appr cis1ons and therefore s an . . ther manner by 
specify· oaches the problem of infinite cho1~e ~nano. n field of endeavor 
1Ug a d · within a give · d will be b module upon which all esign d' ation in the Unite 
ased T £ modular coor in d 
States is . • he best example O 11 design is base on a 
module ln the field of architecture where. a 'd and four inches deep. 
cub · h s w1 e, ·t 
Modula e, four inches high, four inG e . h things as £urni ure 
. r coord. . ployed in sue 
design, foo 1nation also has been e~ and packaging. 
d handling equipment design, 
l 3 £ decentraliza tion can be 
The · hilosophY O 1 in 
traced di wide support of the P As an e:xamP e' . rect1 . nal roots. p blic Adm1n-
Marshal1 E Y to present educat1° d n pirnrnock, ~--i; 
istratio,-, (Ndward Dimmock and Gladys o;n;, Inc,, 1955), P·. 335 • t e re 
is the st ew York: Rinehart and comp ta centralization at ate11:1 · too grea of contact 
h eadquart ent : "In administration, k t that point, loss 
ers leads to an overload of wor a 
197 reducing var· bl d . . 1
a es an independent action, can be carried out on a decen-
tralizect basis. B t · . 
u , lt 1s recognized that centralized action agencies are 
n ot 
th
e most flexible units to be found, particularly at the international 
l evel, a
nd 
thus With centralization there is to be found a certain amount 
o f inherent compl .ty 
ex:1 • 
In the national scene there is great fear that centralization of 
standarctizat· . · 1 · ld 10
n 1n government, and particularly by leg1s at10n, wou 
result in th ld b b ht b t 
e creation of a system wherein changes cou e roug a 
0
u 
Only With th 
e greatest difficulty. 
for:rnity is t h ·o s states 
0 
evolve by the separate actions of event e van u 
on things in Which there is no fundamental objection, at least ten years 
But is is al so recognized that if uni-
Would be l"enu1·l"ed 14 F th . 1 · d action is permitted, 
'l • ur er, if decentra ize 
there is ev It This is seen el"y assurance that uniformity will not resu • 
particuiarJy in the state and local standards that have been established 
during the h. roblem and its effect on Years. Addressing himself to t is P 
interstate t t of the Council of State l"ade, F'r ank Bane, executive direc or 
Gover%e t . 
n s, said: 
:ith ~ I conditions and aspirations suffici Centers, and a failure to take loca . l licy. Moreove r, 
e:ntl y · · · g nat1ona po · 1 d concentr . into account when determ1mn effect on reg10na an 
at1on II disasterous k ned local adtt,; . at the top has an egua_ Y_ e uate authority, wea e . 
initiativ n,
st
ration, for it results m mad q of spontaneity and flexi-b
·1 ·t e, too many d t ·1 d instructions, l oss d aroused citizenry. l l Y, the f e a, e . the en • an 
D ecentraJ. rus tra tion of official s, a nd • m ti y sought, " 
l<:atio:n must therefore be constan 
O f Standards in 11 "The Role 
1-Iow p G Agnew, . t· April, 1941 , the Syste ard Coonley and • • . 
1 
Standard1za ion, 
P a rt 2, h l1:i6of Free Enterprize, "Indus:";,ational Commission for 
• _f;J • ·t· . ce o f t e Un1for11:i Le '. c1 1:ng the experien 
g 1slation. 
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Hundreds of trade barriers are today obstructing the free flow of 
commerce among the states •••• Many of these barriers are 
local standards in the form of regulations of state governments; 
some are city ordinances; and others result from generally con-
fused situations. It is clear ••• that most of these barriers 
c.ould be removed- - or better, could have been prevented in the 
first place by national standards. 15 
Looking at the problems created by the local, voluntary implemen-
ta tion of stand d ar s, an American Standards Association Committee on 
Model Laws and Ordinances studied how obsolete technical requirements 
in state laws d 
1 
· d the public The an ocal ordinances affected business an • 
studies of th· . l6 . . ul r thing' if implementation 
is committee point out one sing a ' 
of national standards is decentralized then the standard will not be imple -
mented on a . i·t i·s ever implemented universally. 
uniform basis if, in fact, 
The result .11 Wl be 
. benefit from the new 
that certain areas will never 
technology . 
incorporated in the standard. 
A second result will be that 
P
roduct co t . duction on a uniform, s ry since pr 0 
s will be higher than necessa 
modern bas . 
e will not be possible. 
. t the committee 
Ulustrating its poin ' 
noted that 
0 ne Ohio 
d b the 1897 edition of 
town in 1949 was still governe y 
. 1 standards had 
Similarly, although nationa the Nation 1 a Ele ctrical Code. 
b 
lurnbing codes een draw obsolete P 
n up for a uniform range of pipes' 
to continue 
required th . g manufacturers 
e · s causin 
Use of non-standard item 
their p t owner unnecessary 
roduct· t' g the proper y 




P G Agnew, "The 
l 5 c nleY an • • · 9. F':ra k . Boward 00 . 11 op. cit. , P• 
of St n Bane quoted in .Enterprize , -
a:ntlards in t'he System of Free · d Standards Recognize -=-----
16 Nationally~ -
-Atr.ier· Association, ~ 
lean Standards 
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If international or national standardization is to become a 
reality cent 1 · . ' ra 1zation must win out over the illogical forces of de-
centralization. 
~ Deterrent~£ Voluntary Action. In the United States it is 
now rather . universally accepted that standardization should be a volun-
tary actio n. "General consent" forms a basic part of the definition of 
a "materi· el 17 1-s tandard" as outlined by F . G. Jenkins. "Use of Ameri-
can Standard A . . - . 1. t II but enforce-s ssoc1atlon/ standards 1s not ob 1ga ory, 
menti 18 s rnuch like the enforcement of "common law." It is "most 
important that standards 
1119 When force 
should not be mandatory • • • • 
. . 1120 
is applied 
' the word is alleged not to be d d
. ati·on but "dictation. 
stan ar 1z 
And in th 
e all-black and all-white view of the 
t . onary "dictation" reac 1 , 
must be "b ad. II 
.d t of the American 
Even R. E. Zimmerman, a presi en 
Standard 
8 Ass · 0 c1ation, contends that: 
in State L 
A~ aws d s socia~ an Local 
ican standards 
Ordinances (New York: ;...mer 
ion, 1949). 
l 7 F' . . n II Jron ~' 
Februa-.. • G. Jenkins "Material StandardizatlO ' -
... y 20 I 
, 1941, p. 35. 18 18 see also the 
lnd . ry 1 941, P• • d d 
recolrl:tn US t r1al Standardization, Janua ' ican Stan ar s 
A 
end d t the ;...rner . 
ssociat· e " consensus" policy staternen d rds. (A.rner1can 
S 
lon d . an Stan a . 1 
tandara esires included in all Americ . the Electr1ca 
F
. s A. standards 1n - ~6) 7 ) 
ield, 19 ssociation The 400 .American~· tion 195 ' P• • 
- 56 (l\T ' _ - ..::.==----:;-: ds A,ssocia ' 
.niew York: American Standar . 
l 9 f standa rds in 
p L. F' 11 What Role or 1943 , 
ost ... W-a:t- T"\ • A.darns and P. L. Alger, . t'on pecernber , 
P• 358 .i:--rod d rd1za 
1 
' • uction, 11 Industrial~ 
20 
lvielnitsk 2 Y, op. cit. , P• • 
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All Who have studied the subject agree that the development and 
;se of standards through voluntary standardization is fundamental 
o our e co . d 1 . f nom1c eve opment and the maintenance of the system 
0 free enterprise. 21 
Beyond th· 
is, internationally one can find comments that "one of the more 
signif' 




or "standards derive their authority, not from a 
compu1 . 
sory edict, but from their own merits •••• rr23 
The proponents of the maxim of voluntary standardization or 
stand d. 
ar 1zation on the consensus basis contend that standardization 
cannot 
Work when administered by law or external force. Even Albert 
W. -Whitney held that: 
The further we progress on the road of ••• standardization, ••• 
th
e more clear does it become that standardization must be a process 
by Which a consensus of all interests is reached in a thoroughly repre-
sentative and democratic manner. 24 
B:owev-
er, the proponents of the voluntary maxim will admit that there are 
e:x:cept· 10ns. In some instances these exceptions have been rationalized 
With th 
e statement that consensus may be obtained by the democratic 
I d 21 R. E. Zimmerman, "High Spots of ASA Work for 1941, 11 
n us t · 1 ~ Standardization, .January, 1942, p. 7. 
J\. 22Col. J. s. Lawrence, .Jr. , "Standardization Among Allies, rr 
~, May, 1957, p. 33. 
B:· 23International Electrotechnical Commission, Charles L e Maistre 
i;--::.1
1
s ~k, The I. E. c. (Geneva : Central Office of the Internationa l ' 
.c. ectr t - - - -0 echnical Commission, 1955), P• 17. 
L. 24Albert W. Whitney, The Place of Standardization in Modern 
lfe A - p -A ' St d -d. . ~ ' paper prepared for the First an mencan an ar 1zat10n 
ti Onference, Lima, Peru, I 924 , originally published by the C entral Execu-
Stve Council of the Inter American High Commission, reprinted in Industrial 
~n, .January, 1943, pp. 21 -25, p. 24. 
201 
:Princi l f . . 
P e o maJority rule as in the case of legislation. The proponents 
of the l 
vo untary maxim may even be swayed to the point where they will 
admit th t h . 
a t e makrng of standards by people in authority without the 
conse t f 
n ° those to whom the standard applies is often necessary and 
10gical. 
They will admit, as an example, that a manufacturer need not 
obtain th 
e consent of consumers before he establishes a commodity stand-
ard o th 
r at the police need not obtain the consent of the motorist before 
th
ey establish every vehicular speed standard. Nevertheless , they will 
hold . 
' as did Whitney, that " it is the standards that do not represent a 
real 
consensus of all those interests that are concerned in progress 
Wh. 
lch We should fear. 1125 
The consistent expression of fear of standardization by means 
Other th 
an consensus is to be expected. Few indeed are the people who 
Wish t h 1 1 0 ave their lives ruled by external sources, but such externa ru e 
is 
now an accepted pattern of society. So long as there is justice and logic 
in th 
e operation of the external power there is nothing to fear. On the 
:Practical side, in many areas of standardization, consensus could neve r 
be ach· f h I th leved due to vested interests or a host o ot er reasons. n ese 
cases is the world to be denied the benefits of standardization b ecause of 
the 0
P:P 0 sition of a minority? 
Fortunately, while the principle of voluntary standardization is 
st·1 1 1 Widely held, there is a growing school that believes that certain 
25Ib"d __:_•, p. 24. 
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standard. . 




be noted that during World War II, "to save critical resources 
' 
the vol t 
un ary principle of standardization was abandoned and mandatory 
standard 
s Were placed in effect. These emergency standards ••• had 
the w · 27 eight of law. 11 
Beyond the consideration of application, the voluntary standard-
izat · 
ion principle works to slow the entire standardization process. This 
Was 
noted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where it was observed 
that rr throughout all phases of the processing of any l,;tandardization agree ... 
InentT the ex · · · d · d · ·1 b h l - cess1ve time require 1s cause primar1 y y t e vo untary 
nature f 28 0 the organization. " 
But, on the practical side, it must be admitted that the m a king of 
standard 
s mandatory except by government action runs directly counter to 
current U 
nited States law. It is to avoid legal problems that a great issue 
is lnade 
of the voluntary nature of all non .. governmental standards. While 
it is 
generally recognized that standardization and simplific ation are in 
thelU 
selves legal and unobjectionable, there is equal recognition that 
agr 
eeinents to adhere to standards, to make only standard items or to 
0 
26
This does not mean that all important interests are not consulte d 
r con . h . . 
e sidered in forming the standard. It merely means t at authority 1s 
ll'lployed in fixing and enforcing the standard. 
p 27Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Student Committee Re -
Ort ''S · rr (' h f'l f th A' U · L·b ' pare Parts - -Standardization 1n t e 1 es o e 1r mve rsity 
1 rar . 
Y, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). 
NA 28Col. Donald R. Bodine, "A Proposal for the Reorganiza tion of the 
Cl.To 1.K ·1· d' · "A ·1 1954 ( bl ' h A_· .,vn 1tary Agency for Standar 1zat1on, pn, unpu 1s ed the s i s , 
lr W 
ar College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabam a ), p . 9. 
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:tnake only the items in the standa d d t 1· 
r pro uc 1nes, are probably unlawful 
rest · 
raints of trade, unless they can be justified under the rule of reaso 29 
n. 
Several cases demonstrating this problem were outlined earlier as a part 
of the or · · 
gan1zational problem. Practically, however, if a group of per-
sons ind t . . . 
' us r1es, or associations band together to establish standards 
au
d 
simplifications to facilitate their operations, there is at least tacit 
agreement that they will adhere to the standards that they collectively 
e
st
ablish. But this approaches restraint of trade in that they thereby 
w·11  
tend to exclude non-standard products or services. To circum-
navigate this difficult question, the principle of voluntary adherence 
is V • 01ced and to avoid legal problems: 
It should be made clear to all members of /;tandardization/ trade 
associations and other groups that all parties are free to conform or 
not to the standards or standard product lines as they wish, and there 
should be no attempt by the association or any of its members to exert 
compulsion of any type upon other members, or to invoke moral 
sanctions, in an attempt to have them confine their manufacturing to 
Products conforming to the standards or to only those items included 
in the standard product lines. 30 
In reviewing "Standardization and the Antitrust Laws," James D. 
flay-es reached a parallel conclusion: 
• • • it behooves every association engaged in _L;iandardizatio_::7 to 
make clear beyond question both to its members and to the public 
generally that the promulgation of a standard or standards by it 
does not preclude any member or non-member from making his 
0 wn determination as to whether he will manufactur e in accordance 
With the standard. 
29Industrial Standardization, December, 1944, p. 261. 
30ibid. 
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. Of course, it is natural that a manufacturer who has taken part 
in setting up standards will in all probability manufacture in accord-
anc . · h 
e wit the standards. As long as each manufacturer freely, 
voluntarily, and in good faith does this, whatever restraint of trade 
~esults is incidental • • • • It is only where the freedom of the 
ind· ·d 
. 1v1 ual has been taken from him by an agreement express or 
l:tnplied to adhere that the restraint becomes direct rather than 
incidental. 31 
Obviously some standards need not and should not be mandatory. 
But th 0 
er standards, such as those established under the authority given 
the F 00d and Drug Administration, must be mandatory if they are to have 
any :tn . 
ean1ng. Laws actually are nothing more than standards by another 
na:rne. 
And imagine the chaos that would occur if laws were enforced 
OnJy b 
Y a system of voluntary agreement. If laws are worth pas sing, 
they a 
re worth enforcing. In the same sense, most standards, if they 
are 
Worth making, they are worth enforcing. 
Actually, most objections raised against the enforceme,nt of 
standards are weak. E. C. Crittenden, as an example, makes a great 
po· 
int of the fact that the Congress has not had to legislate standard 
Weights and measures in order for the nation to operate under such a 
Set f 0 standards. But he willingly admits that most of the states have 
adopted Weights and measures laws and it is this action that has led to 
U:n. f 1 
or:rnity in the country. 32 
.l:nct _31 James D. Hayes, 11st~ndardization and the Antitrust Laws, 11 
~ Standardization, April, 1946, P• 77 • 
32E C C ·tt · d "Contributions of Government and Private A. • • r1 en en, . 
ingencies to National Standards, 11 Dickson Reck (ed.), National Standards 
--'.:.. Modern Society (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishe rs, 1956) , 
P. 32~ ----='-
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If one standard is needed for the 
by- denying 
nation, what is to be gained 
national action in favor of fifty separate state actions? And 
What i 
s to be gained by pressing blindly for the principle of voluntary 
standardi . 
zation only thereby to make standardization relatively im -
Possible 
or, at least, exceedingly difficult? 
~ Deterrent of Individualism and Nationalism. In Chapter I 
and in the 
introductory remarks to this chapter, mention was made of 
the rather 
universal psychological reluctance to accept standardization 
on th b 
e asis that standardization destroyed personal freedom. Seldom 
reco · 
gnized, but yet a predominant factor in retarding international 
stand 
ardization, are other individual and collective psychological 
det er rents. 
One very important psychological deterrent to standardization 
s ten-:i s 
froni the fact that one technician's product is to him almost always 
better than 
the product of any other technician. This prejudice or pride 
of author h' f s 1p extends to national preference for the achievements o one's 
ow:n 
service or country and is referred to by those engaged in standardiza -
tion 
as the "NIH" factor (the "Not Invented Here 11 factor). Although it is 
intangibl 
e, it is very real. It naturally makes everyone skeptical of 
idea s, Procedures, or equipment originating outside his own group. 
This state of mind is fortified rather than reduced by the pre ... 
"ailin 
g Political systems which emphasize that interna tionally divisive 
fore e, 
during 
nationalism. The effect of nationalism was in particular evidence 
the standardization discussions leading to the adoption of a standard 
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rifle f h 
or t e North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Several nations c om .. 
Peted i th d . 
n e esign of this rifle and each propagandized at length as to 
the su . 
perior features of its rifle. Thus 1 when the standardization 
discus . 
sions and comparative trials were undertaken, it was a matter 
of nat· 
ional prestige and not the relative merits of the respective rifle s 
that w 
as under consideration. It is no wonder that a solution proved 
!bost di££· 1 icu t for the acceptance of any nation's rifle was fo r that nation 
a natio 1 · na victory and for all other nations a national defeat. 
Reflecting this general problem, Col. R. C. Heflebower conr, 
eluded that: 
A very real difficulty /in international standardization/ lies in 
th f - -e act that there prevails among our people the feeling that we 
should state our intentions a n d that others should fall in line; tha t 
we, as the predominant p.-oducer and user should set the pace fo r 
au to follow. 33 
It wa . 
s in recognition of this national feeling that one of the Unite d State s 
Officer · · d" · f h "fl f h s intimately associated with the standar ization o t e r1 e or t e 
North Atl . . . antic Treaty Organization commented: 
It is not easy for strong partners, who in the p a st have with c o n-
siderable pride developed and produced their arms independently, 
to acknowledge the need for and practice collaboration. The ac tion 
of the United Kingdom in reversing its original decision to adopt a 
British ... developed rifle and round in favor of a Belgian rifle a nd a 
{United States/ round was not only politically courageous , but a n 
unparalleled demonstration of the British intention to enc ourage 
allied standardization. 34 
St 
33
Col. R . C . Heflebower, "The USAF Program, of Internationa l 
a ndardiza tion, 11 Standards Engineering, Septembe r , 1955, p . 13. 
34 
A Col. J . S. Lawrence , Jr. , "Standa rdiza tion Among A llies, rr 
-<"l.r!by M 
~· ay , 1957, p. 35. 
207 
Inte.rnat" 1 iona standardization develops out of the realization that 
na tiona1 d . 
ifferences are unhealthy. I t t· l t d d " n e.rna 10na s an ar ization is also 
a r 
ecognition 




em. But if the problem goes beyond the individual and the 
' en it is academic to attempt to emphasize the individual and 
state· 
interests 
and prejudices. Yet, so far, it has been found near 
i!l"lPossible 
the 
to deemphasize these interests and prejudices so as to satisfy 
greater n d ee. Howard Coonley summed this up by saying that: 
The . 
d speed with which international standards are set up is going to 
a~Pe
nd 
more on changing the attitude in _L'the United State_!!_l than on 
thy 0ther thing. Again, we are individualists. We want to say to 
e rest of the world, "Take American standards or none. 1135 
~ ..Q.eterrent 53._f Time. International negotiations are, at best, 
slow. 
International standardization negotiations probably are among the 
Slowest. 
United States Air Force experience has shown that an inter-
llationa1 
standard takes from two to five or more years to resolve with 
the 
average f . t· standard consuming about three plus years o negotia ions. 
When the 
time delays involved in the national implementation process are 
cl.dd 
ed to the 
international negotiation times, the delay between the con-
Cent· 
i:-
1011 of the h 'f · idea and the realization of result approac es, i it does 
llot 
e:,cceed h .. 
, t e level of unacceptability. Experience also has shown that 
Perso 
nnel change as often as three to six times during the course of dis -
cussion 
~Ven a simple standard. This , in itself, is a disorganizing 
35 
A.!l) . Boward Coonley "The Importanc e of Standardization to Our eric , . 
A.r!l"l an Enterprize, rr An address b efore the Industrial College of the Libr:: .F'orces, February 19, 1948 (in the files of the A ir Univers ity 
Y, Maxwell Air Force Bas e, Alabama) . 
--
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influence . B 
ut when changing concepts and technology are added to the 
Prcblem th . 
e situation borders on the limits of intolerability. 
Time considerations are, of course, a measure of the 1 comp exity 
Of th 
e problem and of the organization. International machinery, in 
Particular . 
• is ill-adapted to carrying out with speed most programs, let 
alone 
one so complicated as the international standardization prog ram . 
Reporting on the problem of time in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Orga . 
nization, Col. Bodine noted that in extreme cases, the processing 
of a simple 
operational procedure standard c o vering procedures already 
being 
used by a majority of the nations took over two years to comple te. 36 
Nationally, commenting on the time problem of sta ndardization, 
the .A, · 
ir Research and Development Command of the United Sta t e s Air 
.F'orce 
stated that: 
The fundamental nature of standardization and the high obsole s ence 
rate of Air Force equipment combine to produce an environme nt in 
Which standardization sometimes is of low payoff. To be e ffective, 
a standard must be widely agreed upon and widely applied. A limited 
standard is of limited utility. Yet the time required to obta in wide 
acceptance and use of a standard inevitably is long becaus e it requir e s 
the agreement and active participation of many different a g encie s . 
The standardization process seems to be growing more l e ng thy b e-
cau h d' · . se of the increase in complexity and t e correspon ing inc r ease 
in engineering and logistic problems which must be resolved before 
dee · · isions can be rendered. 
. On the other hand, the performance of weapons syste ms in the 
in:entory today are orders of magnitude apart as compare d to the 
ll'linor performance differences whi c h e x isted b e tween systems in 
World War II. This leads to a very rapid obsolesc enc e of syste m s 
:nd of equipment items. It has be e n our ~xp~rienc e , fo r example, 
hat we were able to obtain final standardization of some c ompone nts 
36Col. Bodine, op. cit., p . 13. 
al9 
Used in 
an early K-system onl y a few months before the particular syste · 
:rn itself was due to be phased out of the inventory. 
t It is clear that if standardization is to be of reasonable benefit 
~ the government, the time required to standardize must be con-
sid~rably reduced. The engineering decisions involved in stand-
ardizat· 
h ion probabl y cannot be compressed. The cycle at present owe r • , 
Ver, includes many months of processing from agency to 
agency• • • • Funneling all standardization actions into the 
Present cumbersome military standardization machinery can re-
sult only in limited benefits. It appears that the time and man-
Power invested per item standardized in such an environment will 
continue to increase to a point at which the val ue of many such 
actions b · 37 may e open to question. 
Obviously, if the time required to reach agreement remains 
e:x:ces . 
sive, standardization cannot become a reality. 
~ Deterrent of C ost. Most authors and professional standard-
izers 
e:x:toll the savings that accrue from standardization. Indeed, savings 
are th 38 
e prime j ustification for standardization. But the savings that 
accrue f 
rorn standardization are usually long term. In the short term, 
standarct· . 
ization can ·be expected to cost for any standardization usually 
resul ts . 
in change on someone's part. And any change is costly, partic-
U.la-..1 . 
... Yin thi·s d era of big business and big in ustry. Acceptance of a new 
Or ct· 
iffering standard by a civilian firm or industry or by government very 
Often . 
involves considerabl e financial expense in new tooling, in retraining 
lr:li't 
37
U. S. Congress Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Com-
tee , -----=---- - . --.--~~ Government Operations, House o!_ Representatives, E1ghty-
~ ~s, First Session, Jan~a~y, 30, )_!, and March~. 1957 
hington: U. s. Government Prrntmg Office, 1957), pp. 341 ... 342. 
38 
d · As an example, Melnitsky, _op. cit., devotes an entire chapter lscu . 
w ssing " The Underlying Profit Motive" for standardization. In his 
th
0 l"ds: 11 
elr:l is Standards have actual value only when the money invested in 
recouped with interest. 11 
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Personn I . 
e , in the maintenance of two standards for a period of time to 
acco:rnm d 0 
ate old customs, and in many other ways. But, before the 
cost of · 1
rnplernentation is incurred, there is the very real cost of form ... 
Ulati 
ng the standard. In some cases this initial cost can be sizeable. 
Yet, if standa d" t· . b r 1za 10n 1s to e achieved, this cost of standardization 
ll"lust be borne. As Roger E. Gay stated: 
:tandardization is a function that costs money and must be paid for. 
Uch costs are simply one expense of doing business. They are as 
much a routine and necessary business expenditure as legal counsel, 
advertising, or market research. 39 
However, the cost of working towards standardization as opposed 
to the 
cost of implementing standards is usually of minor consequence. 
This I t 
a ter cost was pointed to by Lord Ismay as one of the inherent 
difficult· 
les of achieving materiel standardization in the North Atlantic 
Treat 0 
Y- rganization. In his words, "standardization very often involves 
the 
great expense of scrapping existing equipment and retooling production 
lines 1140 · · · f 
• Such a cost can be great and to avoid this type o cost m a ny 
:Pel:"so h 
ns advocate the principle that standardization should be reac ed 
:Pl"" 
l.ol:" to the establishment of production lines. 
Beyond these conventional costs, it is possible to place other 
sel"ious 
costs in the way of standardization. If standardization involves 
th
e Select· . · f th t ·t b ion of a proprietary item, the licensing o a i em may e 
39Roger E. Gay, quoted in Standardization, January, 1951, p. 9. 
l ands: 4 0Lord Ismay, NATO, The First~ Years, 1949 ... 1954 {Nether -
Bosch- Utrecht, n. d. }, pp. 79-80. 
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Pl:"ohibit· 
iv-e. A lso, if standardization involves the selection of an item 
av-ailab1 
e only in a 
fol" 
high cost area , that fact may prevent standa rdiza tion 
standard . 
Items should be made available at terms and prices com -
Pal:"ab1 ' 
e to that which would be paid for non - standard items . 
A t Present the United States and most other nations approach 
na tiona1 a . nd international standardization on the basis that it should b e 
achieved . 
Without cost. This is , of course, impossible. And unle ss this 
fact. 
ls r . 
Of th 
ecogn1zed, standardization will never advance beyond the fringe s 
e Probl ern. 
~ .!_echnological Deterrent. In a certain sense, sta ndardiza tion 
a nd t 
echnol · og1cal advancement are enemies . One seeks to fix d e sign to 
a de 
gl:"ee While the other seeks to improve design through c ha nge. In t he 
l°l1ilitar . 
Y fields, and to a large extent in all other fields, t e chnolog ical 
con. 
sider t· 
a 10ns worl<; against standardization in two ways. Firs t , b eca us e 
Of th 
e recognized differences between the two ends coupled with the con-
stant 
de:rnands for new and improved items in the world's a rms , indus t r i a l , 
and 
social races' every standardization effort embarks with the qua lify ing 
clau 
Se that it must not be permitted to impede res earch a nd development 
OJ:" th 
e development of advanced ideas, tactics, or te c hnique s . S e cond, 
techn . 1c:!Ues and ideas b e ing in a constant state of evolution and the n ee d 
alwa s . 
Y existing to advance to new techniques and ideas, there i s a tend ency 
to 
avoid commitment but to attempt to obtain the best possible s olut ion 
b 
y Const h · d · antly adjusting to newer but differ ent te e mques a n ideas. Pursued 
to it 
s logical end, this c ould result in pre venting a ny sel ec tion, for a new 
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and bett 
er technique or idea would always be J·ust ahead. U f n ortunately, 
a sig 'f· 
ni leant number f b 1 o persons e ieve that standards may readily be-
co111e 
a barrier to b k' . progress y ma mg 1t so easy not to depart from obso-
lete 1 
so utions. Having this concept as a primary consideration, advances 
in st
a nda rdization will be difficult at best. 
~ Technical Deterrent. There can be little question that differ ... 
big national 
technical procedures make the production of identical or 
standard items 
difficult if not impossible. The problem arises from the 
fact that . 
industrial practices and technical equipment of the various 
natio 
ns and industries have grown up without serious consideration given 
to the id . . 
ea of international collaboration or even, in some cases, national 
couaborat' 10n. Actually, it is only within the last comparatively few 
Years th 
at aggressive programs have been undertaken within the various 
count . 
ries to achieve domestic industrial standardization among the many 
fi:t-111 
s and industries. The complexity of this problem is appropriately 
ill 
ustrated by the tank contract awarded to the Chrysler Corporation 
during World War II of which there were a carload and a half of army 
blueprints. Each of these blueprints had to be redrawn in order to make 
Wo:rki 
ng drawings that could be understood by the Chrysler personnel. 
l'his 
same process then had to be repeated when General Motors Corp -
oi-ation Was awarded a similar contract. 
Essentially nations have differing drawing practices, testing 
Pi-ocedures, technical symbology, basic fabricating methods, etc. and 
these d'f 1 ferences , which have their origins in centuries past, while 
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make standardization in the more sophisticated levels 
This has been recognized, but little is being done about it. 




is chapter would be inclined to state that standardization, 
.Pa:i-t· 
lcu.lar1 . 
Y- international standardization, would be impossible to achieve. 
Bowe 
V-ei- 1 
' a l the deterrents, while significant, can be removed if the will , 
tb.e . 
Pi-10:i-ity-, 
and the organization exist to effect their removal. But if 
tb.e1r 
J ai-e 
not removed, there is little question that standardization will 
b.ev-er b 
ecome much more than a subject of discussion. 
CH.APTER IX 
COURSES OF ACTION 
"· •• next to providing for the common defense against exte rnal 
e n e mies, the chief reason for the existence of formal government is the 
need for the establishment and the enforcement of standards of practice. ,,1 
G e neral. Standardization in a general sense has deve loped c on-
currently with government. But there remains the question as to whether 
it is now advanced to the point where it is meeting the n ee d s of govern-
ment. A review of some comments on this point is appropriate. 
In 1956 The Magazine~ Standards , the national standardization 
journal, was led to conclude that: 
We have come to the point in our highly complex Am eri can indus -
trial economy where national standards can give us greater b e n e fits 
than ever before in lower production costs, added efficiency, a nd 
better use of human and material r e sources. 
We are in a new era of new technolog i es and new industries; diver-
sification, mergers, and decentralizing executive command; high costs 
and squeezed profit margins; and great depe ndence of each industrial 
enterprise on its suppliers and sub-contractors. In this era, we 
need as never before a common language among industr y, scienc e, 
insurance, labor, government, and the public. A compr ehen sive set 
of national standards for dimension , definition, p erformance, testing, 
and safety will provide that language. 
1 E . C . Crittenden , "Contributions of Government and Private 
Agencies to National Standards , 11 Dic kson Reck (ed.), National Standards 




We do not have an adequate set of well conceived national stand ... 
ards. Our progress in standards has lagged behind our advances 
in other areas of the national economy. 2 
In that same year, 1956, Thomas P. Pike was lead to an almost 
identical conclusion: 
Our national security is dependent on government- industry 
coordination. Strategic military plans must be supported by materiel 
to permit our armed services to fulfill their assigned missions. / There .. 
fore, our military strength is closely tied to the ability of our indus -
tries to produce support materiel. Through government-industry 
cooperation in the field of standardization, we can increase ind us trial 
output for military requirements, as well as improve the logistical 
support of our armed services. 
We have now come to the point where new technologies make it 
imperative for us to develop quickly many new, coordinated stand-
ards. We must make sure that parts fit and that they are interchange -
abl e, simple, and accessible. We must avoid confusion. We must 
speak the same technical language. We must us e the same signs and 
symbols in our drawings, blueprints, and purchase orders. 
For all this we need organizations that give us the facilities to 
meet on a common ground where we can harmonize and coordinate 
our ideas and interests in matters of standan:ls. 3 
Looking at the strict military problem of standardization, Life 
magazine commented in 1951, the year the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion moved into full swing to counter the Soviet threat, that: 
One of the most complex problems facing the G-4's of Eis enhower's 
Armies, the men who deal with supplies, is that of utilizing the avail-
able old weapons and coordinating the manufactur e of the new ones. 
To supply twelve armies which use 33 types of machine guns and 90 
types of heavy guns is a nightmare and one that could end in defeat on 
the battlefield. Refusal to use the weapons now available in Europ e 
2 The Magazine of Standards, January, I 956, p. 16. 
3Thomas P. Pike, quoted in American Standards Associa tion, The 
400 American Standards in the Electrical Field, 1956 {New York: American 








:ouid reduce the NATO's Armies to a pitifully weak force during 
le: danger perio~ of the next few years. The answer to the prob-
' _of course, is some degree of standardization of arms, but 
m~shing a dozen different industrial plants makes this neither a 
quick nor a simple solution. 4 
Business Week in I 951 was, perhaps, a little more pointed in 
its 
commentary: 
T A lot of i_United State!!__l generals have nightmares these days. 
_hey dream that American and European infantrymen are fighting 
Side by 'd. , . 
th si e in an all out war. The Americans have the guns and 
he Europeans have the shells. But the European shells don't fit 
t e American guns. 5 
A full decade ago Maj. Gen. Oliver P . Echols, president of the 
Aircraft 
Industries Association, stated that standardization efforts in 
the 
aeronautical field were confused by a lack of straightforward policy 
a:nd org . 
anization and by considerable overlapping and duplication of 
:res 
P 0 nsibility. 
S tandardization efforts in the aeronautical field of both Govern .. 
:rnent and industry today are far more costly and complicated than 
th
ey should be • • • • I believe that we have reached a point where 
"W_e must critically review the entire aeronautical standardization 
Picture to find better methods 9f accomplishing our purposes with 
far l 6 
ess expense and red tape. 
A..:nct 1vr . 
aJ. Gen. Echols' words were indicative not just of aeronautical stand .. 
a:rct. 
lzation but of the entire national and international standardization 
Pictu:r e. 
4
"Beadache Standardization, JI Life, July 16, 1951, p. II6. 
5 
Week "Slow Going on Standardization of Most Weapons, JI Business 
~ November 3, I 951, p. 80. 
J\lly 
6
1v1aj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols, quoted in Industrial Standardization, 
• l 94 7' p. 176. 
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This thesis has been devoted largely to the problem of inter _ 
national standardization with a high flavor of military international 
standardization. However, it was necessary to wander into the national 
standardization picture to review the broader international problem. 
Now that this has been done, the reader can reach his own conclusicns 
as to whether the situation described by Maj. Gen. Echols in 194 7 has 
or has not been corrected. The author believes that, while some, 
actually minor , progress has been made nationally, internationally even 
less progress has been made and unless major steps are undertaken 
another decade will pass with the situation as little resolved as it is 
today. 
F ive y ears ago a milita r y commentary p ointed o ut that despite 
spending much more money and with many m ore facilities at its disposal 
than the communist countries, the free world , as a whole , had such a 
low peacetime production effectiveness that it was unable to match the 
communist aircraft production. "The main reasons for this are a l ack 
of standardization of aeronautical material and lack of coordination in 
7 
Prototype and production planning. " 
Over a decade ago, when the Soviet Union set about replacing the 
tremendous damage incurred during World War II, informed Americans 
Were forced to conc lude that the Soviet success in this work would have 
been · d . · 118 impossible "without standar 1zat10n. 
7 American Aviation, September 2 7 , 1946 , p . 20. 
8Industrial Standardization, Janua r y , 1946, P• 20. 
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Now among the office rs of the United States and its allies one 
can hear the jealous lament that: 
"We 
On the Russian side you find the same system of Command staff 
d . ' uties and tactical "doctrine'' throughout; and what is more important 
t~an all, standardization of equipment. On our side all these vary 
with the different countries forming the armies of the Western 
Democracies. 9 
Eight years ago a leading Czech engineer declared in Prague: 
will put ourselves in the forefront of the greatest system in the 
Worid ... ~Soviet Standardization. 1110 The reader should contemplate this 
st
atement carefully. We have seen advances made in the Soviet Union 
th
at exceeded all reasonable expectation of the other nations. We have 
seen the time between research and development and actual production 
of complex items of equipment cut to but a fraction of the time required 
for a · .1 sim1, ar operation even in the industrially advanced facilities of the 
Dnited States. We have marveled that a nation could produce so much 
from so little. But we have failed to take account of the fact that these 
advances have come about through the application of one of the world's 
11::lost advanced systems of standardization. Without advanced stand .. 
a rdization, the Soviet Union and its satellites would be impotent, , With 
standardization, the Soviet Union with its satellites may well achieve the 
9B · d. J G s th The Western Defenses (London: Allan w· riga 1er • • my , 
ingate, 1951), p. 87. 
1 OQuoted by William L. Batt, United States Minister for Economic 
l\.ffairs to the United Kingdom in an address to the Annual Meeting of the 
~11::lerican Standards Association, New York, December, 1952, contained 
in National Aircraft Standards Committee letter, su_bject: "ASA Annual 
~eeting--Address of Wm. L. Batt," December IO, 1952 (in the files of 
e Committee, file: 14. 9). 
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goal th h . 
ey ave laid out for themselves. But the final decision rests in 
the ha d 
n s of the non-communist nations, particularly the United States . 
A.re the United States and the other non- communist nations willing to 
institute a system of standardization that will insure their survival - -a 
sy
st
ern that will insure that the strength they possess individually c a n be 
Posse d 
sse collectively- -a system that will insure the achievement of 
:tnaxirn 
urn strength through minimum cost? 
The author will not attempt to justify standardization, na tional 
or · 
international, here - - in spite of the comments of doubters , it already 
has b 
een justified by many scores of persons of greater prominence than 
the author. To further belabor the beneficial effect of broad standa rdiza -
tion 
on World peace, commerce, education, research, developm e nt, 
Understa d ' n ing, labor, standards of living, or even the ability to wage 
War n t ' a ionally or in concert with allies would be to drag before the r eader 
that Wh ' ich generally cannot be questioned. It really is not a matte r of 
What h 
s 0 uld be done, but how should it be done? 
Recognizing the world situation as it is toda;Y, the author knows 
that 
a logical question is: How is the Soviet Union c arrying on standa r d -
ization? Up to the present a comparison of the United States and Sovie t 
Dnio db h n standardization systems has been avoide ecause any sue com ... 
Pariso t · n tends to bring forth two stereotype g roup r e ac 10ns. The first 
g l'oup reaction is to discredit the Soviet way of doing things onthe b as is 
th
at all Soviet actions are non- democra tic a nd , the r efor e, unaccepta ble 
~l'W k es tern adoption. The second group r eac tio n is to see acceptance 
of the Soviet way of doing things on t h e basis that Soviet methods 
must b e adopted to counter Soviet gains. The author subscribes to 
n . h 
eit er approach. But the author does recognize the advantages he ld 
by the Soviet Union over the non-communist nations as a result of the 
So · 11 
Vlet concentration on the subject of standardization. These ad -
vantages have been recognized by others . 12 
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In the system of international power politics , national mediocrity 
can be accepted only so long as the threatening force is e qually inefficient. 
But wh 
en the threatening force succeeds in advancing beyond the s e l e vels , 
the n th . . . . 
e m a intenance of med1ocr1ty 1n one's own nation and as be tween 
h" 
ls nation and his nation's allies is a luxury that cannot be afforded. 
Accordingly, the author agrees with the British that: 
• • • the latest proofs of Russia's technical capacity and the r ea c tions 
to it in the councils of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion ••• 
emphasize the need to intensify standardization techniques in bot h 
military and commercial enterprize s. 13 
l 11 Howard Coonley reported in 1950 that the Soviet Union had a 
/rger standardization activity than any other nation. (Howa rd Coonley, 
t~:dustrial Standardization, ff An address ~efore the In~ustr~al C~lleg~ of 
1vt Armed Forces, April 6, 1950 (in the files of the Air Umver s 1ty Libra r y , 
t . a x well Air Force Base Alabama) . ) For a description of "Sta nda rdi za-lon · , . 
in the Soviet Union' 1 see Appendix B. 
t . 1211 There is too much futility and frustration in standardization in 
his country The American Standards A ssociation its e lf is with -
out a h • • • • f .f Ut ority. • • • Some • • • standards have taken 1 t .. e e n to twe nty 
:.; a rs to put throughi but, •• • I happ e n to know that in Rus sia i t is 
A~ ferent. 1f (Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, "Indus t ria l Standardization, fr 
l addre ss before the Industrial College of the A rme d Forces , Ma r c h 14, 
Ai4 9 (in the files of the Air Unive rsity Library, Maxwell Air Force Base , 
abama) . ) 




epeat over the next decade and a half the errors that have been 
corn · 
rnitted over the past decade and a half would be disastrous in the 
e:x:trerne. 
But unless the free nations, and particularly the United 
States . . 
• are willing to approach this problem with objectivity and re 80 ... 
lution th f 
' e orthcoming events will be a sordid repetition of the pre ... 
Ced' 
ing history. In spite of glowing statements to the contrary, the 
a uthor b 1 · e 1eves the preceding pages more than warrant the conclusion 
that i · 
n international standardization, and even in national standardization, 
au. 
ls not going well. However, the author is not so naive as to believe 
that he alone can produce a solution to this complex problem. Yet, in 
all · 
sincerity, the author feels he is qualified to make certain recom ... 
ln . 
e ndations for future courses of action. 
First, the United States must either move forward in standardiza -
tion 
and become the leading influence in the world or some other nation 
Will a 
ssurne that position with dire effect on the United States trade and 
technical position. Every industrially advanced nation stands to profit 
by the adoption abroad of its standards, either directly or through the 
lnediu 
rn of an international organization such as the International Organi -
Z~tion f . . 
· or Standard1za tion. In the past, many nations, the United States 
e:x:clud d e , took great pains to promote the use of their standards in the 
l ess d 
eveloped and even in the develop ed areas of the world. Germany 
"-as 
Particularly noted for its effective standards promotional methods. 
l'he G 
errnan national standards body, the Deutscher Normenausschuss, up 
to 194 
O had published four foreign language handbooks devote d to basic 
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st
andards , production mater:als, and bolts, nuts, and accessories. 
Also, some I 70 individual standards concerning various aspects of 
electrical, civil, and mechanical engineering had been published in 
for · eign languages. The advantages of this program were tremendous. 
Ger:rnan products began to infiltrate most of the world as did German 
ideas. F h urt er, the German language was well on the way to becoming 
th
e technical language of the world. It was this German aggressiveness 
in the spread of its standards and related technology that eventually 
resulted in the criticism raised against its actions in the International 
Federation of National Standardizing Associations. Had Germany been 
but 1· a 1ttle more patient, its standards and technology would have 
captured a major portion of the world and the German language would 
be the world language of technology. That this did not occur is due 
alniost solely to Germany's unwise entry into war in 1939. 
It is significant that at the time German standards and technolog y 
Were capturing the world, the United States was still hardly able to muster 
even a limited national standardization effort. Even now there does not 
e){:ist in the United States a national standardization organization which 
Would make possible an international program equal to the pre - World 
Wa-:r 1I program of Germany. But now the United States does not face 
just the German threat, it faces the British, the French, and, soon, the 
Soviet threat. Other nations go so far as to install representative offices 
Of their standards bodies in foreign nations solely to prevent, wherever 
Possible, the adoption by the foreign nation of a standard. that would differ 
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from that in use by the home nation. The United Kingdom, as an 
example, maintained such an office in Argentina. The advantage accruing 
to th e United Kingdom from its program of having its standards adopted 
abroad is seen in this statement: 
One of the most favorable factors arises from the acceptance 
or use by many countries of British standards. Since replac e m e nt 
or new equipment ordinarily must c onform to these standards a nd 
specifications, a regular flow of trade is virtually guaranteed. 14 
Should the United States fail to meet this threat a nd not spre ad 
its 
own standards and its own technical thoughts abroad or should the 
Dnited States not insure that the standards and technical thoughts accepted 
abroad are international standards consistent with accepted Unite d States 
Practice, then the standards and technical thoughts of others will b e spread 
to the detriment of the United States. And the trend naturally is awa y 
from U · d h · nited States practice because the United States an ot er nations 
are 1 d a ready divided on such basic points as weights an measure s. In 
addit· h th f f · ion, United States products often cost too muc ; e re ore, are1g n 
Customers tend to turn to the products and standards of othe r na tion s . 
Dnder t h h · t · ese circumstances, a division on ot e r po1n s 1s e asy. Thus 
th
e requirement for positive action on the part of the Unite d Sta t e s is 
a11 the more necessary and urgent. 
S e cond, the United States must eithe r move forwa rd in s tand ardiza .. 
t · 10:n. and become the l e ading influence among the fr e e and a llie d na tions of 
14,,.B ·t . 1 C t Problems in Foreign Trade R ec onstruc tion, 11 F' . r1 a1n s urren . . 
~e1ggn c W kl March 29 1947 , quote d m Industria l Stand -!za~ 0 mmerce ee y, , 
~n, November, 1948, pp. 166 - 167. 
.... +w...: -
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the world or it and its allies will find themselves unable to compete 
against the organized Soviet system based on full and intelligent stand-
ardization. The fact that 400, 000 Belgian troops were forced to surrender 
prematurely because British ammunition did not fit their guns, that United 
States aircraft grounded in the United Kingdom could not turn to the 
British for even the most simple parts, that non-standard screw threads 
cost the United States 600 million dollars in World War II, that a year 
was required to redraw 2000 blueprints so that the British Rolls - Royce 
Merlin engine could be produced in the United States, that parts were 
rushed thousands of miles to meet urgent combat requiremen1B only to 
find later that the needed items were already in stock under other part 
numbers, that United Kingdom bombs could not be carried on United 
States aircraft, that fire hoses from one city did not fit couplings in 
another, that oxygen could be mistaken for hydraulic fluid because the 
containers were marked the same--these facts and others adequately 
point to the utter confusion, waste, and tragedy that accompanies non-
standardization. At present and for the foreseeabl e future military 
international standardization will hinge on whe ther the United States 
takes an active lead in the program. If the United States fails to take 
this lead and standardization does not materialize between the United 
States and its allies, then the a lliances of the United States will 
me rely represent an assemblage of uncoordinated parts which may 
actually weaken rather than strengthen the United States. 
To the author, given the problem of the Soviet Union and its 
satellites vis ! vis the United States and its allies , the only alterna -
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tive to greater and fuller international standardization is ultimate defeat. 
In World War II, the United States could look proudly at itself and say~ 
"We outproduced them. 11 Without international standardization between 
the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union may well be able to 
make that statement in the future. Among the Soviet Union and its 
satellites, and more recently to include China , technical and industrial 
integration is not only possible, it is a stark fact. Although the central -
ization of control that accompanies the Soviet system carries with it a 
degree of excess overhead in comparison to the United States system 15 
and although centralization of direction may create certain management 
inefficiencies, the vast amount of duplication that is avoided makes up 
for these inefficiencies many, many fold. 
At present, in terms of technol ogy and production and, to a 
degree, in terms of military forces, the United States - dominated series 
of alliances established to counter the Soviet threat are little more than 
l egal/moral fences. And without standardization they will remain as 
legal /m oral fences. Without standardization, "Western unity1116 will 
never have to be feared by the Soviet Union=-it will never exist. 
1 Son balance there is a considerable amount of United States 
overhead not found in the Soviet system. 
l 6Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field -
Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. {New York:Th.e 
World Publishing Co. , 1958), p. 4 74: "Wester~ ucity is the only thing 
the Russians fear •••• 11 
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Given these two conclusions, and even with lesser conclusions, 
' the question of international standardization vis':.. vis the United States 
narrows to the single element of "How?" How can the United States do 
better in international standardization? How can the history o f the past 
not be repeated? How can the United States achieve unity when it seems 
basically divided on scores of points all of which seem vital to the question? 
The author is inclined to state that it may be more a matter of 
11must 11 than of "how, 11 but it would be improper to avoid the one on the 
basis of the other for they both are material. 
In solving the question of "How?" it is necessary to solve the 
primary question of "What? 11 What is the full need in international stand-
ardization now, in the immediate future, and over the next several decades 
and centuries: This is a question of policy and of program. And to solve 
it jointly, the knotty question of organization must be solved. Policy, 
program, and organization are one inseparable unit. If the wrong organ-
ization is drawn to answer the question of policy and program, if, as an 
example, an a ll .. industry group is again established to answer the question, 
the answer cannot but be in error. 
Complicating this very basic element of the proble m is the fa c t 
that it must be solved on two planes. First, it must be solved on the 
national, United States plane. Second, it must be solved on a twin inter -
national plane as between the United States and its allies and as between 
the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its sate llite s. 
In this regard, the author is of the school that believes that the long 
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:rang 
e nature of much international standardization is such that the con-
ventional b · · 
arriers of friend and foe are impractical criteria for establish-
ing rnany programs and policies. A brief look at history will show that 
rnuch work in international standardization benefits neither the friend nor 
the fo · h . . 
e in t e military or cold war sense, but it does make the collective 
World a · . . n easier place for both to survive in, to prosper, and to relegate 
sorne of their differences to secondary positions. A brief look at history 
also Will show that many important international standardization projects 
Were conducted on a disastrous stop-and-start basis while moods of 
n t· 
a ions vaillated, while nations inevitably alternated between the status 
of friend and foe in the play of power politics. One has merely to look at 
internat· 1 · · · f · · l · t· iona standardization in terms o internationa avia ion, commun-
icatio . . ns, navigations, health 1 and now space to see that the conventional 
friend/foe basis of relations is not particularly applicable to a significant 
Part of the problem. Thus the author rejects the reasoning that may have 
Put forth as cause for the United States not participating with greater 
Vigor in such international standardization bodies as the International 
Organization for Standardization, the International Electrotechnical 
Corn . 
tnission, and others. 
Returning to the problem of national policy, program, and organ-
ization, the author endorses completely the "all-parties II policy advocated 
by- the American Standards Association and the "coordination" policies 
advocated by the Department of Defense and others. However, in endors -
ing thern the author believes that they should be carried out in the ir 
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true sense. I n theory, the government is capable of representing 
the t· 
en ire nation. But, in practice, standardization has introduced a 
new el 
ement and problem. Even in the strong central government in the 
So · 
Viet Union it is recognized that standards must flow from an organiza -
tion th 
at represents something more than the governmental hierarchy. 
Stand d 
ar s are down to earth, practical things that must be capable of 
ra · d 
Pl and dynamic creation, growth, revision, and in some cases, ex-
tinction. If the policy, program, and organization does not embody 
th
ese capabilities,, it may well do more harm than good. And the author 
does t b . no eheve a solely governmental standardization body is capable 
of embodying these capabilities. On the other hand, the author is 
equally convinced that an all - civil body encompassing producers, con-
sul'l1ers 
' educators, and others does not embody these elements even 
though 
government may be represented in a liaison capacity. Specifically, 
While th . . e author has great respect for the American Standards A ssocia -
tion as d currently organized, with equal conviction the author oes not 
believe th · t d l at that organization, as now constltu e , proper y can repre -
sent th · d d" · e nation in international stan ar 1zation • 
• 
For an organization to represent the United States in interna-
tional · f l · standardization {as well as to carry on a meaning u national 
Program) it must embody the several national elements that are effected 
by th e process. Beyond that it must embody a procedure that provides 
for th 
e reaching of decisions with speed. This means that provision must 
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be made for decisions to be reached on a basis other than unanimous 
' 
voluntary consent. Further, while the voice of government should not 
be all ... powerful, there must be certain areas, such as national 
defense, health, etc., where the government voice must be final. This, 
however, is little different than it is now. 
These same conclusions extend to the allied level of organization 
and o · peration and to the full international level of organization and oper -
ation. 
The idea that narrow, specialized bodies can successfully carry 
on· 
international standardization, the broadest of subjects , is preposterous. 
The idea that international standardization can either be military or civilian, 
can either be operationally or logistically motivated, can be achieved on 
th
e basis of organization instead of on the basis of subject- ... is not sound. 
~ Reference .!_o Organization on the United States Level. Looking 
at the United States national level, the author concludes that the nation 
is in u · 1 d d. t· b d rgent need of a truly natlona stan ar iza ion o y. Ii the United 
st
ates is to engage in international standardization with any purpose, 
Objectivity, or sincerity, it must possess an organization that speaks 
With authority. At present no organization, government or civil, can do 
th
is. As a result there is at present no body in the United States that 
hon tI · · t· t· · h es y can conduct international standardization nego ia ions wit 
Other nations. This is recognized by other countries and the effect is 
Sizeable. 
But to form a true United States national standardization body will 
be most difficult for the creation of such a body will run count er to a host 
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of forces· . ·1 
· c1v1 and governmental, group and individual. 1 7 It is 
doubtf r. 
u if the military would ever support such a scheme for it would 
run 
counter to the idea of service prerogatives. Further, it would 
threaten the statu·s and position on many employees who have military-
11':lanag d · 
e international standardization as their sole or primary job 
fos tific a tion. 
It is doubtful if the Department of Defense would support 
such a s h . 
c eme for 1t would tend to degrade a function of great importance 
to 
th
e stature of that organization and to the status and position of many 
of it 
s employees. It is doubtful if the Department of Commerce would 
s upport 
such a scheme for it would mean the loss of certain functions 
that h 
ave been held by the department for decades. It is doubtful if 
the D 
epartment of Justice would support such a scheme for that depart -
11':lent th ereby might be forced to pre-judge rather than post-judge 
17 ''E The author cannot help but recall the words of Edwin O. Stene: 
st Very large social organization is characterized by the presence of 
rong centrifugal forces which tend to generate autonomous operation of 
s e gl1':l . . 
11':l ents, and counteracting centripetal forces designed to draw the 
w·any activities into an integrated unity. In modern American society, 
1th 
its tradition of political democracy and individual freedom, the 
centr'f 1 ugal forces seem to be the more spontaneous and the more readily 
;ccepted by the participants. The maintenance of a unified outlook and 
~tegrated operation on the other hand, requires constant attention and 
p a_nning on the part ~fan organization's executives. Although the forces 
Of Int · . · egration in American governmental operat10ns have been strengthened 
auct systematized in recent decades, they have been faced with new and 
lllor · h I e powerful forces of disunity, and at the same time t e en arged span 
of governmental activities has increased the difficulties of integration, 
~s Well as its importance. Among the most important of these new forces 
ls that of specialization- - both specialization within the bureaucracy and 
8 Pec · 1· k t 'nfl la 1zation of pressure groups that see to exer 1 uence upon govern-
;ent. 1·1 (Edwin o. Stene, "Administrative Integration, 11 The Annals of the 
-:---:.::_I 11':le~ ... r i.icca n1 Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1954, p.- -
'II~----"------
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standardization actions. It is doubtful if the Department of Agriculture 
Would support such a scheme for it, like the Department of Commerce , 
Would eventually lose some of its functions to the national standards 
body. It is doubtful if industry would support such a scheme for it 
Would surely lose some pre:i;ogatives to governmental influence. It is 
doubtful if labor, education, consumers, farmers, or any other major 
group would really support a true United States national standards body. 
It · is even doubtful that the Congress that already turned down the federal -
izing of the American Standards Association would support the scheme 
for» if for no other more intimate political reason, it runs counter to 
the congressional trend toward organizational dispersion ar:rl strategic 
Pluralism. It is probably for these reasons that the subject lies so 
dor.rnant after once having had such magnificant support. 
Yet, while it can be concluded that more than a majority of the 
forces within the nation would object to the creation of a United States 
national standards body~ when faced with the facts of the problem, how 
can the need be denied? It cannot except by organ:izations and individ-
uals who prize their own short term security above the long term security 
of the nation. True, the creation of a United States national standards 
body w Id 1 . h t fer of many governmental functions that ou resu t 1n t e rans 
are now · 1 d th hout the government to a central body. True, p1ecemea e roug 
the creation of a United States national standards body would result in the 
dislocati·on f . .1 d goverrunent employees. True, the creation o many c1 v1 an 
of a u ·t d . 1 t <lards body would result in the los s of some n1 e States natlona s an 
prerogatives to industry and to consumers as well as to government. 
True, the creation of a United States standards body would require 
change . th· k' s 1n 1n 1ng and procedures employed by such agencies as the 
Federal Trade Gornrnission. But what is the alternative? 
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The alternative to the creation of a United States national stand .. 
a rds body is to perpetuate a system wherein not only national but inter-
national standardization will not be achieved in the free worl d system. 
The United State s , because of its current industrial, technical, military, 
a nd other predominance , prevents the accomplishment of international 
standa d" · . r 1zation by its absence. Although the United States participates 
in a considerabl e number of international standardization organizations, 
it does so in name only for actually only el ements of the United States 
act and are consulted. The result is that the international standards 
achieved, if any can really be achieved, are questionable and, often, 
at cross purposes with other actions and activities of the United States . 
As an example, it would seem that United States monies spent to finance 
th
e production of foreign designs operates directly counter to any Unite d 
8tates standardization effort. Further, it would seem obvious that 
1ndustry could not represent the United States government without con-
s Ul ti h · 1 · . d d ng t e government as to 1ts po 1c1es an nee s. On the other hand a 
tnil · Id ·11 · 1 tary or other governmental department wou appear 1 -equipped 
to negotiate internationally a standard that in the United States was 
Controlled primarily by a civil body. It is easy to imagine the 
impossible situation a foreign nation finds itself in when attempting 
to negotiate a standard with the United States. Thus , on the basis of 
the evidence available, there seems no acceptable alternative to the 
establishment of a United States national standards body. 
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With Reference to Organization on the Free World Level. The 
------ - -- --=----- - -- ---
problem of the national level is the problem of the international level. 
Standardization, by its nature, is a central problem and it cannot be 
handled on a disorganized basis. To state that standardization simul-
taneously can be done on a military service basis, on a civil defense 
basis, on a war production basis, on an industrial basis, on a joint 
basis, on a selected topic basis, and on a host of other divisional bases 
is to deny the concept. That a half dozen American••British- Canadian 
organizations can function in the area of standardization is to deny that 
standardization is possible. To organize North Atlantic Treaty stand -
ardization on the basis of several agencies is to insure that standardiza-
t· . 
ion will not b e a chieved. A s F iel d M a r s hal Vi scount Montgomery has 
stated: "The fact is we are really not an allian ce • • • • We are a group 
18 
of nations unable to agree how to get where we want to go. " 
But to centralize standardization internationally will be as diffi -
cult as the centralization of standardization within the United States. 
Actually, the two go hand in hand for the international centralization of 
stand d t th nati·onal centralization of standardization and ar ization suppor s e 
l 8Field Marshal Viscount Montgome ry, quoted in Time, November 
lO, 1958 , p. 34. 
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vice versa. International centralization of standardization will never 
be possible so long as standardization is not centralized on the national 
basis. B t b d h h u eyon t at t e international centralization of standardization 
Would be resisted for it would disrupt the status and position of many 
employees who are tied directly to the decentralized organization; it 
Would be resisted because it would reduce the numbers of organizations 
a nd inevitably the personnel and facilities that are now a part of some 
local economy; it would be resisted because it is too simple and too 
direct. 
Yet, while it can be concluded that considerable resistance would 
e:xist to the centralization of standardization on the international level, 
can the difficulties caused by the present system be justified? 
Centralization must take place on the international level, but it 
may have to follow centralization on the national level. However, if 
centralization on the international level is achieved, it could well force 
centralization on the national level. 
~ Reference !? Organization~ the World Level. On the world 
level, primarily through the United Nations and its affiliates, standard-
ization organization already is largely centralized. But because it has 
not been centralized on the national level, primarily in the United States , 
and because the nations, :primarily the United States, do not support the 
:Program with dynamic and unified action and policy, the program has b een 
and is lagging and will continue to lag until these basic deficiencies are 
e liminated. 
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With Reference~ Voluntary Standardization. Voluntary stand-
ardizat· · ion 1s simply a l egal out with regard to the restraint of trade 
question and a counter offensive to standardization- in-seclusion. 
Cert · ain standards need not be more than recommended practices. 
But for the good of the nati on and its allies many standards should be 
nationally or internationally mandatory. For national and international 
Well being, red and green should have no opposite meanings to stop 
a nd go. For national and international well being only one symbol, not 
a series of symbols, should be allowed to indicate hazards to life and 
Property. The human mind should not be confused by forcing it to 
co:rnprehend a host of signals to convey the same message or frustrated 
With a single signal conveying a series of contradictory messages. 
But, like all things, there is a gray area in which justification exists 
both for making standards mandatory and allowing them to re voluntary • 
.F'or these areas and for all others, no objection should be raised as to 
Whether the standards are mandatory or vol untary so long as in their 
Preparation all parties of consequence are heard, the decision is 
justified by the evidence, and recourse is open to injured parties. 
With Reference to General Deterrents .!_o Standardization. Most 
of the deterrents to standardization stem from inadequate knowledge of 
the standardization process, from the actions of incompetent standard-
ization organizations, or from a failure to face squarely the problem of 
standardization in the short and long range. 
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On the first point, inadequate knowledge of standardization 
' 
onJy- by a broader education in the subject can an appreciation and 
understanding be found. Parties who have no knowledge of standardiza-
tion can hardly be expected to support it for in their ignorance they 
must mistrust it. Except in certain engineering courses, standardiza-
tion cannot be found in a school curriculum. Military schools, except 
for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, do not consider it worth 
discussing. Unless a knowledge of standardization is disseminated there 
Will continue to be deterrents to the concept and these deterrents will be 
based 1 so ely on ignorance. 
On the second point, incompetent standardization organizations, 
Only- an appreciation of the need and a complete reorganization of the 
standardization organization and policy will provide a solution. One 
cannot expect good work from a poor organization and a poor or non-
e){:· 
lstent policy. 
On the third point, failure to face squarely the problem of stand -
ardization, 1 d ation organization, and policy will bring on y proper e uc , 
the d.ff· f One cannot face squarely a 1 iculties and solutions into ocus. 
:Problem when it is not adequately illustrated in terms of program, 
:Policy- d . . , an organization. 
~ Summary. an l
'nherent air of hopelessness in these There is 
final . . d largely by the tremendous obstacles conclusions. This 1s force 
facing the d d" ation national and international. 
concept of stan ar 1z ' 
But 
the circumstances provide little latitude. The past history of the 
problem adequately illustrates this. 
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Facing facts is usually difficult, but facts, however distasteful , 
are real. And in this case the facts seem to show that standardization 
is a necessary end but an end whic h will b e reached only with the 
greatest difficulty. 
The tug of war that takes place within a democratic society is 
real and not always guided by the most selfless intentions. Unfortunately, 
national or international survival is sometimes secondary to short range 
personal gain and security. 
APPENDIX A 
STANDARDIZATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Austria. The Austrian Standards Association (ONA) was created 
in 1920 on the initiative of Austrian industry so that it is in no way sub-
jec t to direct governmental control. Numerous industrial enterprizes 
are members of the Association, and official agencies or other organi-
zations may a l so be admitted. The Association is subsidized by the 
Federal Chamber of Commerce, but maintains independence from that 
organization. It is managed by a Council e l ected at a general meeting . 
Austrian standards are prepared by te chnica l committee s, c om -
prising representatives of producers, custorners, scientists, and 
authorities as fully equal partners . Standards are adopted by unanimous 
d e cision. They have in principle the character of free agreements, but 
can be declared as binding by any public authority interested in the domain 
concerned. For instance, the Vienna Municipality has declar e d numerous 
construction standards as binding; the Ministry of Social Affairs, for 
safety reasons, has taken a similar decision for e leva tors, cranes, and 
winches. 
Austrian standards activity is unique in that the nation remains 
essentially non-military. 
Belgium. Standardization on a national scale began in Belgium in 
1919 with an organization built along B ritish lines. Thi s Belgian standards 
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body, the Association Belge de Standardization (ABS), was suppor ted 
p r imarily b y i n d u stry, but it r ec ei ved a s sistance from technica l associa -
tions and scientific circles. 
In 1946 the Association was replaced by the Institut Belge de 
Normalisation (IBN), a non-profit corporate body. It has abmt a hundred 
rnembers drawn from scientific institutions, public services, industrial 
and trade associations, and various other associations concerned with 
standardization. 
The IBN standardization committees include representatives of 
producers , distributors, and consumers (including public services). For 
some standardization activities, the committees also include repre -
sentatives of the educational authorities and representatives of organiza-
tions and services concerned with the public safety. 
The IBN is legally authorized to enter into agreements with other 
bodies partly or wholly concerned with similar aims. The purpose here 
is to cope with the ever-increasing demand for investigations covering 
a constantly wider range of subjects. The IBN remains responsible for 
the proper performance of work transferred in this way. 
Denmark. The Danish standards association, Dansk Standard-
iseringsrad (DS), like many other national standardization organizations, 
has its roots deep in the machine industry where the need for broad stand-
ardization was first felt. Currently, however, the activity of the Associ -
ation covers the greater part of the main groups in the Universal Decimal 
Classification system. 
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The DS is an independent non- governmental organization and 
consists of a council of 27 members appointed by the Ministry of 
Commerce and representing several government departments, trade 
associations, technical schools, etc. It is financed mainly from 
government subsidies and contributions from industrial organizations, 
trade associations and large independent firms. Its standards are 
formulated on the committee basis, the committees being formed of 
representatives of manufacturers, distributors , and consumers. 
Some standardization work in special fields is carried out by 
societies of engineers and architects, generally with DS approval and 
cooperation. Such standards may be issued as DS standards after 
processing by the Dansk Standardiseringsrad. 
Danish standards are not compulsory, but they are being used to 
an increasing extent in all activities, including education. 
France. The French standards association, !'Association 
Francaise de Normalisation (AFNOR) , was set up on June 22, 1926 , to 
replace the Commission Permanente de Standardisation instituted by 
Government Order (D~cret) in 19 I 8. It was subsequently given official 
recognition and in 1943 was given legal status providing for an appro-
priate distribution of work between the standardization bureau, AFNOR, 
and the Commissaire d; la Normalisation (Standards Commissioner). 
The standardization bureaus , working on a national basis and 
organized by the trades and industries, have been set up in most of the 
major economic sectors . Various departme nts of the Ministry of 
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Agriculture, French Coalfields, Air Ministry, Electrical Mining Equip -
ment Commission, Building Industry and Scientific and Technical Center 
and the Committee for Coordination of Telecommunications in the French 
Union also have the same status as the standardization bureaus. These 
bureaus are responsible for working out preliminary draft standards in 
consultation with AFNOR, and they help to elaborate a final draft after a 
public enquiry has been held. 
• 
AFNOR, which is a private association, centralizes and coordinates 
all work and research relating to standardization. It also revises the draft 
standards prepared by the standardization bureaus after subjecting them 
to public enquiry. For standardization subjects that are not the direct con-
cern of the standardization bureaus, AFNOR will convene special com-
mittees. AFNOR represents France in international standardization 
conferences; it controls the use of the national 11NF 11 standard mark which 
certifies that the approved standards have been observed; and it keeps 
education informed about questions and progress in standardization. 
The Standards Commissioner is a senior official of the Ministry 
of Industry and Fuel and Power who lays down general policy, controls 
the fulfillment of the program of work, submits to the Minister for 
approval as rrFrench Standards II draft standards submitted by AFNOR, 
makes recommendations to ministerial departments regarding procedures 
for the application of standards, deals with applications for exemption 
from the use of standards, and insures that the national "NF" standard 
mark is used as provided for in the French law. The Commissioner a l so 
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has the responsibility to coordinate the work connected with standa rd-
ization in the government departments as well as the responsibility to 
pass on French policy governing participation in international standard-
ization conferences. 
Germany. The German standards association, der Deutscher 
Normenausschuss (DNA), was founded in 1917. Membership in the DNA 
consists of business undertakings, corporations, and organizations which 
pay a subscription based on the size of their staff. German standards are 
formulated by trade association committees and by special investigation 
committees and are subject to public enquiry before approval. The DNA 
has its own investigative committees for working on basic standards and 
for such tasks as do not come within the province of any of the trade 
association committees. The adoption of DNA standards is optional, but 
official bodies have the power to make them mandatory. The "DIN" 
standardization mark of the DNA must appear only on goods which con-
form strictly to the officially recognized standards. The use of the "DIN" 
mark is controlled by a special "standards mark 11 department of DNA. 
Irel and. In Ireland organized standardization first appeared in 
19 34 as an offshoot of industrial research. The central Irish standard-
ization organization is the Institute for Industrial Research and Standards 
set up in 1946. The Institute receives a subsidy from public funds and 
consists of a Council, Industrial Research Committee, and a Standa rds 
Committee. The latter has seven members, of whom three at most may 
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be members of the Industr'· 1 R · · 
ia esearch Committee and ex- officio mem-
bers of the Council. 
The d i rector of the Institute is a ppointed by the Ministe r for 
Industry and Commerce. His duties are tc dir ec t and supervise the 
drafting of standards , e i ther at the instigation of the Ministry, or in 
accordance with the dir ection of the Standards Committee. 
The drafting of standards is the res ponsibility of the Standards 
Committee. When such work is done a t the direction of the Minister, 
the Committee must act in accordance with his instructions. 
Standards are officia lly approved by the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce , after which they are submitted to Parliament. 
The Ministe r is t he p ropri etor of thE standards marks: 11 Caighdean 
Eire abbach" (CE ) and '' Irish Standard" (IS) . The use of these marks can 
be made compulsory by decision of the Minis ter for Industry and Comme r ce. 
The Institute is r e sponsibl e for insuring conformity with standard 
specifications. 
Ital y. The Italian standardization as sociation, l e Ente Nazionale di 
Unificazione (UNI) , is compos e d of a Central Offic e and twelve specialized 
bodies: automobiles, m achine tool s , shipbuilding, aircraft, cerami cs, 
refractories and abrasives, chemistry, r ailway s and tramways, non-
ferrous metals, plastics , optics, fine mechanics and pr ec i sion mechanics, 
ferrous metals. 
The UNI is a g overnmentally recognize d association. UNI stand-





of certain UNI standards for specific purposes or stimulates their use 
b . 
Y including them as bases in governmental contracts and works. 
Infrequently Italian governmental organizations may create their 
own standards using, occasionally, UNI standards as references. 
The Netherlands. Standardization in the Netherlands is coordinated 
by the Stichting voor de Normalisatie in Nederland. This foundation is a 
private, non-profit organization, the statutes of which are approved by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs. It is financed almost equally by its mem -
bers and government. 
The general management of the foundation is in the hands of the 
1-foofdcommissie voor de Normalisatie in Nederland (HCNN) consisting 
of representatives of leading scientific, industrial, and consumer organ-
izations and of the government. The HCNN has from thirty to forty 
tne:rnbers, eight to twelve of whom may be appointed by the government, 
each Ministry being represented. The other members are nominated 
by the different organizations, at the invitation of the HCNN, on the 
Principle that the scientific, technical, economic, and social interests 
should be fully and adequately represented. The nomination of the chair -
tnan of the HCNN must be approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs. 
All d d
. t· ork is based on the principle of free cooper = stan ar 1za 10n w 
at· t t' of the various interests. This 10n between competent represen a ives 
includes public enquiry. 
Standards is voluntary, but may be made The application of 
Ohl adopted by bodies having legal authority. 
igatory when they are 
Manufacturers producing recognized standard articles may 
apply for the right to use the HCNN standards mark: "NENORM." 
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Norway. The Norwegian central institution for standardization is 
the Norges Standardiserings-,Forbund, a private association of profes-
sional and trade organizations in which governmental and semi-govern-
mental institutions are represented without being members. It is 
financed from government subsidies, voluntary contributions, and sales 
of standards. 
A Plenary Assembly is called at least once a year. Apart from 
current matters, this assembly approves as Norwegian Standards (NS) 
the proposals placed before it by its Council or by its Divisions. 
Divisions, Committees, and Sub-Committees established on 
standardization problems usually consist of representatives of the 
different interested parties: private industry, public authorities, 
producers, consumers, tradesmen, and scientists. 
Standards, when completed, must be publishe d at least two 
months before being approved as NS. 
Provided basic requirements relating to representation, contents, 
etc. are met, standards drawn up within other Norwegian groups may be 
accepted by the Plenary Assembly as NS. 
Portugal. Standardization in Portugal was organized at the 
instigation of the government in 1946. In that year there was established 
th f Agricultural and Indus trial Products (IGP AI) 
e General Inspectorate o 




the government gave private organizations a part to play in stanchrdiza-
tion and, in June, 1952, it set up a Standardization Center where , apart 
from the government, trade associations or independent scientific, 
industrial, commercial, and agricultural bodies are represented. 
This Center has its own administrative department but remains under 
the control of the IGPAI. 
Draft standards are investigated either by one of the public or 
private organizations, or by a technical commission appointed by the 
Inspector - General of Agricultural and Industrial Products. The find-
ings are submitted to the Standards Department of the IGPAI which , in 
turn, transmits them to the Standards Council. After a public enquiry, 
the standard, revised as necessary, is referred back to the Council 
which then transmits it, with its own recommendations , to the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs for approval. 
A standard becomes final only after one year has elapsed. It 
can be made mandatory if the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the other 
Ministries concerned so decide. 
IGPAI is responsible for the control a nd use of the IGPAI standards 
mark. 
F
. 1 d d st come up for revision at least every five 1na stan ar s mu 
years. 
Sweden. 
The Swedish Standards Association (SIS) is the sole body 
in Sweden for the preparation of national standards. 
It was created in 1922 
t t·ves from various industrial federations, and is composed of represen a 1 
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technical societies , and governmental departments. The chairman is 
appointed by the government. In addition, the government ratifies the 
constitution of the SIS. 
The SIS is financed jointly by government and private industry. 
Preparation of SIS standards is done on the broad representative 
basis, but the preparation of the draft, the public enquiry, etc. are not 
carried out by the SIS but by affiliated industrial organizations under 
rules and procedures prescribed by the SIS. 
The SIS publishes all Swedish standards, is charged with main-
taining uniformity in standardization as a whole, and is charged with 
protecting common interests of the affiliated organizations, including 
acting as the representative in international standardization organizations. 
Switzerland. In Switzerland standardization is carried on by two 
privately financed organizations: La Soci~t: Suisse des Constructeurs de 
Machines {VSM) founded in 1918, and L'Association Suisse de Normali -
sation (SNV) founded in 1949. 
The VSM deals with the standardization of all products relating 
to the mechanical and engineering industries; the SNV concerns itself 
with all other standardization matters. The two are coordinated by the 
Bureau des Normes de la Soci/tl Suisse des Constructeurs de Machines. 
Internationally, Switzerland is represented in standardization work by the SNV. 
The VSM Standards Committee, with a membership of twelve, acts 
as the controlling authority for any standardization coming within its provinc e. 
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It decides which items and which products should be standardize d and 
approves the specification in each case. The necessary investigations 
are entrusted to technical committees, consisting of representatives of 
manufacturers, government services, the Federal Polytechnic School , 
the Federal Materials Testing Institute, etc., and includes producers 
as well as users. 
The SNV consists of groups of manufacturers and users who are 
interested in standardization of products other than those of the mechanical 
and electrical engineering industries. These groups form independent 
technical committees which are administratively attached to the SNV. 
Each group is itself responsible for the working out and official approval 
of the standards involved. 
United Kingdom. The UK standards association, the British 
Standards Institute {BSI), was founded in 1901. It is an independent 
organization run by a committee structure representative of industry, 
trade, and consumer interests. 
The financing of the BSI is by government and subscribing members. 
The work of the BSI is considered national and a uthoritative. How-
ever, the standards issued by the BSI are not considered mandatory. 
Th t . f BSI standards is under the control of Industry e prepara 10n o 
Sta d · Thi's preparation is done under the principle that n ards Committees. 
such standards must be based on general consent. This includes the consent 









STANDARDIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 
The highest standardization body in the Soviet Union is the 
All-Union Standards Committee. This committee is under the juris -
diction of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Its task con-
sists of preparation and approval of All - Union Government Standards 
(GOST) which are mandatory for all branches of the national e conomy 
of the Soviet Union throughout its entire territories. In addition to 
these All- Union standards, there are standards and specifications for 
local, departmental, or even factory application and significance. 
These are obligatory only in the territory of the member-republic 
Which publishes them, or within the jurisdiction of a government depart-
ment or a factory whose management approves them. 
Scientific standardization in the Soviet Union started 35 years ago 
When a Temporary Standardizing Bureau was created in 1923 by the 
Soviet government. This bureau made a thorough survey of all local 
standards which had existed in the factories in the Soviet Union in addi -
tion to which it studied the various standardization systems in us e a broa d. 
After two years of preliminary work, the Temporary Burea u submitte d 
its proposals, and on September 15, 1925, the Council of P e ople 's 
Commissars of the Soviet Union approved the fir s t c onstitution of the 
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Standards Committee at the Council of Labor and Defense and of the 
Central Bureau of Standards at the People's Commissariat of Workmen 
and Peasant's Inspection. 
Two years later it was found necessary to reorganize and unify 
the work of these two standardizing bodies and on July 21, 1927, a new 
constitution was approved for the Standards Committee of the Council for 
Labor and Defense. Under its provisions the Central Bureau became the 
secretariat responsible for all technical routine work including the super-
vision of the activity of local technical committees, and the preparation of 
final drafts of standards to be submitted to the Standards Committee of 
the Council for Labor and Defense for approval and publication as All-
Union compulsory or recommended standards. 
The Standards Committee consisted of representatives of various 
People's Commissariats, including War and Navy, of delegates of allied 
autonomous republics, of central unions of cooperative producers and 
consumers societies, and of the Union of E ngineering Societies. All 
members were e lected or delegated by their respective organizations, but 
the governing board- -the "Presidium, 11 vice chairman, secretary, and 
four members --were appointed by the Council for Labor and Defense. 
In I 940, the Standards Committe e of the Council for L abor and 
Defense became the All-Union Standa rds Committee of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the Soviet Union. When, in 1946, the Com-
missars became "Minis.ters, " the All - Union Standards Committee became 










Preparatory work on all drafts of All - Union Government Stand-
' 
ard · d s is one by the technical bureaus of the various ministries and 
government departments. These bureaus arrange with various 
scientific research laboratories, institutions, and organizations to 
make the studies and carry on the research required in the prepa ration 
of a draft standard. Certain ministries have their own central engineer-
ing bureaus carrying on standardization work. 
All work in connection with the drafts of All - Union Government 
Standards is done in accordance with a single basic plan which is approved 
each year by the government. 
Each pre pared draft goes through the following steps: The first 
draft is discussed at the meeting of the scientific a nd technic a l council 
of that institution or factory which has originated the draft. After 
approval by this technical council, the draft is circulated among the 
interested organizations either producing or using the product cove r e d 
by the draft. The first draft is also circulated among individua l spe cia l -
ists in the field related to the subject of the draft. After a ll answe r s a r e 
received, the draft is revised by the technical committee for considera -
tion by the respective ministry. Subsequently, the Mini s t e r p re sent s t he 
final draft to the All - Union Standards Committee fo r approval. 
The draft received by the All - Union Standards Committee is again 
studied and examined to check on the thoroughness of the study a nd on a ll 
th 1 d W
hen neces s a ry, the Sta ncl -
e technical and economic factors invo ve • 
ards Committee sets up spe cial c ommissions of expert s i n resp e c t ive 
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branches of the national economy of the Soviet Union. The final revised 
draft of the proposed standard is then submitted for consideration of the 
niernbers of the Standards Committee. 
The Standards Committee, after approving a standard, fixes the 
date when it is to become mandatory. In certain cases standards are 
approved only as recommended specifications and for a limited period 
of time; this is done when it is necessary to test the standard in practice 
and to collect factual material. 
AU .. Union Government Standards of exceptional importance are 
submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers, after being given a 
Preliminary exall)ination by the Standards Committee. 
The Standards Committee has a Coordinating Technical Organ 
to coordinate the standards work of the various industry committees 
and scientific research institutions. This organ also studies foreign 
standards from the viewpoint of their usefulness in connection with 
Soviet standards and is responsible for carrying on relations with the 
International Organization for Standardization as well as with other 
international standardizing bodies . 
The Standards Committee is empowered by the government to 
Conimission various ministries with the preparation of draft standards 
and with special studies in the field of standardization. It also has the 
right to d emand from ministries all necessary materials and information 
and to draft for experimental work various institutions and laboratories 






Only the All- Union Standards committee has the right to publish 
All .. Union Government Standards. The committee operates a special 
publishing office, "Standartgiz, 11 which also takes care of distribution 
of standards. 
Standardization in the Sovie t Union is carried on at a higher 
governmental level than in any other nation. This, in itself, attests 
to the importance given the subject. 
Standardization in the Soviet Union is a centrally controlled 
operation; nevertheless , it uses local experience and skill in the form -
ulation of the standards. In effect , although standardization in the 
Soviet Union is centralized in government it employs the "all-parties rr 
procedure used by the American Standards Association. 
Standardization in the Soviet Union is considered a necessary 
element of organization, production, economy, and education. Accord-
ingly, the Soviet Union places great emphasis on standardization, both 
as regards the numbers of standards written and their enforcement. 
Many standards in the Soviet Union are mandatory and have the weight 
of law. Failure to abide by Soviet Standards is punishable and mandatory 
standards generally carry the warning that: 
Noncompliance with compulsory standards is punishable by im,~ 
prisonment up to two years (Decree of the Central Exe c utive Com -
mittee of USSR dated November 23, 1929, Article 128 ... b of the 
Criminal Code of RSFSR) . 
Standardization in the Soviet Union is well - financed and, 
although starting much later than in most of the other technically-
advanced nations, is rapidly outdistancing standardization activities 
in the rest of the world. 
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